《管子》的生态经济思想论

本文论述了《管子》的生态经济思想：《管子》认为经济系统必须顺应这个生态系统的生态法则：“天时”;《管子》阐述了正确处理人口、生产与资源、环境保护间关系的“务地利”的可持续经济思想;《管子》提出了修德、贫富有度及适度消费的生态经济管理思想。     

论庄子“万物一齐”的生态审美观

当先秦诸子大都以人的理解为中心去看待人与自然万物的存在方式,认为万物只是相对于人来说才具有存在的价值和意义时,庄子站在古典存在论的立场上提出了含有生态审美智慧的“万物一齐”观,即“休乎天钧”的生态和谐理念、“为是不用而寓诸庸”的生态价值观念、“万物与我为一”的生态共生气象。其“万物一齐”的生态审美观所蕴涵的万物平等共生、放弃自我中心、无用之用等观念有助于当代的生态伦理和生态实践建设。     

医疗纠纷泛化原因多视角分析

随着社会的发展,医疗纠纷日趋增多,成为各卫生部门的最大难题,是继医疗改革之后的又一备受社会各界关注的热门话题,医患关系成为社会最不和谐的声音。医患关系是在社会政治、经济、文化、法律等因素共同作用,围绕“治病”所形成的道德、诚信、契约、经济利益关系,通过分析现代医患关系的变化,探讨医疗纠纷增多的原因。     

Acting for reasons: Reply to Dancy

This paper argues that we need to distinguish between two different ideas of a reason: first, the idea of a premise or assumption, from which a person’s action or deliberation can proceed; second, the idea of a fact by which a person can be guided, when he modifies his thought or behaviour in some way. It argues further that if we have the first idea in mind, one can act for the reason that p regardless of whether it is the case that p, and regardless of whether one believes that p. But if we have the second idea in mind, one cannot act for the reason that p unless one knows that p. The last part of the paper briefly indicates how the second idea of a reason can contribute to a larger argument, showing that it is better to conceive of knowledge as a kind of ability than as a kind of belief.     

Philosophy—what is to be done?

Philosophical thinking, in the historically original sense, is simply the human mind in operation, unaided by anything supernatural and unfettered by any human authority or any procedure for reaching some pre-given end. This means that “philosophy” originally included far more than it does now, including all the natural sciences, as well as rational reflection on society, history, and art. What this means for us now is that philosophy must be an essentially outward-facing discipline, open to others. Most importantly, it needs now to be open to the sciences, to practical social reflection, and to its own history. But what philosophy brings to all its reflections is above all a spirit of critical reflection, respect for evidence and argument, and a ruthless honesty that demands of people that they form their beliefs and views of life according to the best reasons and information they have, rather than forming their views according to their wishes or prejudices, or letting them be dictated by authorities or social traditions. In this sense, we are living in an unphilosophical, or even anti-philosophical, age, but this makes it all the more important for philosophy to continue to do its work.     

Philosophy, the “unknown knowns,” and the public use of reason

There are not only true or false solutions, there are also false questions. The task of philosophy is not to provide answers or solutions, but to submit to critical analysis the questions themselves, to make us see how the very way we perceive a problem is an obstacle to its solution. This holds especially for today’s public debates on ecological threats, on lack of faith, on democracy and the “war on terror”, in which the “unknown knowns”, the silent presuppositions we are not aware of, determine our acts.     

从生态自然观看细菌的耐药

伴随抗菌药物强大的抗感染疗效的同时,细菌等病原体对抗菌药物的耐药性问题日渐显露出来。运用生态自然观辨证地对细菌进行剖析,旨在突破传统思维认识细菌耐药性产生本质,从而更加有效,更加科学地控制细菌耐药的发生。     

Environments That Make Us Smart: Ecological Rationality

ABSTRACT— Traditional views of rationality posit general-purpose decision mechanisms based on logic or optimization. The study of ecological rationality focuses on uncovering the "adaptive toolbox" of domain-specific simple heuristics that real, computationally bounded minds employ, and explaining how these heuristics produce accurate decisions by exploiting the structures of information in the environments in which they are applied. Knowing when and how people use particular heuristics can facilitate the shaping of environments to engender better decisions.     

"生态平衡":中国心理学研究突围的别一个方向

当下心理学研究出现的种种问题就其实质而言,是一种生态失衡现象,因此,心理学欲走向健康发展之轨道,应注重心理学研究的生态建设。     

The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.