Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason

The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as committed to the denial of metaphysical modesty, and thereby as committed to the existence of a response independent normative reality.     

Rationalism and empiricism: A new perspective

Though classical and twentieth-century versions of empiricism and rationalism fail in their aims, as does the Kantian attempt at a compromise between those views, there are residues of those views that play important roles in the scientific enterprise. Those residue, and their scientific roles, are examined in this paper.     

Ecological Neuropsychology: An Alternative to the Deficit Model for Conceptualizing and Serving Students with Learning Disabilities

The present paper contends that children with learning disabilities are better served when assessment and intervention are conceptualized within an ecological neuropsychology perspective than within the traditional deficit model perspective, which is the predominant approach to intervention in medical and educational settings. The deficit method conceptualizes problems as within the child, and the major consequence of this approach is that little time is spent analyzing the learning environment or other systems that might impact the child's ability to be successful in an academic setting. Therefore, rehabilitation efforts have had limited success. In contrast, ecological neuropsychology is a strength-based approach that considers the child, as well as the systems within which he/she interacts, when assessing, diagnosing, and intervening with students who are experiencing learning difficulties.     

Shifting the focus from what to why

After 4 decades of research on infant behavior and development, the time has come to shift our focus from What infants do to Why they do it when they do—to move beyond the single-minded search for mechanism and to consider the larger question of function. Infants are not merely incomplete adults who simply get better with age, but they are different organisms altogether, perfectly adapted at every point in ontogeny. For this reason, answers to the Why question will necessarily build upon an evolutionary framework that reflects the infant's changing “occupations” or ecological niches. Through this pursuit, infancy researchers will develop a more integrative science and a greater sense of community.     

Defending the bad against the worse: Education and democracy

Recent writings in philosophy of education have expressed pessimism about the possibility of educating students to think for themselves. Similarly, recent writings in political philosophy have expressed pessimism about the possibility of attaining democracy. In this paper, I suggest that such pessimism is premature and may be alleviated, if not removed, by interpreting both educational enlightenment and the democratic ideal as processes, rather than end states. They are, moreover, processes which exist in symbiotic relationship with one another. Thus educational practices may improve the prospects of attaining democracy, and political practices may strengthen education.     

On the continuing utility of argument in a postmodern world

In this essay we contend that traditional theories of argument are consonant with and enrich the project of postmodernity. Reading postmodernity as a rhetoric underscores how the process of discursively resolving conflicts is occasionally threatened by politically motivated efforts to misuse the methods of argument; it alerts us to the egregious acts that are and can be performed in the name of, but not because of, rationality. Postmodernity is thus an attempt by a new generation of theorists to recast and draw attention to perennial philosophical problems in the context of contemporary political difficulties.     

Some aspects of eloquence in Descartes's works

In Descartes's philosophy, communicating scientific and philosophical truth does not represent a problem that can be traced back to humanistic rhetoric, meant as the art of persuasion. Descartes states his belief in the eloquence of reason: a clear, precise, and adequately expressed thought cannot fail to convince the listener. This is the measure of the distance between the level of truth and the level of opinion. However, the moment of confrontation with the public is also the very moment when the truth of the new knowledge enters into conflict with other, different conceptions. Education and history influence communication with the result that the distinction between intellectual conviction and persuasion becomes less straightforward. Rational eloquence, as Descartes is well aware, must be articulated in such a way as to avoid any possible language equivocation and to adopt exposition strategies ensuring effective access to readers. The aim of this paper is to illustrate some aspects of this tension as expressed by the writer Descartes with reference to a number of texts (from the Regulae to the Meditationes) that were essential for the elaboration and dissemination of his philosophy.     

Sprachspiel vs. vollständige Sprache

The article formulates a criticism of Wittgenstein's later philosophy which, in its substance, I would like to think, is fairly the same as the (hermeneutic) criticism issued by Apel and Habermas in the sixties. Contrary to these philosophers, however, I try to make the point by focusing on the distinction between language game and language, respectively between intralanguage relations of family resemblance (between language games) and interlanguage translation relations. The notion of a complete language is introduced — completeness of a language being, roughly, its possibility in principle of being translated into any (other) language — and the criticism of Wittgenstein is formulated as the allegation that he does not, or will not, acknowledge such a concept of completeness.So far the contents of the first part of the article. The rest of it assembles some hints, remarks and reminders which bear upon the question of the completeness of a language. These considerations include comments on the conditions of translatability, on the performative (agent's) knowledge or intention-in-action of the acting person, on Habermas' concept of communicative competence and on the notion of a responsible subject of action. It is alleged that to speak of translation and reporting an event as language games is misleading.     

Toward a culturally anchored ecological framework of research in ethnic-cultural communities

Proposed a research framework (the “cube” model) in which community psychologists working in ethnic-cultural communities can make appropriate decisions on conceptual and methodological issues from a culturally anchored, ecological-contextualist perspective. The intent of the model is to articulate ethnic-cultural heterogeneity in community research by elucidating three metamethodological issues: (a) definition of an ethnic-cultural community, (b) applicability of cross-cultural theories and methods to ethnic-cultural community research, and (c) geographical or ecological stability of an ethnic-cultural community. The model posits that ethnic-cultural community research can be conceptualized as a three-dimensional structure that represents an interaction among research questions, methods, and cultural complexity (referring to the extent to which an ethnic-cultural group is defined in a larger ecological context or community both at the individual and collective levels). Future directions for research were discussed in terms of the utility and the limitations of the proposed research model.     

Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion,belief and Searle's theory of intentionality

Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality.