两维特征图形的客体和空间工作记忆存储研究

研究采用单探测变化检测范式,考察了两维特征图形在视觉客体和视觉空间工作记忆中的存储机制,并对其容量进行测定。40名被试(平均年龄20.56±1.73岁)随机分为两个等组,分别完成实验一和实验二。实验一的刺激图形由颜色和形状两基本特征组成,实验二的刺激为由不同颜色和开口朝向组成的兰道环。两个实验结果均显示:(1)特征交换变化条件下的记忆成绩与单特征变化条件下最差的记忆成绩差异不显著;(2)空间工作记忆任务的成绩显著优于客体工作记忆任务;(3)被试在视觉工作记忆中能存储2~3个客体和3~4个空间位置。这表明,由两种不同维度特征组成的图形在视觉客体和视觉空间工作记忆中均以整合方式进行存储,空间工作记忆的容量大于客体工作记忆。     

How rejection of essences expresses despair

The Self and the ego in Jung's psychology are an instance of what Edmund Husserl called a 'double intentionality': one tending toward meaning is distinct from another tending toward meaning, yet they are reciprocally inseparable from each other. As perception in a present moment and memory of a past are impossible without each other, so an intending of ego and that of Self are impossible without each other. Accompanying the ego (mostly in the background) during each moment of time is a tending towards a particular Idea or essence. This reciprocity is expressed in a unique way over a lifetime and is like the relation of mother and child, and so it is important for all of us born of women to retain a sense of essences and the fullness of Self. 'Constructivism', however, is a current belief held by some feminists, and it influences both theorizing and practice in analytical psychology. It involves a rejection of essences, a revision of Jung's Idea of Self, and an attempt to conduct analysis without reference to an intentional subjective Self. Such constructivist revision expresses a despair both about essences as Ideas and about Self as intentional and subjective. It is despair over Self in a Kierkegaardian sense.     

TECHNO‐SECULARISM AND “REVEALED RELIGION”: SOME PROBLEMS WITH CAIAZZA'S ANALYSIS

Abstract. Instead of focusing my remarks on John Caiazza's interesting and important thesis about the way in which modern technology is drastically secularizing our culture today, I examine the frame within which he sets out his thesis, a frame I regard as seriously flawed. Caiazza's argument is concerned with the broad range of religion/science/technology issues in today's world, but the only religion that he seems to take seriously is what he calls “revealed religion” (Christianity). His consideration of religion is thus narrow and cramped, and this makes it difficult to assess properly the significance of what he calls techno‐secularism. I suggest that employing a broader conception of religion would enable us to see more clearly what is really at stake in the rise of techno‐secularism. Instead of defining the issues in the polarizing terms of revealed religion versus secularity, I argue for a more integrative approach in which concepts are developed that can bring together and hold together major religious insights and themes with modern scientific thinking. If, for example, we give up the anthropomorphism of the traditional idea of God as creator and think of God as simply creativity, it becomes possible to integrate theological insights with current scientific thinking and to formulate the issues posed by the rise of techno‐secularism in a more illuminating way. This in turn should facilitate effective address of those issues.     

The Sexual Double Standard: Fact or Fiction?

In contemporary society it is widely believed that men are socially rewarded for sexual activity, whereas women are derogated for sexual activity. To determine whether a sexual double standard exists, both undergraduate (n = 144) and Internet (n = 8,080) participants evaluated experimental targets who were described as either male or female and as having a variable number of sexual partners. Targets were more likely to be derogated as the number of sexual partners increased, and this effect held for both male and female targets. These results suggest that, although people do evaluate others as a function of sexual activity, people do not necessarily hold men and women to different sexual standards.     

Paradoxes in Double Extension Set Theories

Three systems of double extension set theory have been proposed by Andrzej Kisielewicz in two papers. In this paper, it is shown that the two stronger systems are inconsistent, and that the third, weakest system does not admit extensionality for general sets or the use of general sets as parameters in its comprehension scheme. The parameter-free version of the comprehension principle of double extension set theory is also shown to be inconsistent with extensionality. The definitions of the systems and a self-contained exposition of their properties is given, sufficient to develop the inconsistency proofs.     

