Rawls's Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough

Res Publica - What sorts of reasons are i) required and ii) morally acceptable when citizens in a pluralist liberal democracy undertake to resolve pressing political issues? This paper presents and...     

Theology, Science, and Postmodernism: Responding to Stanley Grenz

This article responds to Stanley J. Grenz's Templeton Lecture, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?” published in the June 2000 issue of Zygon (Grenz 2000). In the first part I outline my reasons for finding the kind of theological reflections in which Grenz engages worthy of attention by noting my disagreement with the view that a sufficient response to theological issues can be formulated on the basis of an examination of our biological nature. I assert, in that connection, the autonomy of reason as a way of investigating and understanding the world. In the second part I respond directly to Grenz by explaining my disagreement with the postmodern critique of science upon which he relies and his adherence to Christian eschatology as an answer to the conundrums into which, he posits, we are drawn as a result of that critique. I note that I agree with Grenz, however, that the activity of valuing is necessarily a forward‐looking Godlike endeavor that is not derivable from science. In the third part I suggest that we must be open to the investigation of the possible existence of an objective realm of value and that, in any case, rejection of the postmodern critique of science in many cases pro‐vides a sound basis for the disciplined resolution of factual questions that frequently lie at the base of disagreements about values.     

The Enlightenment That Won't Go Away: Modernity's Crux

The Critical Process unleashed by the Enlightenment and endlessly resharpening itself to this day has mortally wounded the God of Deism, maybe also of theism, even of Christianity. A temptation of Christian theology is to retreat in denial into an updated version of Deism, seemingly granting full license to modern science but only so long as it does not impugn God's love. The alternative here proposed is to ride out The Critical Process, in fact to encourage it, all the way into modernity's crux: How can a design that is not benign still be divine? The Christian reply is: through a real death of God and of ourselves as well, and through resurrections beginning now, thus freeing The Critical Process from the illusion of insuring our survival and, instead, for the honest Enlightenment task of merely telling the truth.     

突破现代理性之限——生态伦理的困境与出路

生态伦理以追求人与自然关系的和谐相处为目的,但人与自然关系的恶化主要是现代社会的一个现象,而其深层原因则在于人类思维方式的变化———现代理性的产生,所以,真正的生态伦理就必须从思维方式入手,来解决人与自然的矛盾。     

从对立走向统一——生态伦理学发展趋势研究

在生态伦理学研究中,人类中心主义和非人类中心主义围绕自然存在物有无道德地位等问题展开了激烈争论。这种争论的不可调和性及其观点的不可公度性,意味着生态伦理学自身发生了严重的形而上学危机。如何摆脱这一危机,使生态伦理学研究向纵深发展,成为摆在人们面前的一项重要任务。黑格尔关于人的自由意志是一个否定之否定过程的观点为走出这种争论提供了理论依据,马克思关于人与自然界完成本质统一的思想亦为消解这种对立奠定了理论基础。     

The “Brightening” Effect: Reactions to Positive Events in the Daily Lives of Individuals With Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder

Depressed individuals are less reactive than healthy individuals to positive stimuli in the laboratory, but accumulating evidence suggests that they are more emotionally reactive to positive events in their daily lives. The present study probed the boundaries of this curious “mood brightening” effect and investigated its specificity to major depressive disorder (MDD) vis-à-vis generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), its closest boundary condition. We used ecological momentary assessment to measure reactions to positive events over one week in individuals with MDD (n = 38), GAD (n = 36), comorbid MDD-GAD (n = 38), and no psychopathology (n = 33). Depressed individuals responded to positive events with larger changes in affect, cognition, reported withdrawal (but not approach) behavior, and symptoms than healthy controls. More severe depression assessed before the sampling week predicted greater brightening. Altered reactivity to positive events was relatively specific to MDD when compared with GAD, similar to patterns found for other positive emotional processes. The robustness, scope, and relative specificity of the brightening effect highlights the need to resolve conflicting findings across laboratory and non-laboratory studies to advance understanding of altered reactivity in emotional disorders.     

Anxiety Influences the Perceptual-Motor Calibration of Visually Guided Braking to Avoid Collisions

We investigated whether anxiety influences perceptual-motor calibration in a braking to avoid a collision task. Participants performed either a discrete braking task (Experiment 1) or a continuous braking task (Experiment 2), with the goal of stopping before colliding with a stop sign. Half of participants performed the braking task after an anxiety induction. We investigated whether anxiety reduced the frequency of crashing and if it influenced the calibration of perception (visual information) and action (brake pressure) dynamically between-trials in Experiment 1 and within-trials in Experiment 2. In the discrete braking task, anxious participants crashed less often and made larger corrective adjustments trial-to-trial after crashing, suggesting that the influence of anxiety on behavior did not occur uniformly, but rather dynamically with anxiety amplifying the reaction to previous crashes. However, when performing continuous braking, anxious participants crashed more often, and their within-trial adjustments of deceleration were less related to visual information compared to controls. Taken together, these findings suggest that the timescale and nature of the task mediates the influence of anxiety on the performance of goal-directed actions.     

Methodological Challenges in the Study of Emotions in Politics and How to Deal With Them

This introductory article to the special issue zooms in on the literature on political emotions with a specific focus on methodological questions of “how to study” political emotions. To the extent that methodological matters are addressed in the extant literature, the associated challenges are often portrayed as a clash between social science and natural science disciplines, a clash frequently illustrated by the meeting between political science and neuroscience. Rather than being a clash between academic disciplines, this article argues that many of the methodological challenges facing emotional research have their origin in scholars' diverse views on the relationship between themselves as researchers and political emotions as a research object. In the light of this acknowledgment, the article encircles and discusses the methodological challenges associated with three key conceptual distinctions between: (1) individual and collective emotions, (2) emotions and reason, and between (3) involuntary political emotions and the strategic usage of political emotions. Using the contributions to this special issue as illustrations, the article argues in favor of moving beyond mutually exclusive dichotomies regarding these conceptual distinctions and offers pathways for dealing with current methodological challenges to emotional research. It points to methodological pluralism, transparency, and context‐sensitive research strategies.     

Too good to be true? Psychological responses to uncommon options in risk–reward environments

Risks and rewards, or payoffs and probabilities, are inversely related in many choice environments. We investigated people's psychological responses to uncommon combinations of risk and reward that deviate from learned regularities (e.g., options that offer a high payoff with an unusually high probability) as they evaluated risky options. In two experiments (N = 183), participants first priced monetary gambles drawn from environments in which risks and rewards were negatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In later trials, they evaluated gambles with uncommon combinations of risk and reward—that is, options that deviated from the respective environment's risk–reward structure. Pricing, response times, and (in Experiment 2) pupil dilation were recorded. In both experiments, participants took more time when responding to uncommon compared to foreseeable options or when the same options were presented in an uncorrelated risk–reward environment. This result was most pronounced when the uncommon gambles offered higher expected values compared to the other gambles in the set. Moreover, these uncommon, high‐value options were associated with an increase in pupil size. These results suggest that people's evaluations of risky options are based not only on the options' payoffs and probabilities but also on the extent to which they fit the risk–reward structure of the environment.