Psychological Type: A 32-Year Follow-Up

This study is a follow-up to three previous studies of psychological type published in this Journal in 1964, 1976 and 1978 by Bradway, Bradway and Detloff, and Bradway and Joseph Wheelwright. Participants in all of our studies were limited to Jungian analysts and candidates. Participants of the first two studies and of the current study were from California; participants of the 1978 study included the participants from the previous study plus persons attending the 1974 International Congress in London. In 1993 we sent letters to the 232 current analysts and candidates in the San Francisco and Los Angeles C.G. Jung Institutes, as well as to the nine participants in our 1974 study who were no longer members of the Institutes but could be located, asking them to fill out a questionnaire that included self-typing, and to self-administer the Gray-Wheelwrights Jungian Type Survey (GW). The response rate was high: 196 or 81% of the 241 persons to whom we sent letters returned filled-in questionnaires and GWs; all 67 or 100% of the participants in the 1974 study who could be located returned the filled-in material. Eight of those 67 had also been in the 1961 study. The current study provides data on the changes in psychological type over time, in some instances over a period of 32 years. It added for the first time a consideration of analysts' rating of themselves as primarily clinically or symbolically orientated, and a survey of analyst opinions as to the determinants of psychological type. Summarizing the results: A smaller percentage of analysts typed themselves as intuitive thinking than in 1961; the percentages of congruence between self-typing and the Gray-Wheelwrights scores in the three dimensions (introvert/extravert, sensation/intuition, and thinking/feeling) in 1961, 1974 and 1993 are between 76% and 96%; changes in typology from 1961 to 1993 occur more frequently in the younger age group than in the older age group; 65% of the participants considered the distinction between clinical and symbolic important, but only 41% rated themselves as either primarily clinically oriented or symbolically oriented with essentially no relationship between that orientation and typology; a sub-study of typology of partners within this study does not support the concept that opposites marry; according to the opinion of this group of analysts and candidates as to the determinants of adult typology, genetics (chromosomes) is distinctly the strongest contributor with family dynamics a not-very-close next contributor.     

Thyme to touch: Infants possess strategies that protect them from dangers posed by plants

Plants have been central to human life as sources of food and raw materials for artifact construction over evolutionary time. But plants also have chemical and physical defenses (such as harmful toxins and thorns) that provide protection from herbivores. The presence of these defenses has shaped the behavioral strategies of non-human animals. Here we report evidence that human infants possess strategies that would serve to protect them from dangers posed by plants. Across two experiments, infants as young as eight months exhibit greater reluctance to manually explore plants compared to other entities. These results expand the growing literature showing that infants are sensitive to certain ancestrally recurrent dangers, and provide a basis for further exploration.     

表象研究方法论

本论文从表象研究的历史沿革入手,对迄今为止几种主要的表象研究方法及其有关方法论方面的问题进行了分析探讨,认为当代认知心理学的表象研究给心理学传统的反应时指标赋于了新的方法论意义．但单一性的反应时指标有较大局限     

苏俄心理学对中国心理学的影响与启示

苏俄心理学是现代心理科学的一个重要的组成部分。近一个世纪来,苏俄心理学不仅对我国心理学的发展产生了重要影响,而且也从理论与实践双重层面给我们以有益的启示。     

Psychoanalysis and empirical research

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the idea of reason began to lose its universal and absolute value, undermining the view of science as a form of objective knowledge that reveals a fundamental reality. These changes have also had an impact on psychoanalysis, leading to a proliferation of theories and the end of a positivistic approach, epitomized by a 'neutral' analyst who knows the contents of the patient's mind. Hermeneutic philosophy provides a tool with which to explore both theoretical multiplicity and the contribution of the analyst's subjectivity to the analytic process. Furthermore, a hermeneutic approach does not have to be hostile to empirical science, but can be integrated with it in a 'scientific-hermeneutic model' in which historical and biological principles are given equal value.     

Jung's view on myth and post-modern psychology

Post-modern psychology embodies two core themes, the social mind and the narrative self. Whereas the social-mind thesis seems diametrically opposed to Jung's position regarding human nature, the narrative-self thesis is associated with research and theorizing about personal myth and mythmaking in ways that could make contact with Jung's concerns. Jung's view is examined here with particular attention to McAdams' theory of narrative identity. It is suggested that the ostensible differences between Jung and post-modern psychology might reflect divergent interests, rather than necessarily irreconcilable worldviews.     

Indigenization and the history of psychology

This article argues for the development of a historical perspective to help understand the process of indigenization in psychology. The indigenization of psychology in both the United States and India is shown to be part of larger social, economic, and political processes. A center and periphery model of knowledge production and praxes is deployed to show how practices of scientific imperialism are used to maintain the hegemony of the center. It is argued that historical approaches may be useful to challenge and counter such practices. Finally, the authors call for a polycentric history of psychology that will correspond to the emerging polycentrism exemplified in indigenous psychologies.     

Cognitive epidemiology: With emphasis on untangling cognitive ability and socioeconomic status

This commentary touches on practical, public policy, and social science domains informed by cognitive epidemiology while pulling together common themes running through this important special issue. As is made clear in the contributions assembled here, and others (Deary, Whalley, & Starr, 2009; Gottfredson, 2004; Lubinski & Humphreys, 1992, 1997), social scientists and practitioners cannot afford to neglect cognitive ability when modeling epidemiological and health care phenomena. However, given the dominant concern about the confounding of general cognitive ability (GCA) and socioeconomic status (SES), and the extent to which SES is frequently seen as the primary cause of health disparities (while GCA is neglected as a possible influence in epidemiology and health psychology), some methodological applications for untangling the relative influences of GCA and SES are reviewed. In addition, cognitive epidemiology is placed in a broader context: Just as cognitive epidemiology facilitates an understanding of pathology (“at risk” populations, and ways to attenuate undesirable personal and social conditions), it may also enrich our understanding of optimal functioning (“at promise” populations, and ways to identify and nurture the human and social capital needed to develop innovations for saving lives, economies, and perhaps even our planet). Finally, while GCA is likely the most important dimension in the study of individual differences for modeling healthy behaviors and outcomes, other relatively independent dimensions of psychological diversity do add value (Krueger, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000). For example, compliance has at least two psychological components: a “can do” competency component (ability) and a “will do” motivational component (conscientiousness). Ultimately, developing and modeling healthy behaviors, interpersonal environments, and medical maladies are best accomplished by teaming multiple dimensions of human individuality.     

Sunk-cost effects on purely behavioral investments

Although the sunk-cost effect is a well-documented psychological phenomenon in monetary investments, existing literature investigating behavioral investments (e.g., time, effort) has not replicated this effect except when such investments relate to monetary values. The current explanation for this discrepancy proposes that purely behavioral sunk-cost effects are unlikely to be observed because they are difficult to book, track, and balance in a mental account. Conversely, we argue that, through an effort-justification mechanism, people account for the amount of behavioral resources invested when selecting an alternative, in which case they may fall prey to purely behavioral sunk-cost effects. The results of two experiments support this prediction. Because many decisions involve behavioral investments, behavioral sunk-cost effects should be pervasive psychological phenomena.     

The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.