The illusion of replacement in research into the development of thinking biases: the case of the conjunction fallacy

The conjunction fallacy is a violation of a very basic rule of probability. Interestingly, although committing the fallacy seems irrational, adults are no less susceptible to the fallacy than young children. In Experiment 1, by employing tasks where the conjunctive response option involved two non-representative items, we found a large reduction in fallacy rates as compared to traditional conjunction fallacy problems. Nevertheless, fallacy rates remained relatively high in both adolescents and adults, although adults showed more consistency in their normative responses. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that children’s relatively good performance on the task was not the consequence of their missing knowledge of social stereotypes. Additionally, children were more strongly affected by explicitly presented frequency information than adults. Indeed, adults only took frequency information into account when frequencies were made relevant by a training in probabilistic reasoning. Overall, the results suggest that whereas the potential for normative reasoning increases with development, this potential is often overshadowed by a pervasive tendency in adolescence and adulthood to rely on contextual information, knowledge, and beliefs, even when conflicting information is available. By contrast, children are more strongly influenced by explicitly presented information than relevant knowledge cued by the tasks.     

The lack of dominance and choice deferral: Choosing to defer to cope with the feeling of being out of control

The present study aimed to explore whether emotional dominance can also account for choice deferral. This research manipulated emotional dominance through the difference in attractiveness among current alternatives in Experiment 1 and the readability of fonts for describing current options in Experiment 2, to investigate the role of dominance in choice deferral. The results revealed that increasingly submissive decision environments were related to more choice of deferral options. Mediation analyses indicated that dominance could mediate the effects of experimental manipulations on choice deferral, and that the actual choice of a deferral option was associated with more increase in dominance of retrospective emotion. The results indicate that dominance plays an important role in choice deferral and that choosing to defer can minimize the explicit confrontation of being out of control.     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

The caregiving relationship under stress: foster carers’ experience of loss of the sense of self

This paper is an account of a piece of research which involved interviewing six foster carers who had ended a placement with a child under the age of five with an early experience of abuse and neglect. The paper describes one of the themes that emerged from the data analysis, the loss of the sense of self in the foster carers, and argues that the experience of attempting to provide care for these children led to internal shifts in the carers that reverberated throughout the network around the child. The paper suggests that knowing about the external reasons for placement breakdown is not enough without taking into account the impact on the internal world of the foster carers and the emotional impact of attempting to provide care for a child who has experienced abuse and neglect.     

Differences in alexithymia and emotional awareness in exhaustion syndrome and chronic fatigue syndrome

Symptoms of Exhaustion Syndrome (ES) and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) are overlapping and create difficulties of differential diagnosis. Empirical studies comparing ES and CFS are scarce. This study aims to investigate if there are any emotional differences between ES and CFS. This cross‐sectional study compared self‐reported alexithymia and observer‐rated emotional awareness in patients with ES (n = 31), CFS (n = 38) and healthy controls (HC) (n = 30). Self‐reported alexithymia was measured with the Toronto Alexithymia Scale‐20 (TAS‐20) and emotional awareness with an observer‐rated performance test, the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS). Additionally, depression and anxiety were scored by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Results show that patients with ES expressed higher self‐reported alexithymia in the TAS‐20 compared to HC, but had similar emotional awareness capacity in the observer‐rated performance test, the LEAS. Patients with CFS expressed more difficulties in identifying emotions compared to HCs, and performed significantly worse in the LEAS‐total and spent more time completing the LEAS as compared to HC. Correlation and multiple regressions analyses revealed that depression and anxiety positively correlated with and explained part of the variances in alexithymia scores, while age and group explained the major part of the variance in LEAS. Findings of this study indicate that emotional status is different in patients with ES and CFS with respect to both self‐reported alexithymia and observer‐rated emotional awareness. Emotional parameters should be approached both in clinical investigation and psychotherapy for patients with ES and CFS.     

THE MAGIC OF PLAY: LOW‐INCOME MOTHERS’ AND FATHERS’ PLAYFULNESS AND CHILDREN'S EMOTION REGULATION AND VOCABULARY SKILLS

Using data from a diverse sample of low‐income families who participated in the Early Head Start Research Evaluation Project (n = 73), we explored the association between mothers’ and fathers’ playfulness with toddlers, toddler's affect during play, and children's language and emotion regulation at prekindergarten. There were two main findings. First, fathers’ playfulness in toddlerhood was associated with children's vocabulary skills in prekindergarten whereas mothers’ playfulness was related to children's emotion regulation. Cross‐parental effects were found only for mothers. The association between mothers’ playfulness and children's vocabulary and emotion regulation was strengthened when fathers engaged in more pretend play and when children were affectively positive during the play. These findings show that playfulness is an important source of variation in the vocabulary and emotion regulation of children growing up in low‐income families. They also point to domain‐specific ways that mothers and fathers promote children's regulatory and vocabulary skills, and highlight the importance of children's positive engagement in play.     

Alternatives to the fixed-set model: A review of appraisal models of emotion

Over several decades, appraisal theory has emerged as a prominent theoretical framework explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, and has stimulated a great deal of theorising and empirical research. Despite the large amount of research in this area, there are many aspects of appraisal theory and research that remain unclear or problematic. In this review, we identify a common assumption of many appraisal theories—the fixed appraisal set—and argue that this assumption, combined with a lack of explicit theorising about the predicted relationship between appraisals and emotions, leads to a lack of clarity in both appraisal models and the empirical testing of those models. We recommend that appraisal theorists move in a direction already taken by a small number of theorists, and adopt the starting assumption of a variable appraisal set. We further suggest that theories of concepts and categorisation may inform theorising about appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Revisiting the revisit: added evidence for a social chemosignal in human emotional tears

In a study by Gelstein et al., we found that human emotional tears act as a social chemosignal. In the first of three different experiments in that study we observed that sniffing women’s emotional tears reduced the sexual attractiveness attributed by men to pictures of women’s faces. In a study partly titled “Chemosignaling effects of human tears revisited”, Gra?anin et al. claim failed replication of this effect in a series of experiments, one they described as “exactly the same procedure” as Gelstein. Given that Gra?anin et al. refused our extended offer to jointly replicate the experiment at our expense, we can merely comment on their effort. We find that Gra?anin, who are not a chemosignaling laboratory, used methodology that falls short of standards typically applied in chemosignaling research. Thus, their experiments were profoundly different from Gelstein. Finally, we found that in reanalysing their raw data we could in fact replicate the effect from Gelstein. Thus, we conclude that the failed replication in Gra?anin is neither a replication nor failed.     

IS MY FEELING YOUR PAIN BAD FOR OTHERS? EMPATHY AS VIRTUE VERSUS EMPATHY AS FIXED TRAIT

The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly.