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121.
Jianping Xu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(2):229-253
Chinese people attach importance to intuition and imagery in ways of thinking that are quite sensible, but the result, i.e.
the thoughts that are popularized in virtue of political power, are rather rational. These rational thoughts, which were influenced
by Buddhism and continually became introspective, had been growing more irrational factors. Up to the middle and late Ming
Dynasty, when the economy was developed, they merged with the growing emphasis on daily needs of food and clothes and the
envisagement to the utilitarian circumstances, and finally broke through the threshold of rationalism. Under the attack of
Geng Dingxiang, Li Zhi who emphasized these thoughts was forced beyond his previous boundaries and led a whole variation in
how he viewed a series of issues including values, humanity, ethics and aesthetics. This indicated a historical change from
rationalism to irrationalism in Chinese humanism and aesthetics thoughts.
Translated by Huang Deyuan from Xueshu Yuekan 学术月刊 (Academic Monthly), 2006, (11): 103–112 相似文献
122.
Simon Fokt 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(4):404-429
Most modern definitions of art fail to successfully address the issue of the ever‐changing nature of art, and rarely even attempt to provide an account that would be valid in more than just the modern Western context. This article develops a new theory that preserves the advantages of its predecessors, solves or avoids their problems, and has a scope wide enough to account for art of different times and cultures. It argues that an object is art in a given context iff some person(s) culturally competent in this context have afforded it the status of a candidate for appreciation for reasons considered good in this context. This weakly institutional view is supplemented by auxiliary definitions explaining the notions of cultural contexts, competence, and good reasons for affording the status. The relativisation to contexts brings increased explanatory power and scope, and the ability to account for the diversity of art. 相似文献
123.
《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2017,(2):237-248
Against the background of a short meditation on the contrasting ways in which landscape has been represented and idealized in Eastern and Western painting traditions,the article will try to show,using some striking examples,that the development of landscape painting in the last two centuries reflects the changing relationship of humanity and nature,leading in both the East and in the West to either the expression of a nostalgic longing for nature to be back as it once was,or to a gloomy expression of the vanishing of nature amidst the modern,technological world.Connecting to both the concept of "harmony," which is a key concept in Eastern aesthetics,and to some recent reflections in Western philosophy on the relationship of nature and technology,a post-nostalgic conception of nature and natural beauty is defended,in which nature and technology are no longer seen as opposing categories,but rather as poles that are intertwined in an ever-lasting process of co-evolution.It is argued that we should not so much strive to go "back to nature," but rather to go "forward to nature" and establish a new harmony between human and non-human nature and technology.The article ends with some reflections on the role artists and aestheticians may play in this transformation. 相似文献
124.
Pullman D 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2002,23(1):75-94
Inasmuch as unmitigated pain and suffering areoften thought to rob human beings of theirdignity, physicians and other care providersincur a special duty to relieve pain andsuffering when they encounter it. When pain andsuffering cannot be controlled it is sometimesthought that human dignity is compromised.Death, it is sometimes argued, would bepreferred to a life without dignity.Reasoning such as this trades on certainpreconceptions of the nature of pain andsuffering, and of their relationships todignity. The purpose of this paper is to laybare these preconceptions. The duties torelieve pain and suffering are clearly mattersof moral obligation, as is the duty to respondappropriately to the dignity of other persons.However, it is argued that our understanding ofthe phenomena of pain and suffering and theirrelationships to human dignity will be expandedwhen we explore the aesthetic dimensions ofthese various concepts. On the view presentedhere the life worth living is both morally goodand aesthetically beautiful. Appropriate``suffering with' another can help to maintainand restore the dignity of the relationshipsinvolved, even as it preserves and enhances thedignity of patient and caregiver alike. 相似文献
125.
Lev Kreft 《Sport, Ethics and Philosophy》2014,8(2):137-146
The aim of this paper is to defend the position that aesthetics and ethics in sport are not two separate domains or aspects. In sport, the aesthetic and the ethical both arise from sport’s (aesthetic) attractiveness or from the pleasure sport offers to its activists and consumers. To think about sport philosophically, we should find a link and a principle beyond this division as a source of both the aesthetic and the ethical in sport. The philosophy and philosophical sociology of Jean-Marie Guyau is presented as a response to this problem. Two points of fundamental importance are considered critically here: his criticism of any reductionism, and life or the idea of life as key principle of a philosophical system which puts ethics and aesthetics together. 相似文献
126.
Jon Robson 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(4):657-668
It is commonplace amongst philosophers of art to make claims that postulate important links between aesthetics and perception. In this paper, I focus on one such claim—that perception is the canonical route to aesthetic judgment. I consider a range of prima facie plausible interpretations of this claim, and argue that each fails to identify any important link between aesthetic judgment and perception. Given this, I conclude that we have good reason to be sceptical of the claim that perception is in any way privileged as a source of aesthetic judgment. 相似文献
127.
Panos Paris 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(4):642-656
Although formative of modern value theory, the moral beauty view—which states that moral virtue is beautiful and moral vice is ugly—is now mostly neglected by (analytic) philosophers. The two contemporary defences of the view mostly capitalize on its intuitive attractiveness, but to little avail: such considerations hardly convince sceptics of what is nowadays a rather unpopular view. Historically, the view was supported by thought experiments; and although these greatly increase its plausibility, they also raise empirical questions, which they leave unanswered. Here, I offer a novel defence of the moral beauty view, capitalizing on empirical evidence and arguing via an inference to the best explanation. 相似文献
128.
129.
Michael Frishkopf 《Zygon》2019,54(4):857-879
This essay explores the universal nature of aesthetic, creative, and mystical experience, tracing some essential interrelations among the three. Enlarging upon the work of anthropologist Jacques Maquet, I speculate that “sensory fixedness” is both necessary and sufficient to achieve aesthetic experience, and that the unification of mind engendered by sensory fixedness is the essential source of aesthetic power. Therefore, the role of the aesthetic object (construed broadly) is either as an arbitrary sensory focusing mechanism, or as the physical embodiment of a gestalt facilitating fixedness; the first category is merely attractive, while the second contains all that is truly great in art (visual and auditory). I suggest further that as both creative inspiration and mystical experience result from fixedness, both are related to aesthetic experience. However, while aesthetic experience is rooted in sensation, mystical and creative experience, though often prepared by sensory fixedness, may transcend the sensory domain altogether toward more abstract forms of mental fixedness. 相似文献
130.
Christopher Thomas 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2020,28(2):145-167
ABSTRACT For Simone Weil the invocation of ‘rights’ to address extreme human suffering–what she calls ‘affliction’–is ‘ludicrously inadequate’. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the ‘cry’ of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil’s concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil’s ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention. 相似文献