Person perception from changing emotional expressions: primacy,recency, or averaging effect?

ABSTRACT

Dynamic changes in emotional expressions are a valuable source of information in social interactions. As the expressive behaviour of a person changes, the inferences drawn from the behaviour may also change. Here, we test the possibility that dynamic changes in emotional expressions affect person perception in terms of stable trait attributions. Across three experiments, we examined perceivers’ inferences about others’ personality traits from changing emotional expressions. Expressions changed from one emotion (“start emotion”) to another emotion (“end emotion”), allowing us to disentangle potential primacy, recency, and averaging effects. Drawing on three influential models of person perception, we examined perceptions of dominance and affiliation (Experiment 1a), competence and warmth (Experiment 1b), and dominance and trustworthiness (Experiment 2). A strong recency effect was consistently found across all trait judgments, that is, the end emotion of dynamic expressions had a strong impact on trait ratings. Evidence for a primacy effect was also observed (i.e. the information of start emotions was integrated), but less pronounced, and only for trait ratings relating to affiliation, warmth, and trustworthiness. Taken together, these findings suggest that, when making trait judgements about others, observers weigh the most recently displayed emotion in dynamic expressions more heavily than the preceding emotion.     

The effects of action,normality, and decision carefulness on anticipated regret: Evidence for a broad mediating role of decision justifiability

Two distinct theoretical views explain the effects of action/inaction and social normality on anticipated regret. Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) emphasises the role of decision mutability, the ease with which one can imagine having made a different choice. Decision justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) highlights the role of decision justifiability, the perception that the choice was made on a defensible basis, supported by convincing arguments or using a thoughtful, comprehensive decision process. The present paper tests several contrasting predictions from the two theoretical approaches in a series of four studies. Study 1 replicated earlier findings showing greater anticipated regret when the chosen option was abnormal than when it was normal, and perceived justifiability mediated the effect. Study 2 showed that anticipated regret was higher for careless than for careful decisions. Study 3 replicated this finding for a sample holding a different social norm towards the focal decision. Finally, Study 4 found that, when decision carefulness, normality and action/inaction were all specified, only the former showed a significant effect on anticipated regret, and the effect was again mediated by perceived justifiability. Decision justification theory thus appears to provide a better account of anticipated regret intensity in this context than does norm theory.     

When emotion does and does not impair performance: A Garner theory of the emotional Stroop effect

It takes people longer to name the ink colour of emotion or threat words than that of neutral words, the emotional Stroop effect (ESE). In three experiments with normal and patient populations, we show that the ESE is a special case of a generic attention model and effect entailed in Garner's speeded classification paradigm. Guided by the Garner model we demonstrate that task-irrelevant dimensions that differ in salience can produce the ESE and mimic it with neutral stimuli. When each word appears in a constant colour, as mandated in the correlation condition of the Garner design, the ESE is eliminated. This important result is consistent with the attention account of the ESE. We conclude that when emotion stimuli appear in a random fashion they interfere with task performance. However, when emotion stimuli are correlated with features of the ongoing task they help task performance not least due to their extreme salience.     

Cognitive Behavioral Principles Within Group Mentoring: A Randomized Pilot Study

This study evaluated the effectiveness of a group mentoring program that included components of empirically supported mentoring and cognitive behavioral techniques for children served at a community mental health center. Eighty-six 8- to 12-year-old children were randomly assigned to either group mentoring or a wait-list control group. Group mentoring significantly increased children's reported social problem-solving skills and decreased parent-reported child externalizing and internalizing behavior problems after controlling for other concurrent mental health services. Attrition from the group mentoring program was notably low (7%) for children. The integration of a cognitive behavioral group mentoring program into children's existing community mental health services may result in additional reductions in externalizing and internalizing behavior problems.     

The Work Process as Spatial Situation: A Sketch

Interacting with the work of art entails a spatial situation, which is double. On a mental plane it is encapsulated reverie, on a physical plane it is production and consumption. These two are woven together as an orthogonal text or texture. The space of the work of art thus contains both the process of its making and its viewing. Seen as a dimensional space it is non linear. It is characterized by oscillations, discepancies, misalignements, multiplicity and recurrence. There is a correspondance between the studio and the exhibition area, as well as a dialogue between privileged and unprivileged spaces. The situation has something in common with oneiric space, where weightlessness and gravity oscillate.     

Are Actual and Perceived Intellectual Self‐enhancers Evaluated Differently by Social Perceivers?

Do actual and perceived self‐enhancement entail differing social impressions (i.e. interpersonal evaluations)? Actual self‐enhancement represents unduly positive self‐views, as gauged by an objective criterion (in this case, IQ scores), whereas perceived self‐enhancement involves the extent to which an individual is seen by informants (i.e. peers or observers) as self‐enhancing. In an online survey (N = 337), a laboratory experiment (N = 75), and a round‐robin study (N = 183), we tested the effects of actual and perceived intellectual self‐enhancement on (informant‐rated) emotional stability, social attractiveness, and social influence. Actual self‐enhancers were rated as emotionally stable, socially attractive, and socially influential. High perceived self‐enhancers were judged as socially influential, whereas low‐to‐moderate perceived self‐enhancers were deemed emotionally stable and socially attractive. Privately entertained, illusory positive (even extreme) self‐beliefs confer social benefits, whereas being perceived as self‐enhancing buys social influence at the cost of being despised. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The Cognitive Processes Underlying Risky Choice

In this article, we tested two concepts of decision making: expected utility theory and heuristic choice. In Experiment 1, we applied think‐aloud protocols to investigate violations of expected utility theory. In Experiments 2 to 4, we introduced a new process‐tracing method—called predict‐aloud protocols—that has advantages over previously suggested research methods. Results show the following: (i) people examine information between rather than within gambles; (ii) the priority heuristic emerges as the most frequently used strategy when problems are difficult; and (iii) people check for similarity when problems are easy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE SECOND SPHERE AND THE STORY OF NO STORY

The author discusses Roy Schafer's ideas of the second self and second reality, as well as his consistent theme of storyteller and story. The latter theme is also explored in the context of more recent psychoanalytic influences, such as Bionian thought, trauma theory, the French approach, and the interpersonal perspective. To illustrate the idea of the nonstory in today's clinical encounters, the author presents two clinical vignettes.