Finding Empathy: How Neuroscientific Measures,Evidence and Conceptualizations Interact

ABSTRACT

Questions about how empathy should be conceptualized have long been a preoccupation of the field of empathy research. There are numerous definitions of empathy that have been proposed and that often overlap with other concepts such as sympathy and compassion. This makes communication between research groups or across disciplines difficult. Many researchers seem to see the diversity of definitions as a problem rather than a form of benign pluralism. Within this debate about conceptualization, researchers sometimes suggest that more neuroscientific evidence will make the problem go away – that uncovering the processes underlying empathy will thereby also sort out conceptual difficulties. In this paper, I challenge this assumption by examining how neuroscientists studying empathy use concepts in practice – both in the development of their measures and in the interpretation of their data. I argue that this neuroscientific literature demonstrates that continuity and stability comes from the use of certain established measures, while progress comes from expansion upon those measures and the flexibility of stated concepts. We do not ‘find’ empathy through increased neuroscientific evidence but we do get closer to understanding empathic processes, flexibly understood.     

Psychology of Science/Theology of Science: Reaching Out or Narrowing?

Formalizing a “psychology of science” today will constrain intellectual freedom in ways more likely stultifying than liberating. We should be more improvisational in seeking ideas from academic psychology to develop a more comprehensive purview. I suggest that a psychology of science should look at systematic theology and empirical theology. Liberal theologians have long experience trying to distill from religion those structural aspects that affirm openness in a search for truth. Science, as well as religion, has its myths and rituals, but theologians are more experienced than scientists at a large mythohistorical scale. There are distortions in the extreme degree to which psychological science has traditionally emphasized empiricism, positivism, hypothesis testing, and falsifiability. I argue for less critical reduction and more creative augmentation. This could include looking outside academia at cognitive competencies of people in trades. Exaggerated parsimony is an old story. This is illustrated by the opposition to David Hartley's 1749 theory of neural oscillations. There is an inexorable “margin of uncertainty” where scientific prediction and control can never outstrip the new uses to which human beings put ideas. Facts and values interact in this margin; theology has long made a home there, but scientists sometimes have been excessive in rejecting the “naturalistic fallacy.” There is also often a degree of disingenuousness in psychology's reluctance to take subjective phenomena seriously; here there may be lessons in how empirical theology has handled subjectivity, as well as in taking an honest look at the way much of the methodology of experimental psychology incorporates subjective assessments. Feist's book is a start, but these things need more thought before codifying a psychology of science.     

Cornell College: Program in Science and Religion

Cornell College in Mount Vernon, Iowa, has established a new interdisciplinary program in science and religion. One of the features of this program is an undergraduate major in science and religion that requires substantial course work in at least one of the natural sciences as well as course work in philosophy, religion, and history. As a result of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation, Cornell College will offer a special course, God and Physics: From Aquinas to Quantum Mechanics (April 1998), and will sponsor an international symposium on creation and contemporary cosmology (April 1999). Opportunities exist for interested scholars to come to Cornell as Templeton Visiting Fellows in order to participate in these activities.     

Prescriptions: Autonomy,Humanism and the Purpose of Health Technology

My purpose is to examine two of the foundations of medical ethics: the principle of autonomy and the concept of the human. I also investigate the extent to which health technology makes autonomy and humanness possible. I begin by underlining Illich's point that the same health technology designed to promote health and autonomy also is pathogenic. I proceed to analyse the Kantian concept of autonomy, a concept which is closely associated with health and which continues to determine current ethical thinking. In so doing, I uncover an unexpected ontological function of health technology, a function described in Heidegger's work on technology. Based on this discovery, I suggest that calls for Kantian autonomy may often be self-defeating or even sometimes harmful. I conclude by calling for continued ethical vigilance, but also for a questioning of the hitherto virtually unquestionable concepts of ethics and humanness which may themselves play a role in our era's greatest problems.     

Personality characteristics of women with alcohol addiction: A Rorschach study of women in an early treatment programme

This study identifies personality characteristics in a group of Swedish women (N=60) attending their first treatment for alcohol problems.The treatment programme specifically addressed women in an early phase of their drinking career, and was called "Early Treatment of Women with Alcohol Addiction" (EWA). Rorschach personality profiles of the 60 women differed significantly in almost all investigated aspects in a psychopathological direction from norms reported by Exner for a reference group of female non-patients. The findings are consistent with the assumption that, although the EWA women were socially well-functioning and fairly early in their drinking career, they nevertheless reveal serious underlying psychopathology. Clinical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Culture,Contexts, and Directions in Russian Post-Soviet Philosophy

Studies in East European Thought - The author examines, historically and theoretically, issues related to the state and current tendencies of post-Soviet Russian philosophy. The accent falls on the...     

New Philosophies of Science in North America – Twenty Years Later

This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

初中一,二年级学生的亲子冲突

本研究选取北京市两所普通中学１９２名初一和初二学生为被试,通过学生对８个方面亲子冲突的评价,探讨初中生亲子冲突的特点。研究发现,（１）初中生早期的亲子冲突处于较低水平;（２）与母亲的冲突多于与父亲的冲突,女生尤其如此;（３）多数亲子冲突随年级而增加;（４）在多数冲突上,男生与父母的冲突多于女生;（５）亲子冲突最多的三个方面为日常生活安排、学业和家务,而冲突最少的为隐私。     

Working in the borderland: early relational trauma and Fordham's analysis of ‘K’

This paper outlines a view of early relational trauma as underlying borderline states of mind, and argues that Knox's 1999 paper on internal working models and the complex provides a basis for understanding such states of mind. The author argues that in addition to internal working models, the complex also embodies and contains primitive defences of the core self. He outlines how these apply on the objective, subjective, transference and archetypal levels, and in direct and reversed forms and applies this to the account of Fordham's analysis of his patient ‘K’, which ended in impasse. The paper explores the dynamic that emerged in that analysis and suggests that it could be helpfully accounted for in terms of the co‐construction and re‐construction of early relational trauma in the analytic relationship.     

Business Ethics without Philosophers? Evidence for and Implications of the Shift From Applied Philosophers to Business Scholars on the Editorial Boards of Business Ethics Journals

This article considers the relationship between business ethics and philosophy, specifically in relation to the field and persons working in it. The starting point is a grammatical one: business ethics by the rules of grammar belongs to ethics. In terms of academic disciplines, it belongs to applied ethics, which belongs to ethics, which belongs to practical philosophy, which belongs to philosophy. However, in the field of business ethics today one will seldom meet colleagues from philosophy; instead, they will come from business, applying business studies perspectives, approaches, and increasingly quantitative methods. This article provides empirical evidence that today the three top journals with “business ethics” in their titles (and “awarded” a high impact factor) are mostly run (in terms of their editorial boards) by business scholars with PhDs in business. The article compares the three journals today with their inaugural issues and finds that at their inception all three were run by a majority of philosophers. The article discusses six possible explanations for this shift and provides suggestions for how to bring business ethics back to philosophers (and vice versa).