Do Smarter People Employ Better Decision Strategies? The Influence of Intelligence on Adaptive Use of the Recognition Heuristic

Within the adaptive toolbox approach, it has repeatedly been shown that, on average, people tend to adapt their decision strategies to the decision context. Building upon these results, we investigated whether individuals systematically differ in their ability to successfully adapt to the situation when applying the fast‐and‐frugal recognition heuristic (RH). In decisions between recognized and unrecognized choice objects, individuals can base their choices solely on recognition, as predicted by the RH, or they can use further knowledge retrieved from memory. Since intelligence has been conceived as the ability to successfully adapt to different situations, we expected intelligence to influence the degree of adaptive use of the RH. To test this hypothesis, we first re‐analyzed data that referred to a decision domain for which RH‐use is known to perform well. As expected, individual RH‐use increased with general intelligence. Next, we designed an experiment addressing individual RH‐use in two new decision domains, one domain for which RH‐use was less effective than knowledge‐use and another domain for which both strategies were about equally effective. In addition, we tested whether fluid or crystallized intelligence best predicts adaptive use of the RH. RH‐use was found to decrease with fluid but not crystallized intelligence when RH‐use was less effective than use of further knowledge. In contrast, there was no significant association between either type of intelligence and RH‐use when none of the two strategies was optimal. We conclude that adaptive use versus non‐use of the RH is moderated by fluid intelligence. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is told when the story is retold? Consistency of victimization reports in psychiatric patients

The use of retrospective self‐reports is a major methodological concern when ascertaining the occurrence of victimization experiences, with additional concerns when assessing psychiatric patients. The test for consistency can overcome some of these concerns, increasing the confidence in the information reported. Our aim was twofold: (1) to know the consistency of victimization reports; and (2) to test the role of changes on emotional distress in predicting report discrepancies, in a sample of 34 adult psychiatric patients. Participants were assessed twice, with a year interval. Sexual abuse was the experience that presented the higher level of consistency for childhood victimization, while assault with a weapon had the higher consistency level for adolescent and adult victimization. We found that increases on emotional distress predicted report discrepancies, and more specifically, increases in the report of victimization. Our results displayed acceptable consistency levels, suggesting some stability in the reporting of victimization over time. Considering that inconsistencies tended either to increases and decreases in the reporting of victimization, it would be important to consider the impact of such experiences when intervening with psychiatric patients.     

Mimicking emotions: how 3–12-month-old infants use the facial expressions and eyes of a model

While there is an extensive literature on the tendency to mimic emotional expressions in adults, it is unclear how this skill emerges and develops over time. Specifically, it is unclear whether infants mimic discrete emotion-related facial actions, whether their facial displays are moderated by contextual cues and whether infants’ emotional mimicry is constrained by developmental changes in the ability to discriminate emotions. We therefore investigate these questions using Baby-FACS to code infants’ facial displays and eye-movement tracking to examine infants’ looking times at facial expressions. Three-, 7-, and 12-month-old participants were exposed to dynamic facial expressions (joy, anger, fear, disgust, sadness) of a virtual model which either looked at the infant or had an averted gaze. Infants did not match emotion-specific facial actions shown by the model, but they produced valence-congruent facial responses to the distinct expressions. Furthermore, only the 7- and 12-month-olds displayed negative responses to the model’s negative expressions and they looked more at areas of the face recruiting facial actions involved in specific expressions. Our results suggest that valence-congruent expressions emerge in infancy during a period where the decoding of facial expressions becomes increasingly sensitive to the social signal value of emotions.