EXPERIENTIAL NARRATIVES OF RAPE AND TORTURE

Many Guatemalan women suffered extreme sexual violence during the latter half of the twentieth century. Learning of this violence can evoke hatred in persons who love and respect women—hatred for the men who perpetrated the violence and also for other men around the world who victimize women in this way. Hatred is a common response to a perceived evil, and it might in some cases be a fitting response, but it is important to subject one's emotions to critical moral reflection. A key task of ethics is to encourage persons to cultivate good habits of being moved. This essay analyzes the way in which two different texts manage, through the skillful presentation of experiential narratives, to help readers acknowledge the hatred they might feel, but also to think twice about the hatred to which they consent.     

AGNOSTIC MEDITATIONS ON BUDDHIST MEDITATION

I first attempt a taxonomy of meditation in traditional Indian Buddhism. Based on the main psychological or somatic function at which the meditative effort is directed, the following classes can be distinguished: (1) emotion‐centered meditation (coinciding with the traditional samatha approach); (2) consciousness‐centered meditation (with two subclasses: consciousness reduction/elimination and ideation obliteration); (3) reflection‐centered meditation (with two subtypes: morality‐directed reflection and reality‐directed observation, the latter corresponding to the vipassanā method); (4) visualization‐centered meditation; and (5) physiology‐centered meditation. In the second part of the essay I tackle the problem of the epistemic validity and happiness‐engendering value of Buddhist meditation. In my highly conjectural view, the claim that meditation represents an infallible tool for realizing the (Supreme) Truth as well as a universally valid method for attaining the highest forms of happiness is largely based on the crēdō effect, that is, a placebolike process. I do not deny that meditation may have some positive effects on mental and physical health or that its practice may bring changes to the mind. Meditation may be a valuable alternative approach in life and clinical treatment, but it is far from being a must or a panacea.     

PRL-3在宫颈鳞癌组织中的表达及临床意义

通过RT-PCR和Western blotting来检测45例宫颈鳞癌组织和20例正常宫颈组织中PRL-3的表达情况。RT-PCR和Western blotting结果均显示宫颈鳞癌组织中PRL-3的表达明显高于正常宫颈组织(P0.01),PRL-3的表达与宫颈鳞癌组织的分化程度及淋巴转移密切相关(P0.05),而与患者年龄、肿瘤直径无关(P0.05)。因此PRL-3可能参与了人类宫颈鳞癌的发生、发展,并与宫颈鳞癌的部分临床病理特征有关,将可能作为宫颈鳞癌靶向治疗的一个新的分子靶点。     

Electromyographic Analysis of Responses to Third Person Intergroup Threat

This study attempts to replicate and extend the findings from Davis and Stephan’s (2011) article investigating facial electromyographic (EMG) responses to individually directed or group-directed realistic threat. Using news footage from the Columbine school shootings as a third-person threatening stimulus, participants were instructed to view the clips while considering how they felt during the original events (individually primed) or how students felt during the original events (group-primed). EMG analysis of activity levels of the medial frontalis and the corrugator supercilii indicated differential activation based on the instructions. Individually primed participants experienced more fontalis activity and group-primed participants experienced more corrugator supercilii activity. These findings replicated the Davis and Stephan results and extended it to a third person-based intergroup threat.     

Face in profile view reduces perceived facial expression intensity: An eye-tracking study

Recent studies measuring the facial expressions of emotion have focused primarily on the perception of frontal face images. As we frequently encounter expressive faces from different viewing angles, having a mechanism which allows invariant expression perception would be advantageous to our social interactions. Although a couple of studies have indicated comparable expression categorization accuracy across viewpoints, it is unknown how perceived expression intensity and associated gaze behaviour change across viewing angles. Differences could arise because diagnostic cues from local facial features for decoding expressions could vary with viewpoints. Here we manipulated orientation of faces (frontal, mid-profile, and profile view) displaying six common facial expressions of emotion, and measured participants' expression categorization accuracy, perceived expression intensity and associated gaze patterns. In comparison with frontal faces, profile faces slightly reduced identification rates for disgust and sad expressions, but significantly decreased perceived intensity for all tested expressions. Although quantitatively viewpoint had expression-specific influence on the proportion of fixations directed at local facial features, the qualitative gaze distribution within facial features (e.g., the eyes tended to attract the highest proportion of fixations, followed by the nose and then the mouth region) was independent of viewpoint and expression type. Our results suggest that the viewpoint-invariant facial expression processing is categorical perception, which could be linked to a viewpoint-invariant holistic gaze strategy for extracting expressive facial cues.     

