Category-bounded emotional enhancement: spillover effects in the valuation of public goods

ABSTRACT

We examined whether enhancing (vs. not enhancing) the emotionality of a referent public good influences the subsequent valuation of a target public good. We predicted that it would and that the directionality of its impact would depend on a fundamental cognitive process – categorisation. If the target and referent goods belong to the same domain, we expected that the effect on the target would be in the same direction as the emotional enhancement of the referent (assimilation effect). However, if the target and referent goods belong to different domains, we expected that the effect on the target would be either negligible or in the opposite direction to that of the emotional enhancement of the referent (null or contrast effect). In Experiment 1 we examined the impact of emotionally enhancing a referent public good on feelings towards a target public good, whereas in Experiment 2 on the willingness to contribute towards a target public good. The results support the predicted interaction, which was driven by an assimilation effect for same-domain goods and a null effect for different-domain goods. In doing so, the present findings highlight the interplay between cognition and emotion in the valuation of public goods. We discuss theoretical and practical implications.     

Stories of crime,stories of suffering: A narrative perspective on ethical issues in criminal justice counselling

Counsellors working with prisoners often listen to stories that are both stories of crime and stories of suffering. From a criminal justice perspective, the suffering of offenders is deliberately inflicted as punishment. From a counselling perspective, however, responding to the suffering of a client and even trying to relieve it is a basic ethical concern. So counsellors, working with offenders, may face the ethical question of how to integrate a response to the suffering of offenders with a response to crime, especially when confronted with stories of cruel, violent crimes. In this paper, it is argued that a narrative perspective on counselling offers a framework in which these responses may be integrated. Here, the principle of recognizing privileged authorship of persons is crucial. The concepts of ‘double listening for implicit others’ and ‘relationally rich stories’ are developed, which are based on concepts and ideas from narrative therapy. These serve as a first step of translating the narrative ethical framework to counselling practice.     

The Relationship of Temperament Scores to the Way Young Adults Adapt to Change

Temperament has been suggested as affecting the way individuals adapt to changes. This study examined the relationship of temperament, as measured by the Dimensions of Temperament Scale (Lerner, Palermo, Spiro, & Nesselroade, 1982), to three aspects of adaptation for 167 students starting post-secondary education. Loneliness was measured using Schmidt and Sermat's (1983) Differential Loneliness Scale, involvement was measured using Scales of Satisfaction and Activity (Vinsel, Brown, Altman, & Foss, 1980), and affect was measured using the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965a). In the sample, feelings of loneliness were related to temperament differentially with regard to friends, romantic-sexual relationships, groups, and family. Involvement was best predicted by the approach/withdrawal dimension, whereas affect was best predicted by the dimensions of mood. The results are consistent with earlier work with children and lend support to the view of temperament as an active mechanism by which the individual adapts to life changes.     

亮度对空间-数字反应编码联合效应的影响

本研究探讨亮度对空间-数字反应编码联合效应（Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes,简称SNARC效应）的影响及其机制。通过三个实验设计不同的亮度对比水平,要求被试对阿拉伯数字1~9（5除外）进行奇偶判断。实验一将数字亮度设为最高值255时,结果出现了数字的SNARC效应。实验二将数字的亮度值分别设为255和213时,结果仍存在SNARC效应。实验三将亮度值分别设置为213和42时,数字的SNARC效应却消失了。这些结果表明亮度会激活或抑制数字的空间表征,可能与亮度对比值的高低及所消耗认知资源的多少有关。     

Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations

Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side‐effect ( Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006 ). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side‐effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations and provide evidence that their role in moral judgment is mediated by these nonmoral psychological representations. Specifically, the action/omission distinction affects moral judgment primarily via causal attribution, while the means/side‐effect distinction affects moral judgment via intentional attribution. We suggest that many of the specific patterns evident in our moral judgments in fact derive from nonmoral psychological mechanisms, and especially from the processes of causal and intentional attribution.     

The dynamics of successive induction in larval zebrafish

Charles Sherrington identified the properties of the synapse by purely behavioral means—the study of reflexes—more than 100 years ago. They were subsequently confirmed neurophysiologically. Studying reflex interaction, he also showed that activating one reflex often facilitates another, antagonistic one: successive induction, which has since been demonstrated in a wide range of species, from aphids to locusts to dogs and humans. We show a particularly orderly example in zebrafish (Danio rerio) larvae; the behavior (locomotion) of larvae is low in dark and intermediate in light, but low in light and substantially higher in dark when dark followed light. A quantitative model of a simple dynamic process is described that readily captures the behavior pattern and the effects of a number of manipulations of lighting conditions.     

Is A Purely First Person Account Of Human Action Defensible?

There are two perspectives available from which to understand an agent's intention in acting. The first is the perspective of the acting agent: what did she take to be her end, and the means necessary to achieve that end? The other is a third person perspective that is attentive to causal or conceptual relations: was some causal outcome of the agent's action sufficiently close, or so conceptually related, to what the agent did that it should be considered part of her intention? Recent goods based views in ethics are divided as to whether only the first person perspective, or a mix of both perspectives, are necessary to understand intention and action. But resolution of the issue is necessary if goods based views are to be able to deploy to principle of double effect; for that principle requires an account of how to distinguish what is genuinely a matter of intention in human action from what is not. I argue that the pure first person account is better than the mixed account.     

When does a referent public problem affect financial and political support for public action?

In three studies we examined the willingness to support action to remedy a public problem. In Study 1 and Study 2, people were asked whether they would financially contribute to solution of a public problem. In Study 3, people were asked whether they would sign a petition to support a public action. The aim was to test whether the willingness to support solution of a public problem is affected by the type of problem that is used as the referent. We hypothesized that the willingness to support a public action is lower when evaluated in the context of a high‐ as opposed to a low‐importance referent problem (importance contrast effect). We also hypothesized that the importance contrast effect is tied to the perceived relatedness between the target and referent problems. The importance contrast effect should be found only when the two problems relate to different category domains. The findings bear out this prediction. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.