Positive emotion is associated with 6-year change in functional status in individuals aged 60 and older

Analyses examined both positive emotion (PE) at baseline and change in PE from baseline to follow up as predictors of change in functional status (FS). Initial models examined baseline PE, and change in PE, as predictors of change in FS adjusted for baseline PE, negative emotion (NE), FS, and age and gender. Final models included additional adjustments for frequency of social contact, marital status, body mass index, smoking status, drinking behavior, and comorbidity at baseline. Baseline PE was a predictor of change in FS, adjusted for NE, age, and gender (p?=?0.033). Additional covariates reduced the effect of baseline PE as a predictor of change in FS (p?=?0.115). Change in PE was a significant predictor of change in FS – increases in ratings of PE over time were associated with less decline in FS (p?=?0.001). The association for change in PE remained significant in the fully adjusted model (p?=?0.004). Results replicate our prior findings.     

An examination of patience and well-being

Patience is the propensity to wait calmly in the face of frustration or adversity. The new 3-Factor Patience Scale (Study 1) measures three types of patience (interpersonal, life hardship, and daily hassles patience), which differentially relate to well-being and personality. In Study 2, goal pursuit and achievement mediated the relation between patience and well-being. Participants rated 10 personal goals on 15 dimensions of goal pursuit (e.g. patience enacted, difficulty, achievement satisfaction, effort). Patience facilitated goal pursuit and satisfaction especially in the face of obstacles. In Study 3, participants took part in a training program designed to increase trait patience. The program led to increased patience, decreased depression, and increased positive affect relative to a control condition, suggesting that patience may be modifiable.     

On the structure of global development goals

The design of global development goals has been beset by deep flaws, inconsistencies, and manifest unfairness to some developing countries. Momentum has now peaked for the creation of Sustainable Development Goals to replace the Millennium Development Goals. This comment addresses three challenges that arise in setting development goals, and recommends feasible development goals that can meaningfully guide development cooperation, and focus the attention of policy makers on the worst-off.     

Working memory demands of exact and approximate addition

We compared the working memory requirements of two forms of mental addition: exact calculation (e.g., 63 + 49 = 112) and approximation (e.g., 63 + 49 is about 110). In two experiments, participants solved two-digit addition problems (e.g., 63 + 49) alone and in combination with a working memory task (i.e., remembering four consonants). In Experiment 1, participants chose an answer from two alternatives (e.g., exact: 112 vs. 122; approximate: 110 vs. 140). In Experiment 2, participants responded verbally with exact or approximate answers. In both experiments, the working memory load impaired exact and approximate addition performance, but exact addition was affected more. Load also impaired performance on problems with a carry operation in the units (e.g., 28 + 59 or 76 + 57) more than on problems without a unit carry (e.g., 24 + 53 or 76 + 52). These results identify the carry operation as the source of the working memory demands in multidigit addition.     

Varieties of Anger: The Relation Between Emotion Terms and Components of Anger Expressions

Component theory (C. Smith & H. Scott, 1997) predicts that presence of component movements (action units) alters the decoded meaning of a basic emotional expression. We tested whether the meaning of the basic expression of anger varied when different components were present in the expression. Participants were asked to label variants of anger from Ekman and Friesen's Pictures of Facial Affect using 15 anger terms, and invariance of labeling was tested by manipulating the judgment task. Data were analyzed using consensus analysis, multidimensional scaling, and numerical scaling. Components did not result in consensus about fine distinctions in the meanings of the anger expressions. Varying the type of task strongly affected results. We believe this occurred because language elicits different categorization processes than evaluation of facial expressions nonverbally.     

Challenge versus threat effects on the goal–performance relationship

This study tested the situational effects of goals and stress on the performance of complex tasks and on adaptation to change in the task. Difficult goals often exceed the individual's resources and thus create stress. However, stress may be appraised as either challenge or threat. Challenge is experienced when there is an opportunity for self-growth with available coping strategies, whereas threat is experienced when the situation is perceived as leading to failure with no available strategies to cope with it. We hypothesized that participants who appraised the situation as a challenge would perform better and adapt better to changes under difficult goal conditions, as compared with general goals or strategy goals. By contrast, threat appraisals would be better addressed by strategy goals rather than difficult goals. One hundred and fifty five students performed a task, which required their making predictions concerning the value of 120 companies' stocks based on three manipulated cues. We used a three by three by two factorial design in which goals, stress, and change (as a repeated factor) were varied to test the hypotheses. Results supported the main hypotheses and demonstrated that the same level of goal difficulty may lead to high or low performance and adaptation to change depending on the appraisal of the situation as challenging or threatening. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are further discussed.     

A cognitive‐emotional account of the shape of the probability weighting function

Research has shown a tendency of decision makers to overweight small probabilities and to underweight moderate and large probabilities. In standard treatments this is graphically modeled by an inverse S‐shaped probability weighting function. We suggest that emotions play a significant role in the shaping of the probability weighting function. In particular, the weighting function is proposed to be some function of objective probability, expected elation, and expected disappointment. The overweighting of small probabilities results from the anticipated elation after having won, given that winning was very unlikely. The underweighting of large probabilities results from anticipated disappointment after having failed to win, given that winning was very likely. Hence, probability is assumed to influence utility. Three experiments investigate these hypotheses. Experiments 1 and 2 show that a convex function relates probability to surprise. Experiment 3 elicits choice data and further supports the proposed hypotheses. The model adds to the understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes underlying the shape of the probability weighting function. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Acting with Feeling from Duty

A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action's manner, how an action is done, and its motive, the agent's reason for acting. Through a range of examples I demonstrate how an emotion can determine an action's manner without also serving as the motive. Thus, it is possible for an agent to act compassionately from duty alone. This distinction between the manner and the motive of an action not only restores a central claim in Kantian ethics but it also allows for an expanded role of emotions in moral action.     

Emotion Regulation Across the Life Span: An Integrative Perspective Emphasizing Self-Regulation,Positive Affect,and Dyadic Processes

In this commentary, we build upon the papers featured in this 2-part special issue to advance an integrative perspective on emotion regulation that emphasizes the developmentally specific goal-contexts of emotional phenomena. We highlight the importance of (1) multilevel longitudinal investigations of interactions among biological, affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes with respect to emotion regulation; (2) the integration of emotion-regulation processes with self-regulatory processes across the life course; (3) the dynamic relationship between positive and negative affect and their respective influence on regulatory processes; and (4) greater consideration of the dyadic context of emotion-regulation processes. From this perspective, the optimal developmental outcome with respect to emotion regulation is not affective homeostasis, but rather a dynamic flexibility in emotional experience, the ability to pursue and prioritize different goals, and the capacity to selectively and proactively mobilize emotions and cognitions in the service of context-specific and developmentally specific goals.