Colour fluctuations in grapheme‐colour synaesthesia: The effect of clinical and non‐clinical mood changes

Synaesthesia is a condition that gives rise to unusual secondary sensations (e.g., colours are perceived when listening to music). These unusual sensations tend to be reported as being stable throughout adulthood (e.g., Simner & Logie, 2007, Neurocase, 13, 358) and the consistency of these experiences over time is taken as the behavioural hallmark of genuineness. Our study looked at the influence of mood states on synaesthetic colours. In Experiment 1, we recruited grapheme‐colour synaesthetes (who experience colours from letters/digits) and elicited their synaesthetic colours, as well as their mood and depression states, in two different testing sessions. In each session, participants completed the PANAS‐X (Watson & Clark, 1999) and the BDI‐II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996, Manual for Beck Depression Inventory‐II), and chose their synaesthetic colours for letters A‐Z from an interactive colour palette. We found that negative mood significantly decreased the luminance of synaesthetic colours. In Experiment 2, we showed that synaesthetic colours were also less luminant for synaesthetes with anxiety disorder, versus those without. Additional evidence suggests that colour saturation, too, may inversely correlate with depressive symptoms. These results show that fluctuations in mood within both a normal and clinical range influence synaesthetic colours over time. This has implications for our understanding about the longitudinal stability of synaesthetic experiences, and of how mood may interact with the visual (imagery) systems.     

Categorization and understanding of facial expressions in 4‐month‐old infants

This study examined whether 4‐month‐olds (N = 40) could perceptually categorize happy and angry faces, and show appropriate behavior in response to these faces. During the habituation phase, infants were shown the same type of facial expressions (happy or angry) posed by three models, and their behavior in response to those faces was observed. During the test phase immediately after the habituation phase, infants saw a novel emotional expression and a familiar expression posed by a new model, and their looking times were measured. The results indicated that, although 4‐month‐olds could perceptually categorize happy and angry faces accurately, they responded positively to both expression types. These findings suggest that, although infants can perceptually categorize facial expressions at 4 months of age, they require further time to learn the affective meanings of the facial expressions.     

Big Five personality traits contribute to prosocial responses to others’ pain

ObjectivesTwo studies examined whether observers’ personality traits contribute to prosocial responses to others’ facial expression of pain. Experiment 1 examined the personality traits that could account for observers’ variability in estimating others’ pain intensity. Experiment 2 questioned to what extent the contribution of personality traits on inclination to help people in pain depend on observers’ beliefs about pain’ characteristics.Method59 (experiment 1) and 76 (experiment 2) participants observed to 3-D realistic synthetic face movements mobilizing action units of pain, in order to estimate others’ pain. In experiment 2, painful localizations (e.g., chest, hand) were also manipulated. In each experiment, Big Five personality traits were assessed.ResultsExperiment 1 revealed that agreeableness and conscientiousness contributed to observers’ pain estimates across the increase of facial expression intensity. Experiment 2 showed that conscientiousness contributed to observers’ judgments whatever pain’ characteristics. Neuroticism was only salient for pain referring to life-threatening pain.ConclusionProsocial response to others’ pain depends on agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism. However, these links are modulated by the pain behavior elicited and observers’ belief about the characteristic of pain.     

Illusions of Learning: Irrelevant Emotions Inflate Judgments of Learning

People use assessments of how much they have learned to choose and recommend instructors, seminars, and weekend trips. How do people assess how much they have learned? Recent theorizing has depicted emotion as a cue for learning, and so people may be misled by recent emotional states to infer that they have learned more than they actually have. Four studies showed that people associated emotion with learning and believed, often falsely, that they learned more when in an emotional than unemotional state. Factual lessons were coupled with manipulations of arbitrary, irrelevant emotional states. Participants rated that they learned more after an emotion had been induced than in emotionally neutral control conditions. These differences remained significant after controlling for actual learning as measured by objective tests, which was unaffected by emotion. This illusion of learning caused by emotion was robust with respect to changes of procedure and sample, including whether the emotion came before or after the information to be learned. Alternative explanations were ruled out, including that emotion would intensify ratings generally, that emotion would make incoming information seem particularly personally relevant, that emotion increased engagement in the research, and that illusory learning would depend on retrospective exaggeration of one's prior ignorance. Because irrelevant emotions can increase people's judgments that they have learned something, incidental emotional experiences could increase a person's likelihood of deciding to take another class with a particular instructor, to sign up for another leadership seminar, or to engage in a risky (but emotion‐filled) excursion. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.