The analytic setting today: using the couch or the chair?

This paper re‐visits Murray Jackson's 1961 paper in the Journal of Analytical Psychology, ‘Chair, couch and countertransference’, with the aim of exploring the role of the couch for Jungian analysts in clinical practice today. Within the Society of Analytical Psychology (SAP) and some other London‐based societies, there has been an evolution of practice from face‐to‐face sessions with the patient in the chair, as was Jung's preference, to a mode of practice where patients use the couch with the analyst sitting to the side rather than behind, as has been the tradition in psychoanalysis. Fordham was the founding member of the SAP and it was because of his liaison with psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts that this cultural shift came about. Using clinical examples, the author explores the couch/chair question in terms of her own practice and the internal setting as a structure in her mind. With reference to Bleger's (2013) paper ‘Psychoanalysis of the psychoanalytic setting’, the author discusses how the analytic setting, including use of the couch or the chair, can act as a silent container for the most primitive aspects of the patient's psyche which will only emerge in analysis when the setting changes or is breached.     

Challenges in Developing a Cultural Evidence‐Based Psychotherapy in the USA: Suggestions for International Studies

In this article, we underscore some of the cultural challenges and limitations of the evidence‐based psychotherapy (EBP) utilised within the USA with the hope that these problems will be avoided or ameliorated in Australia and other countries. Although the EBP research is very diverse and complex, we categorise this fast‐growing literature using a threefold classification system that underscores culture. This classification system is proposed to examine the influence of culture on EBPs. The three categories used are (a) universal evidence‐based psychotherapies or universal psychotherapies, (b) race and ethnic minority evidence‐based psychotherapies or racial/ethnic psychotherapies, and (c) cultural evidence‐based psychotherapies or cultural psychotherapies. After each category is described, its benefits and limitations are discussed, emphasising implications for culturally diverse and international studies. We conclude with suggestions to promote the advancement of a more effective and inclusive cultural EBP in which researchers from different countries can collaborate and learn from each other.     

Commentary on Three Articles on Self‐practice/Self‐reflection in Cognitive‐Behavioural Therapy

The commentary embraces three valuable contributions to the development of professional practice: (a) engagement with self‐practice/self‐reflection as a professional self‐development: the role of therapist beliefs; (b) spontaneous self‐practice of cognitive‐behavioural therapy (CBT) by aboriginal counsellors during and following CBT training: a retrospective analysis of the facilitating conditions and impact; (c) developing metacompetence in low intensity CBT interventions: evaluating a self‐practice/self‐reflection programme for experienced low intensity CBT practitioners. Each article provides different perspectives of the self‐practice and self‐reflection benefits for efficient therapy and their use as powerful resources in therapeutic training skills in general and CBT in particular. Conclusions of their contributions close the commentary.     

Predicting Political Biases Against the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party Movements

Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right‐wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment.     

A Below‐Average Effect with Respect to American Political Stereotypes on Warmth and Competence

The “above‐average effect” is the phenomenon that people tend to judge themselves above average on desirable traits. Based on social identity theory, we propose that a “below‐average effect” may arise when individuals rate themselves and the average ingroup member on traits stereotypically associated with the ingroup. In two studies, Republican and Democrat participants rated themselves and the average political ingroup member on possession of desirable traits related to warmth and competence. Current political stereotypes in America associate the former dimension with Democrats and the latter with Republicans. Consistent with our hypothesis, the above‐average effect was moderated by political group and dimension in interaction. In particular, Democrats rated themselves below the average Democrat on warmth and Republicans rated themselves below the average Republican on competence.     

The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.     

The Politics of Teaching of Indigenous Traditions in Aotearoa/New Zealand

Reflecting on two study abroad trips to New Zealand in 2005 and 2007, I suggest in this essay that it is possible to mitigate the risk of (American or European) students recapitulating imperial attitudes through development of a rigorous curriculum focusing on the legacies of colonialism, institutional racism, and the somewhat dubious phenomenon of “post‐colonialism.” Readings, I argue, should be in continual play during cultural and social activities, operating in a dialectal move toward an “ethics of respect.” Such an ethics remains aporetic, or uncertain, insofar as no code of behavior can render us immune to the political and polemical effects of past and present forms of imperialism. However, a cultivated respect for distance and difference, including regarding questions of “authenticity,” can help to actualize the transformative promise of studying (indigenous) religion abroad. This essay is published alongside of six other essays, including a response from John Barbour, comprising a special section of the journal (see Teaching Theology and Religion 18:1, January 2015).     

WHY I AM AN ACCOMMODATIONIST AND PROUD OF IT

There is a strong need of a reasoned defense of what was known as the “independence” position of the science–religion relationship but that more recently has been denigrated as the “accommodationist” position, namely that while there are parts of religion—fundamentalist Christianity in particular—that clash with modern science, the essential parts of religion (Christianity) do not and could not clash with science. A case for this position is made on the grounds of the essentially metaphorical nature of science. Modern science functions because of its root metaphor of the machine: the world is seen in mechanical terms. As Thomas Kuhn insisted, metaphors function in part by ruling some questions outside their domain. In the case of modern science, four questions go unasked and hence unanswered: Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the foundation of morality? What is mind and its relationship to matter? What is the meaning of it all? You can remain a nonreligious skeptic on these questions, but it is open for the Christian to offer his or her answers, so long as they are not scientific answers. Here then is a way that science and religion can coexist.     

Oculomotor responses of stereo‐anomalous observers to pulse and ramp disparities

We examined oculomotor responses to binocular disparities of one stereo‐normal and three stereo‐anomalous observers, who were identified through a stereoscopic depth‐discrimination task, in two experimental conditions. In the pulse disparity condition, crossed and uncrossed disparities (1–6°) were briefly presented (for .25–2.0 s). In the ramp disparity condition, disparities were varied continuously with constant velocities (.7–2.0°/s) and with an amplitude of 10°. The stereo‐normal observer showed vergence responses to both pulse and ramp disparities. The three stereo‐anomalous observers showed a marked reduction or absence of vergence responses to pulse disparities but showed vergence responses to ramp disparities. The results suggest the existence of separate sub‐systems mediating disparity vergence eye movements.