Exploring the Psychological Foundations of Ideological and Social Sorting

Americans are sorting ideologically: Liberals and conservatives are more likely to respectively identify as Democrats and Republicans. They are sorting socially as well: Partisans like and trust copartisans more than opposing partisans. Existing explanations for these phenomena rely on exogenous factors, such as elite polarization. But exogenous explanations cannot fully explain variation in sorting. We argue that psychological characteristics can help explain the tendency to sort ideologically or socially. Specifically, we investigate an individual’s responsiveness to internal values versus normative social pressures as a determinant of sorting. We test this theory with several nationally representative surveys, as well as one survey experiment, and find strong support that an individual’s own tendency to respond to social cues, as opposed to ideological values, has important consequences for this process. Our work allows for a better understanding of the psychological factors that promote partisan sorting and for interpreting variation in the degree to which citizens sort into partisan groups.     

CULTURE AND HISTORY: ESSENTIAL PARTNERS IN THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Abstract. In this essay I respond to John Caiazza's claim for the primacy of what he calls techno‐secularism for understanding twentieth‐century history. Using the examples of the Taiping Rebellion in nineteenth‐century China and Zionism in twentieth‐century Europe, I argue that the range of Caiazza's schema is confined solely to the Protestant West with little applicability to other national histories. I argue further for the lack of clarity and therefore the uselessness of the dichotomy of the secular and the religious for understanding human history. I claim instead that, while the category of technology and the institutions of religion are important determiners in human history, they need to be subsumed, without special status, within a broader set of interrelated factors called “culture.” I appeal for the academic study of science and religion to give primacy for the near future to the history of science and religion over both theology and science.     

Differentiating explanations of attitude-consistent behavior: the role of perspectives and mode of perspective taking

We examined whether participants could differentiate between explanations of attitude-consistent behavior related to EU membership given from two perspectives (EU supporter and EU opponent) by means of three perspective taking modes (the explainer's own perspective, imagined in-group members' perspective, and imagined out-group members' perspective). Participants were presented with explanations provided from different perspectives and perspective taking modes, and they were asked to judge the extent to which they agreed with each explanation, to guess the attitude of the provider of each explanation, and to rate the quality of each explanation in various respects. Participants could not differentiate between explanations given by in-group members and out-group members who imagined the same perspective. They responded more favorably to explanations given from own perspective than from the imagined perspectives. The results suggest that there exists a shared understanding about how both sides should explain attitude-consistent behavior, but this understanding is measurably different from the actual explanations.     

Secularization and the Wider Gap in Values and Personal Religiosity Between the Religious and Nonreligious

Increasing proportions of religious nonaffiliation characterize most Western societies, although the periods over which these increases have occurred and the speed in which they happen do vary. Consequently, some nations now have larger unaffiliated groups and others much smaller ones. What is less well known is if, in areas where unaffiliated groups are larger, the religious “nones” have become more distinct from the actively religious in their attitudes and behavior. In contexts of advanced secularization, to what extent is the gap greater between the actively religious and the nonreligious when it comes to their views on family life and reproduction, for example? In regards to their levels of religiosity and spirituality in their private lives? Are the unaffiliated more liberal in their attitudes and less religious in their private life? This article sheds light on these questions by analyzing data from over 200 North American, European, and Oceanic country subregions included in the 2008 International Social Survey Programme. With hierarchical linear models, I find that, in areas where the unaffiliated form a larger proportion of the population, the differences between the actively religious and the unaffiliated in family values and personal religiosity tend to be greater.     

Who Is to Blame? Official Discourse and Ethnic Diversity Attitudes During the 2011 Riots in England

In 2011, the killing of a Black man by a police officer triggered violent riots across England. In a context where ethnic minorities are rarely openly blamed, we examined the lens through which the events were interpreted in the official discourses of the British Prime Minister. A thematic content analysis (Study 1) revealed that, without explicitly blaming ethnic minorities, the discourses built on antagonistic normative references opposing a virtuous majority to threatening minorities. Then, based on online survey data of self‐declared Londoners (N = 223) during the riots, we analyzed (Study 2) how agreement with the discourses related to individuals’ ethnocentrism and their understanding of the causes underlying the events. Results of regression analyses showed how agreement with the discourses related to blaming ethnic diversity for the riots and to higher ethnocentrism, especially among individuals least likely to discriminate against minorities (i.e., low in social dominance orientation). Agreement with the discourses was also linked to reduced blame of authorities. To conclude, we discuss the mobilization potential of political discourses on ingroup virtue and outgroup threat.     

