Citizens in appropriate numbers: evaluating five claims about justice and population size

Abstract

While different worries about population size are present in public debates, political philosophers often take population size as given. This paper is an attempt to formulate a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian approach to population size: does it make sense to speak of ‘too few’ or ‘too many’ people from the point of view of justice? It argues that, drawing on key features of liberal egalitarian theory, several clear constraints on demographic developments – to the extent that they are under our control – can be formulated. Based on these claims, we can clarify both the grounds and content of our obligations to future generations.     

The threat of intergenerational extortion: on the temptation to become the climate mafia,masquerading as an intergenerational Robin Hood

Abstract

This paper argues that extortion is a clear threat in intergenerational relations, and that the threat is manifest in some existing proposals in climate policy and latent in some background tendencies in mainstream moral and political philosophy. The paper also claims that although some central aspects of the concern about extortion might be pursued in terms of the entitlements of future generations, this approach is likely to be incomplete. In particular, intergenerational extortion raises issues about the appropriate limits to the sway of central values such as welfare and distributive justice. We should be wary of ways in which such values invite us to buy off, or perhaps to join, an intergenerational climate Mafia.     

Nietzsche’s cultural elitism

Elitist readers, such as John Rawls, see Nietzsche as concerned only with the flourishing of a few great contributors to culture; egalitarian readers, such as Stanley Cavell, see Nietzschean culture as a universal affair involving every individual’s self-cultivation. This paper offers a compromise, reading Nietzsche as a ‘cultural elitist’ for whom culture demands that a few great individuals be supported in a voluntary, rather than state-mandated way. Rawls, it claims, is therefore misguided in worrying that Nietzsche’s elitism is a threat to justice. The paper focuses on Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer as Educator, the key text in the elitist-egalitarian debate.     

Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals

Can material Egalitarianism (requiring, for example, the significant promotion of fortune) include animals in the domain of the equality requirement? The problem can be illustrated as follows: If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal mice are included in this egalitarian requirement, then normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because their wellbeing is much lower than that of normal humans. Thus, equality of wellbeing requires a massive shift of resources away from most humans to mice. This view, however, seems crazy. I explore this problem and propose a solution.     

ABSTRACTION,IDEALIZATION, AND OPPRESSION

Abstract: Feminists, critical race scholars, and other social‐justice theorists sometimes object to “abstraction” in liberal normative theory. Arguing that oppression affects individual agents in powerful yet subtle ways, they contend that allegedly abstract theories often reinforce oppressive power structures. Here I critically examine and ultimately reject Onora O'Neill's “abstraction without idealization” as a solution to this problem. Because O'Neill defines abstraction as simply the “bracketing of certain predicates,” her methodology fails to guide decisions about what to bracket and what to include in the theory. Moreover, it may not be possible to abstract without also relying on some particular ideals. While abstraction is unavoidable, I conclude that it must be employed with greater attention to sociopolitical hierarchies and by using ideals that do not collude with structures of oppression. I discuss the work of Susan Babbitt and Elizabeth Anderson as examples of how nonoppressive ideals might be incorporated into normative theory.     

Understanding pro‐environmental intentions by integrating insights from social mobility,cosmopolitanism, and social dominance

To offer an integrative account bridging individuals’ sociocultural orientations with pro‐environmentalism, the current research tested the mediating and moderating relationships among pro‐environmental intentions and three person‐level factors: perceived social mobility, cosmopolitan orientation, and social dominance orientation (SDO). With a Singaporean college student sample (N = 220), we found support for the hypothesized second‐stage moderation model that perceived social mobility positively predicts cosmopolitan orientation, and in turn, cosmopolitan orientation is moderated by SDO to positively predict pro‐environmental intentions. Specifically, lower levels of SDO strengthen the pro‐environmental advantages of endorsing higher levels of cosmopolitan orientation. These findings add novel knowledge to the environmental psychology literature by advancing an integrative approach that demonstrates how the interplay of people's perceptions about the social, cultural, and group standing impacts their likelihood to engage in pro‐environmental actions. We discuss the implications that an egalitarian worldview toward other cultures, social groups, and human–nature relations might be the key to addressing the global challenge of climate change.     

Constitutive Luck

‘Constitutive luck’ refers to luck that affects the sort of person one is. This article demonstrates that it is a philosophically troubling sort of luck, causing problems in, at least, ethics and political philosophy. Some, notably Susan Hurley, Nicholas Rescher, and Daniel Statman, have argued that such trouble can be avoided, by pointing out that the notion of constitutive luck is incoherent. The article examines this claim by means of a discussion of the idea of luck in general, settling on an account of luck in terms of the notions of chance, value, and (lack of) control. This account is then used to show that the notion of constitutive luck is not incoherent. We are stuck with the problems made by constitutive luck.     

A Leader Who Sees the World as I Do: Voters Prefer Candidates Whose Statements Reveal Matching Social-Psychological Attitudes

Politicians are increasingly able to communicate their values, attitudes, and concerns directly to voters. Yet little is known about which of these signals resonate with voters and why. We employ a discrete choice experiment to investigate whether and which social-psychological attitudes predict how adult British voters respond to corresponding attitudinal signals communicated by candidates in hypothetical social media posts. For all attitudes studied, covering social feelings (trust, collective nostalgia), social perceptions (nationalism, populist sentiment), and social commitments (national identification, authoritarianism, egalitarianism), we find that participants are much more likely to vote for candidates who signal proximity to their own attitudinal position and less likely for candidates who signal opposing views. The strongest effects were observed for national identification, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism, indicating the importance of commitment to a shared group and to particular principles for distributing power and resources within and between groups. We further demonstrate that social-psychological attitudes are not acting as mere proxies for participants' past votes or left–right ideology. Our results extend adaptive followership theory to incorporate preferences concerning intragroup coordination and intergroup hierarchy, while highlighting the social-psychological dynamics of political communication that may transcend the concerns of particular election cycles.     

Japanese Adults’ Sex Role Attitudes and Judgment Criteria Concerning Gender Equality: The Diversity of Gender Egalitarianism

This study investigated how societal conditions have influenced Japanese gender egalitarianism by analyzing sex and age group differences in attitudes towards sex roles and “gender equality judgment criteria,” the theoretical framework used to capture the diversity of gender egalitarianism. Questionnaire surveys were mailed to 1,000 randomly sampled Japanese adults in their 30s to 60s (501 valid responses). The results show that the most egalitarian sex role attitudes and greatest consideration given to gender equality judgment criteria were seen in women and in the 40s age group. This age group difference could be attributed to societal conditions during adolescence and young adulthood, including the questioning of the homemaker role during the women’s movement in Japan and the passage of laws concerning equal employment opportunities for both sexes in 1985. This article is based on the doctoral dissertation of the first author with some amendments and revisions. A part of this article was presented at the 43rd Annual Convention of the Japanese Society for Social Psychology.     

Nagel's `Paradox' of Equality and Partiality

Thomas Nagel has argued that we are theoretically committed to both ethical pluralism and liberal egalitarianism in a way that seems plausible but that the combination leads through time to a deep-seated incoherence within our own moral and political outlook.This paper critically examines Nagel’s arguments for this conclusion. The paradox is centrally generated by the dual role of the impartial perspective in Nagel’s argument. This dual role is analysed and rejected as based on a mistake about objectification, such that there is no conflict between the personal and impersonal point of view of the kind Nagel describes. His insightful account of the prospects for egalitarianism is, further, hindered by his account of the internal division of the self. A positive proposal is made for a feasible egalitarian ideal that overcomes such a dichotomy within the self in the context of civil society. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.