Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

CHOICE-MAKING TREATMENT OF YOUNG CHILDREN'S SEVERE BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS

The choice-making behavior of 5 young children with developmental disabilities who engaged in aberrant behavior was studied within a concurrent operants framework. Experimental analyses were conducted to identify reinforcers that maintained aberrant behavior, and functional communication training packages were implemented to teach the participants to gain reinforcement using mands. Next, a choice-making analysis, in which the participants chose one of two responses (either a mand or an alternative neutral response) to obtain different durations and qualities of reinforcement, was conducted. Finally, treatment packages involving choice making via manding were implemented to decrease inappropriate behavior and to increase mands. The results extended previous applications of choice making to severe behavior disorders and across behaviors maintained by positive and negative reinforcement.     

Token reinforcement, choice, and self-control in pigeons.

Pigeons were exposed to self-control procedures that involved illumination of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) as a form of token reinforcement. In a discrete-trials arrangement, subjects chose between one and three LEDs; each LED was exchangeable for 2-s access to food during distinct posttrial exchange periods. In Experiment 1, subjects generally preferred the immediate presentation of a single LED over the delayed presentation of three LEDs, but differences in the delay to the exchange period between the two options prevented a clear assessment of the relative influence of LED delay and exchange-period delay as determinants of choice. In Experiment 2, in which delays to the exchange period from either alternative were equal in most conditions, all subjects preferred the delayed three LEDs more often than in Experiment-1. In Experiment 3, subjects preferred the option that resulted in a greater amount of food more often if the choices also produced LEDs than if they did not. In Experiment 4, preference for the delayed three LEDs was obtained when delays to the exchange period were equal, but reversed in favor of an immediate single LED when the latter choice also resulted in quicker access to exchange periods. The overall pattern of results suggests that (a) delay to the exchange period is a more critical determinant of choice than is delay to token presentation; (b) tokens may function as conditioned reinforcers, although their discriminative properties may be responsible for the self-control that occurs under token reinforcer arrangements; and (c) previously reported differences in the self-control choices of humans and pigeons may have resulted at least in part from the procedural conventions of using token reinforcers with human subjects and food reinforcers with pigeon subjects.     

Choice and reinforcement delay

Previous studies of choice between two delayed reinforcers have indicated that the relative immediacy of the reinforcer is a major determinant of the relative frequency of responding. Parallel studies of choice between two interresponse times have found exceptions to this generality. The present study looked at the choice by pigeons between two delays, one of which was always four times longer than the other, but whose absolute durations were varied across conditions. The results indicated that choice is not uniquely determined by the relative immediacy of reinforcement, but that absolute delays are also involved. Models for concurrent chained schedules appear to be more applicable to the present data than the matching relation; however, these too failed to predict choice for long delays.     

Self-control in pigeons under the Mischel paradigm

Walter Mischel studied self-control in preschool children in the following manner: if the child waited for an interval to end, he or she received the more preferred of two reinforcers; if the child responded to terminate the interval by ringing a bell, the less preferred reinforcer was given. We used an analogous procedure to study self-control in pigeons: if the bird waited for a trial to end, it received the more preferred reinforcer; if the bird terminated the trial by pecking a key, the less preferred reinforcer was given. We explored the effects on self-control of a number of variables analogous to those studied by Mischel and co-workers, e.g., presence versus absence of reinforcers, of alternative responses, and of stimuli during the wait interval; prior experience of the subjects; and test paradigm. The results obtained with pigeons paralleled the results obtained by Mischel with human children.     

Multivariate stochastic processes compatible with “aspect” models of similarity and choice

Various recent works have developed feature or aspect models of similarity and preference. These models are more concerned with the fine detail of the judgment process than were prior models, but nevertheless they have not in general developed an underlying stochastic process compatible with the assumed structure. In this paper, we show that a particular class of multivariate stochastic processes, namely those associated with the Marshall-Olkin multivariate exponential distribution, generates several of these models. In particular, such stochastic processes (appropriately interpreted) yield Tversky's elimination by aspects model, Edgell and Geisler's (normal) additive random aspects model, and Shepard and Arabie's additive cluster model.This work was supported by Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada Grant A8124 to A.A.J. Marley.     

Preference for mixed versus constant delays of reinforcement: Effect of probability of the short, mixed delay

Preference for mixed versus constant delays of reinforcement was studied with a concurrent-chain procedure. Lever pressing by rats in concurrently available variable-interval 60-second initial links occasionally produced mutually exclusive terminal-link reinforcement delays. A constant delay of reinforcement (either 15 seconds or 30 seconds) composed one terminal link and mixed delays (.2 second and twice the value of the constant delay) were arranged in the other terminal link. The proportion of .2-second delays in the mixed-delay terminal link took on values of 0, .1, .25, .5, .75, .9, and 1.0 over experimental conditions. Based on relative rates of responding in the initial links, preference for the mixed delays was a negatively accelerated function of the proportion of short, mixed delays. Three of five rats preferred the mixed delays to the constant delays when the proportion of short, mixed delays was .1 or higher, and all five rats preferred the mixed delays when the proportion of short, mixed delays was .25 or higher. Neither Squires and Fantino's (1971) delay-reduction model of choice nor a model based on the harmonic mean reinforcement delay provided a close estimate of choice proportions over the range of short-delay proportions studied. The delay-reduction model underestimated choice for the mixed delays at low and intermediate proportions of short delays, and the harmonic-mean-delay model overestimated choice for the mixed delays at intermediate and high proportions of short delays.     

Choice as a function of local versus molar reinforcement contingencies.

Rats were trained on a discrete-trial probability learning task. In Experiment 1, the molar reinforcement probabilities for the two response alternatives were equal, and the local contingencies of reinforcement differentially reinforced a win-stay, lose-shift response pattern. The win-stay portion was learned substantially more easily and appeared from the outset of training, suggesting that its occurrence did not depend upon discrimination of the local contingencies but rather only upon simple strengthening effects of individual reinforcements. Control by both types of local contingencies decreased with increases in the intertrial interval, although some control remained with intertrial intervals as long as 30 s. In Experiment 2, the local contingencies always favored win-shift and lose-shift response patterns but were asymmetrical for the two responses, causing the molar reinforcement rates for the two responses to differ. Some learning of the alternation pattern occurred with short intertrial intervals, although win-stay behavior occurred for some subjects. The local reinforcement contingencies were discriminated poorly with longer intertrial intervals. In the absence of control by the local contingencies, choice proportion was determined by the molar contingencies, as indicated by high exponent values for the generalized matching law with long intertrial intervals, and lower values with short intertrial intervals. The results show that when molar contingencies of reinforcement and local contingencies are in opposition, both may have independent roles. Control by molar contingencies cannot generally be explained by local contingencies.     

Subjective probability and delay.

Human subjects indicated their preference between a hypothetical $1,000 reward available with various probabilities or delays and a certain reward of variable amount available immediately. The function relating the amount of the certain-immediate reward subjectively equivalent to the delayed $1,000 reward had the same general shape (hyperbolic) as the function found by Mazur (1987) to describe pigeons' delay discounting. The function relating the certain-immediate amount of money subjectively equivalent to the probabilistic $1,000 reward was also hyperbolic, provided that the stated probability was transformed to odds against winning. In a second experiment, when human subjects chose between a delayed $1,000 reward and a probabilistic $1,000 reward, delay was proportional to the same odds-against transformation of the probability to which it was subjectively equivalent.