Religion and Science in America: Populism versus Elitism

Historian James Gilbert argues that the dialogue between science and religion is an important dynamic in the creation of contemporary American culture. He traces the dialogue not only in the confines of the academic world but also in popular culture. The science-religion dialogue reveals a basic tension between the material and the spiritual that helps define the core of the American psyche: fascination with material progress yet commitment to traditional religious beliefs. Gilbert's cultural narrative traces the dialogue in a unique way because of the attention given to popular renditions of science and religion in evangelical films used by the military, in televised science programs, in science-fiction literature, and at the Seattle World's Fair in 1962. Gilbert suggests that the discussion between science and religion is significant because it is part of the process of creating new cultural structures necessitated by social, scientific, and technological developments. The tensions between religiously informed commonsense science and professional science work to create new cultural forms in a democratic society. Religion and science in dialogue are part of the process of cultural creation. Dogmatism on the part of either scientists or religionists is countered by the democratic process itself.     

TECHNOLOGY,THEOLOGY, AND SPIRITUALITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Digitalization and the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) will bring about substantial changes in all aspects of life. This happens in a world marked by the poisonous synergy of five Ps, polarization, populism, protectionism, post‐truth, patriarchy, as well as an ambiguous interplay of secularization and new visibility of religion. If development of AI is to be beneficial for people and planet a number of challenges must be met. In this regard, religion‐and‐science dialogue needs improvement in making things not only intellectually but also spiritually fit. Ethics should be involved from the beginning rather than being called upon first when problems arise. Faith communities have a prophetical, diaconal, ethical, and theological role. Based on the characterization of life as a fourfold web of relationality, personal, social, political, as well as global issues are identified and discussed. These include mental health disorders, addiction, manipulation, and self‐exploitation. Reflections on leadership suggest resilience, coexistence, and hope as theological key components for navigating the uncharted realms of the digital age.     

Identity,ideology, and personality: Examining moderators of affective polarization in New Zealand

Affective polarization (i.e., differences in evaluations of the in-party and out-party) has important implications for political outcomes including civic engagement and partisan-motivated attitudes and behaviours. In this study, we add to the burgeoning literature on affective polarization by examining moderators of the effect of in-party support on out-party opposition across the three main political parties in New Zealand. Using a large national probability sample of adults (N = 19,078), we assessed the effects of social demographics, Big-Five personality traits, liberal-conservative ideology, political identity centrality, and weekly news exposure on the relationship between in-party and out-party support. Results show political identity centrality is the strongest and most consistent moderator. The effects of some other moderators (e.g., personality, news exposure) are party-specific.     

Interregional and intraregional variability of intergroup attitudes predict online hostility

To what extent are intergroup attitudes associated with regional differences in online aggression and hostility? We test whether regional attitude biases towards minorities and their local variability (i.e. intraregional polarization) independently predict verbal hostility on social media. We measure online hostility using large US American samples from Twitter and measure regional attitudes using nationwide survey data from Project Implicit. Average regional biases against Black people, White people, and gay people are associated with regional differences in social media hostility, and this effect is confounded with regional racial and ideological opposition. In addition, intraregional variability in interracial attitudes is also positively associated with online hostility. In other words, there is greater online hostility in regions where residents disagree in their interracial attitudes. This effect is present both for the full resident sample and when restricting the sample to White attitude holders. We find that this relationship is also, in part, confounded with regional proportions of ideological and racial groups (attitudes are more heterogeneous in regions with greater ideological and racial diversity). We discuss potential mechanisms underlying these relationships, as well as the dangers of escalating conflict and hostility when individuals with diverging intergroup attitudes interact. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

Perceived parental behaviours and motivational processes among adolescent athletes in intensive training centres: A profile approach

Parental behaviours influence athletes’ psychological functioning in different ways. To date, research has typically explored parental behaviours one by one, and few papers have simultaneously considered sets of parental behaviours. The objectives of this study were to: (a) identify parental behaviours using a person-centred approach and differentiating mother’s and father’s behaviours; (b) explore the changes of parental behaviour profiles across the season; and (c) examine the prospective impact of parental behaviour profiles at the beginning of the season on athlete scores of motivation, satisfaction, and frustration of basic psychological needs at the end of the season. A longitudinal two-wave measurement design (beginning and end of a season) was used in the study. A sample of 226 French athletes completed self-reported questionnaires: (a) at the beginning and end of the season to measure the behaviours of their parents; and (b) at the end of the season to assess their motivation, satisfaction, and frustration of basic psychological needs. Latent profile transition analysis revealed three parental behaviour profiles: (a) moderate parental involvement; (b) moderate to high parental involvement; and (c) moderate mother’s involvement and low father’s involvement. The profiles were based on associated patterns of four mother’s and father’s behaviours: (a) directive behaviours; (b) active involvement; (c) praise and understanding; and (d) pressure. The three parental behaviour profiles remained stable across the season (i.e., inter- and intra-individual stability). Athletes who reported the moderate parental involvement profile at the beginning of the season had lower scores of controlled motivation and frustration of autonomy as well as higher scores of satisfaction of competence and relatedness at the end of the season than their counterparts from the two other profiles. This study contributes to enriching the complex picture of parental involvement in the sport to help sport organisations identify parents at risk of impeding their child’s development.