Decision making in a dynamic situation: The effect of false alarms and time pressure

An experiment was conducted to investigate the effect of a priori probability of false alarms and time pressure on decision-making behaviour in a dynamic task environment. In order to assess whether strategy selection in a dynamic task environment would be adaptive, we modelled the task mathematically, and compared actual decision strategies to the optimal ones. In addition to the selected strategy, we also studied decision-making behaviour at a lower operational level, reflecting the amount of effort subjects are willing to spend on the decision process. Subjects were required to monitor the fitness level of a simulated athlete, who was running a race, and had to provide treatments whenever the athlete's fitness level suggested a real physiological problem. When a decline of the athlete's fitness was caused by a false alarm, a spontaneous recovery would occur after some time, without any need for intervention. Time pressure was manipulated by the rate at which the athlete's fitness level declined. Overall, subjects did not select the most efficient strategy: they dominantly selected information before applying an action, even though it would have been more profitable, and less effortful, just to apply actions. At the operational level, subjects appeared to invest less effort when the probability of false alarms increased and to invest more effort when time pressure increased. However, in contrast to the outcomes of our mathematical model, subjects adjusted the amount of intervention to the a priori probability of false alarms and not to time pressure. Together, the results indicate that the selection of a decision strategy in a dynamic task is less adaptive then is generally concluded from studies with static tasks.     

A Network Approach to Affect Regulation Dynamics and Personality Trait‐Induced Variations: Extraversion and Neuroticism Moderate Reciprocal Influences between Affect and Affect Regulation Strategies

The objectives of the present study were twofold. First, we tested a new approach to affect regulation dynamics, conceptualized as a network made up of the reciprocal influences that affect and affect regulation strategies constantly exert on each other. Second, we attempted to gain a better understanding of these dynamics by examining how they vary according to broad personality traits. To this end, we adopted an experience sampling method, involving five daily assessments over a 2‐week period. In each assessment, participants indicated their current affective experience and the way they had implemented five well‐known affect regulation strategies (i.e. appreciation, positive reappraisal, distraction, expressive suppression, and rumination) since the previous assessment. At the sample level, the network of affect regulation dynamics was characterized by positive feedback loops between positive affect and so‐called broad‐minded strategies, and between negative affect and narrow‐minded strategies. The form of this network varied according to levels of extraversion and neuroticism. Our findings are discussed in light of current knowledge about personality and affect regulation. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Dynamic Visual Acuity and Performance in a Catching Task

Each of 30 Ss was given tests of dynamic and static visual acuity and then participated in a ball-catching task. Performance in the latter task was an inverted U-shaped function of duration of the occluded period, the time between the termination of the 80-msec. viewing period and the estimated onset of the “latency period” (the point in time at which the ball could no longer serve to cue Ss response). Dynamic and static visual acuity scores were not significantly correlated but, with static visual acuity partialled out, dynamic visual acuity and catching performance were significantly correlated.     

Critical Notice: Peter Ludlow’s Living Words: Meaning Underdetermination and he Dynamic Lexicon,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014

A provocative view has it that word meanings are underdetermined and dynamic, frustrating traditional approaches to theorizing about meaning. Peter Ludlow’s Living Words provides some of the philosophical reasons and motivations for accepting one such view, develops some of its details, and explores some of its ramifications. We critically examine some of the arguments in Living Words, paying particular attention to some of Ludlow’s views about the meanings of predicates, preservation of bivalence and the T-schema, and methods of modulating meaning.