A transitory homosexual passion in the course of an analytic treatment1

Do homosexualities express a sexual confl ict originating in bisexuality or must we look for their deep determinism in the narcissistic confl ict and its vicissitudes? Two clinical sequences from the treatment of a borderline patient, which occurred during years seven and eight of treatment, a period characterised by intense drive turbulence and the unexpected occurrence of a transitory homosexual passion, will enable the reader to follow the psychical movements and evolution of the work of representation. The fi rst sequence throws light on the links between her sudden involvement in this homosexual passion and the traumatic dangers of a breakdown of her ego's capacity for representation, linked to a reactivation in the transference of early and later traumatic traces whose reverberation in the transfero/countertransference dynamic was the source of a painful transference that was responsible for this lateral transference movement. The second sequence shows the links between the strengthening of her capacity for representation, thanks to the working through of the oedipal confl ict in its two aspects, and her renunciation of this passion. The roots of this transitory homosexual passion in the deep fl aws of her psychical functioning raise metapsychological questions concerning, in particular, the dynamic of the ‘double’(‘twin’) and narcissism.     

Paradoxical decrease of imitation performance with age in children

Imitation development was studied in a cross-sectional design involving 174 primary-school children (aged 6–10), focusing on the effect of actions' complexity and error analysis to infer the underlying cognitive processes. Participants had to imitate the model's actions as if they were in front of a mirror (‘specularly’). Complexity varied across three levels: movements of a single limb; arm and leg of the same body side; or arm and leg of opposite body sides. While the overall error rate decreased with age, this was not true of all error categories. The rate of ‘side’ errors (using a limb of the wrong body side) paradoxically increased with age (from 9 years). However, with increasing age, the error rate also became less sensitive to the complexity of the action. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that older children have the working memory (WM) resources and the body knowledge necessary to imitate ‘anatomically’, which leads to additional side errors. Younger children might be paradoxically free from such interference because their WM and/or body knowledge are insufficient for anatomical imitation. Yet, their limited WM resources would prevent them from successfully managing the conflict between spatial codes involved in complex actions (e.g. moving the left arm and the right leg). We also found evidence that action side and content might be stored in separate short-term memory (STM) systems: increasing the number of sides to be encoded only affected side retrieval, but not content retrieval; symmetrically, increasing the content (number of movements) of the action only affected content retrieval, but not side retrieval. In conclusion, results suggest that anatomical imitation might interfere with specular imitation at age 9 and that STM storages for side and content of actions are separate.     

Double Reference Points: the Effects of Social and Financial Reference Points on Decisions Under Risk

The existing literature is inconsistent about how social comparison affects risk attitudes. We propose a framework where the total utility is composed of the social and financial utilities. The financial utility is consistent with prospect theory (i.e., an S‐shaped utility function with a financial reference point), whereas the social utility is affected by both social and financial reference points. Therefore, social risk attitudes are determined by interaction between gains/losses in both social and financial contexts. On the basis of safety‐first principle, we propose that when experiencing financial gains, individuals tend to seek upside potential and take social risks (i.e., a convex social utility function). In contrast, when facing financial losses, people would be more risk seeking in social gains but more risk averse in social losses to maximize security (i.e., an inverse S‐shaped utility function). We also propose that the relative importance of financial and social utilities depends on the saliency of the reference points and size of stakes. Studies 1 and 2 showed that individuals were risk seeking in both social gains and losses with social reference points alone. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that when both financial and social reference points were salient, participants were risk averse in both social gains and losses when facing financial gains, but risk seeking in social gains and risk averse in social losses when facing financial losses. The hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework were in general supported by our experiments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Representationalism,perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts

This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion (blur, perspective, double vision, etc.) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This can be shown by considering limit cases of perceptual distortion, for example, maximally blurry experiences, which manifestly lack details present in clear experiences. I argue that since there is no reasonable way to draw the line between distorted experiences that have degraded content and distorted experiences that do not, we should allow that an increase in distortion is always accompanied by a degradation in content. I also discuss the prospects for a positive account of the contents specific to distorted experiences. I argue that the prospects for such an account are dim, but that this is due to limitations of our phenomenal concepts, not to the falsity of the representationalist thesis.