Face recognition as a predictor of social cognitive ability: Effects of emotion and race on face processing

The human face conveys important social signals when people interact in social contexts. The current study investigated the relationship between face recognition and emotional intelligence, and how societal factors of emotion and race influence people's face recognition. Participants’ recognition accuracy, reaction time, sensitivity, and response bias were measured to examine their face‐processing ability. Fifty Caucasian undergraduates (38 females, 12 males; average age = 21.76 years) participated in a face recognition task in which they discriminated previously presented target faces from novel distractor faces. A positive correlation between participants’ emotional intelligence scores and their performance on the face recognition task was observed, suggesting that face recognition ability was associated with emotional or social intelligence. Additionally, Caucasian participants recognized happy faces better than angry or neutral faces. It was also observed that people recognized Asian faces better than Caucasian ones, which appears to be contradictory to the classic other‐race effect. The present study suggests that some societal factors could influence face processing, and face recognition ability could in turn predict social intelligence.     

Varieties of Anger: The Relation Between Emotion Terms and Components of Anger Expressions

Component theory (C. Smith & H. Scott, 1997) predicts that presence of component movements (action units) alters the decoded meaning of a basic emotional expression. We tested whether the meaning of the basic expression of anger varied when different components were present in the expression. Participants were asked to label variants of anger from Ekman and Friesen's Pictures of Facial Affect using 15 anger terms, and invariance of labeling was tested by manipulating the judgment task. Data were analyzed using consensus analysis, multidimensional scaling, and numerical scaling. Components did not result in consensus about fine distinctions in the meanings of the anger expressions. Varying the type of task strongly affected results. We believe this occurred because language elicits different categorization processes than evaluation of facial expressions nonverbally.     

A cognitive‐emotional account of the shape of the probability weighting function

Research has shown a tendency of decision makers to overweight small probabilities and to underweight moderate and large probabilities. In standard treatments this is graphically modeled by an inverse S‐shaped probability weighting function. We suggest that emotions play a significant role in the shaping of the probability weighting function. In particular, the weighting function is proposed to be some function of objective probability, expected elation, and expected disappointment. The overweighting of small probabilities results from the anticipated elation after having won, given that winning was very unlikely. The underweighting of large probabilities results from anticipated disappointment after having failed to win, given that winning was very likely. Hence, probability is assumed to influence utility. Three experiments investigate these hypotheses. Experiments 1 and 2 show that a convex function relates probability to surprise. Experiment 3 elicits choice data and further supports the proposed hypotheses. The model adds to the understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes underlying the shape of the probability weighting function. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Acting with Feeling from Duty

A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action's manner, how an action is done, and its motive, the agent's reason for acting. Through a range of examples I demonstrate how an emotion can determine an action's manner without also serving as the motive. Thus, it is possible for an agent to act compassionately from duty alone. This distinction between the manner and the motive of an action not only restores a central claim in Kantian ethics but it also allows for an expanded role of emotions in moral action.     

Emotion Regulation Across the Life Span: An Integrative Perspective Emphasizing Self-Regulation,Positive Affect,and Dyadic Processes

In this commentary, we build upon the papers featured in this 2-part special issue to advance an integrative perspective on emotion regulation that emphasizes the developmentally specific goal-contexts of emotional phenomena. We highlight the importance of (1) multilevel longitudinal investigations of interactions among biological, affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes with respect to emotion regulation; (2) the integration of emotion-regulation processes with self-regulatory processes across the life course; (3) the dynamic relationship between positive and negative affect and their respective influence on regulatory processes; and (4) greater consideration of the dyadic context of emotion-regulation processes. From this perspective, the optimal developmental outcome with respect to emotion regulation is not affective homeostasis, but rather a dynamic flexibility in emotional experience, the ability to pursue and prioritize different goals, and the capacity to selectively and proactively mobilize emotions and cognitions in the service of context-specific and developmentally specific goals.     

Integrating Diverse Developmental Perspectives on Emotion Regulation

Emotion regulation has been studied in diverse ways within different subdisciplines of psychology—most notably social development, personality and individual differences, social psychophysiology, interpersonal relationships, and stress and coping. The goal of this Special Issue is to demonstrate the value of integrating these diverse approaches for building multilevel, lifespan models of emotion regulation. We review each of the contributions to this special issue, highlighting recurring themes and previewing our own perspective on directions for future theory and research.     

Impulsive responses to positive mood and reward are related to mania risk

Bipolar disorder is characterised by impulsivity, and recent research suggests it is important to consider more specific forms of impulsivity. In two student samples, we examined associations of self-reported impulsivity with mania risk (Hypomanic Personality Scale, HPS). We hypothesised that mania risk would relate to impulsivity in the context of opportunities for rewarding activities (Delaying Gratification Inventory, DGI), reward pursuit (Fun-Seeking subscale of the Behavioural Activation Scale, BAS), and when experiencing positive affect (Positive Urgency Measure, PUM). In Study 1 (N=823), the HPS was uniquely related to Fun-Seeking and PUM scores. Study 2 (N=482) replicated the correlation of HPS scores with PUM while documenting positive associations between PUM and trait-like responses to positive affect. Findings across both studies stress the importance of considering the role of positive emotion in driving the impulsivity among persons at risk for mania. These findings have implications for refining our understanding of the aetiology of bipolar disorder and for treatment development.     

个人目标相关性对非临床抑郁者未来想象的影响

通过两个实验考查了非临床抑郁者未来想象的异常是否受到个人目标相关性的调节。实验1采用未来想象任务, 实验2采用可能性评估范式, 两个实验一致发现, 抑郁倾向者想象未来积极事件的异常, 受到了与个人目标相关性的调节：相对于非抑郁倾向者, 抑郁倾向者对未来与个人目标相关的积极事件的预期减弱, 而对未来与个人目标无关的积极事件的预期则没有表现出异常; 同时还发现, 抑郁倾向者表现出了对未来消极预期的普遍增强, 不受与个人目标相关性的影响。     

Deficits in prospective memory following damage to the medial subdivision of the mediodorsal thalamic nucleus

Identifying the neurocognitive mechanisms that lead individuals remembering to execute an intention at the right moment (prospective memory, PM) and how such mechanisms are influenced by the features of that intention is a fundamental theoretical challenge. In particular, the functional contribution of subcortical regions to PM is still unknown. This study was aimed at investigating the role of the medial subdivision of the mediodorsal thalamic nucleus (mMDT) in PM, with particular focus on the processes that are mediated by the projections from/to this structure. We analysed the performance of a patient (OG) with a right-sided lesion involving the mMDT in a series of PM tasks that varied for focality (i.e., overlapping of processes for the PM and ongoing tasks) and emotional valence of the stimuli, comparing the patient's performance with that of a control group. We found that the mMDT damage led to deficits in PM that were modulated by focality and emotional valence. OG indeed showed: a greater cost in the ongoing performance when a non-focal PM task was added; a slowing down in retrieving the intentions, in particular when these were associated with focal PM cues; an abnormal performance in the task with positive PM cues. Our findings provide evidence of a contribution of mMDT to PM and suggest a modulation of prefrontal-dependent strategic monitoring and a possible interaction with the limbic structures in the integration of emotion and PM processes. They also give support to the still controversial idea that connections with the perirhinal cortex mediate familiarity-based recognition.