Developmental changes in the relations between inhibitory control and externalizing problems during early childhood

Deficits in executive function, and in particular, reduced capacity to inhibit a dominant action, are a risk factor for externalizing problems (EP). Inhibitory control (IC) develops in the later preschool and early childhood periods, such that IC might not regulate EP in toddlers and younger preschoolers. Aggression was observed during peer play for 66 girls and 49 boys, from 2.75 to 6.00 years (M=4.14, S.D.=0.78). Mothers reported on children's IC and EP concurrently and 12 months later, and concurrent teacher reports of EP were also collected. Factor analysis supported aggregation of mother and teacher‐reported EP and observed physical aggression into one measure of externalizing difficulties. Mothers reported lower IC for children with more externalizing difficulties, and the inverse relation between IC and externalizing difficulties strengthened over the toddler, preschool and kindergarten periods. Similar relations between IC and EP were observed 12 months later, and increases in IC also predicted reductions in EP over 1 year. These data demonstrate that the preschool years are a dynamic period of developmental change in the relations between IC and EP. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

内侧前额叶皮质—— “自我”的神经基础

自我神经基础的探讨常基于自我相关加工的研究, 涉及皮质中线结构各个脑区甚至全脑协同作用。内侧前额叶皮质及其次成分在自我相关加工中发挥重要作用：腹内侧前额叶皮质较多支持默认模式下的自我加工、自我信息的觉察和“在线”自我加工, 背内侧前额叶皮质主要参与有意识的自我参照加工、自我信息的评价和“主导的”自我加工。在自我-他人表征中, 自我-他人表征的情感性、认知性和文化性因素均调节内侧前额叶皮质及次成分的活动。未来在动态的时间和人际背景中解析自我加工的神经机制是重要的研究方向。     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

Age differences in neural activity related to mentalizing during person perception

ABSTRACT

Mentalizing, or thinking about others’ mental states, shapes social interactions. Older adults (OA) have reduced mentalizing capacities reflected by lower medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activation. The current study assessed if OA’ lower mPFC activation reflects less spontaneous mentalizing during person perception. Younger adults (YA) and OA viewed ingroup White and outgroup Black and Asian faces and completed a mentalizing task during fMRI. Afterward, they completed a task in which they inferred mental states from faces. Using an mPFC region defined by the mentalizing task, OA had lower activity than YA during person perception. OA’ mPFC activity toward faces positively related to their mentalizing outside the scanner. The extent of OA’ lower mPFC activation during person perception may depend on their actual detection of mental states in faces. Further, YA’, but not OA’, mPFC activity distinguished between outgroups. OA’ lower mentalizing-related mPFC activity may reduce their ability to individuate outgroup members.