“Seeing is believing”: The effects of facial expressions of emotion and verbal communication in social dilemmas

In social dilemmas, verbal communication of one's intentions is an important factor in increasing cooperation. In addition to verbal communication of one's intentions, also the communication of emotions of anger and happiness can influence cooperative behavior. In the present paper, we argue that facial expressions of emotion moderate verbal communication in social dilemmas. More specifically, three experiments showed that if the other person displayed happiness he or she was perceived as honest, trustworthy, and reliable, and cooperation was increased when verbal communication was cooperative rather than self‐interested. However, if the other person displayed anger, verbal communication did not influence people's decision behavior. Results also showed interactive effects on people's perceptions of trustworthiness, which partially mediated decision behavior. These findings suggest that emotion displays have an important function in organizational settings because they are able to influence social interactions and cooperative behavior. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

第三方惩罚对合作的溢出效应：基于社会规范的解释

第三方惩罚对合作的维系可能来自经济功能或规范提示功能。先前研究没有区分这两种功能, 因而未能回答：当惩罚不足以影响违规收益时, 是否还能促进合作?实验1 (N = 252)发现即使第三方惩罚无法降低违规收益, 依然能抑制自利行为。实验2 (N = 179)发现受过惩罚的违规者在其后的独裁者博弈表现出了更高的合作水平。2(是否旁观惩罚)×2(旁观前后)设计的实验3 (N = 179)显示, 旁观惩罚后被试的合作水平显著高于旁观前, 也高于未旁观惩罚的被试。后两个实验中, 社会规范在惩罚与合作之间均起中介作用。这进一步证实惩罚对合作的促进在很大程度上是通过规范激活来实现的, 并存在两种溢出效应：惩罚抑制了曾经的违规者(纵向溢出效应)和旁观者(横向溢出效应)在新博弈情境下的自私行为。这两种溢出效应的发现补充了文献中占主导地位的经济学解释, 并为理解人类社会长时间、大规模的合作提供了新视角。     

Exploring cooperation and competition in the Centipede game through verbal protocol analysis

The Centipede game is an abstract model of reciprocal relationships in which two individuals alternate in helping each other at relatively small personal cost. Whereas mutual cooperation can benefit both individuals in the long run, a paradoxical but logically compelling backward induction argument suggests that cooperation is irrational. Empirical studies have reported reliable deviations from the non‐cooperative backward induction solution, but their exclusively quantitative methods allow only a limited range of predefined motives to be explored. Our study uses verbal (‘think aloud’) protocols and qualitative data analysis to identify motives for cooperation in the Centipede game. The results provide little evidence for sophisticated backward induction reasoning. Instead, a wide range of motives emerged, their relative saliences varying according to the stage of the game. Activity bias affected decisions mainly at the beginning of the game, whereas cooperative and altruistic social value orientations most frequently accounted for cooperation towards its natural end.     

Patriotism's Impact on Cooperation with the State: An Experimental Study on Tax Compliance

Although it seems reasonable to assume that activating patriotism might motivate citizens to cooperate with the state in reaching societal goals, the empirical evidence supporting this contention is based mostly on correlational rather than experimental studies. In addition, little is known on whether patriotism can be manipulated without simultaneously triggering nationalism and on the psychological processes which determine the patriotism‐cooperation relation. This current article reports results of one survey and three experiments that manipulate patriotism by displaying either a national flag or national landscapes or by priming national achievements. The outcomes indicate that reported and manipulated patriotism indirectly increase tax compliance, although the national flag also increases nationalism. National achievements, on the other hand, seemingly increases trust in national public institutions and the voluntary motivation to cooperate, whereas national landscapes only increase the voluntary motivation to cooperate. Hence, it is possible to increase social capital in the form of trust and cooperation through patriotism without fostering nationalism as well.     

Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction (BI) argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several game, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group vs. individual decisions, and players’ social value orientations (SVOs). Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation.     

Development and validation of the organisational cooperation questionnaire

IntroductionCooperation is an essential framework for the functioning of organisations and society. The limitations of current measures of organisational cooperation led us to construct the measure herein presented.ObjectiveThe paper aims to describe the development and psychometric validation of an organisational cooperation measure based on how the cooperating members view and experience the cooperation process.MethodBased on relevant literature, the items were built and submitted to a panel of experts and fine-tuning procedures. The instrument (31 items) was applied to 1354 employees in local authorities. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis were performed (2 sub-samples), as well as validation procedures through Pearson correlation with the Knowledge Management Questionnaire.ResultsResults showed good statistical indicators of a 22-items three-factor structure: principles of cooperative relationship; formal regulation of cooperation; and cooperation focused on organisational mission. The factors are interpreted theoretically and present high internal consistency. The validation process suggests the suitability of the instrument for the population studied.ConclusionThis instrument can be used as a starting point for organisational intervention when cooperation-intensive processes are relevant. It can be useful to characterize the existing cooperation in organisations and to foster cooperation in organisations, especially in the intended dimensions. Future studies can apply the instrument to various sectors of activity. It will also be worth studying cooperation in its relationship with other organisational variables, namely those concerning cooperation-intensive processes.     

Kinship does not affect litter defence in pairs of communally nesting female house mice

Communal litter defence by sister and nonsister female mice can provide a valuable experimental paradigm to test whether females invest preferentially in kin. Since females within sister and nonsister pairs have different coefficients of relatedness with the young, the cumulative litter has more fitness value for related than for unrelated partners. Sister and nonsister paired females that gave birth simultaneously (n = 18), or at least within 7 days from each other (n = 12), were tested for maternal aggression on post partum day 7, or 10 days after the first delivery, respectively. Sister (n = 14) and nonsister pairs (n = 16) did not differ in cumulative values of post partum aggression or in the extent to which aggression was balanced within the pair. The aggressive behavior of each female was not correlated with her relative proportion of pups in the litter. Rather, the combined scores of aggression within the pairs were found to be positively correlated with the cumulative litter size. The analysis of mouse litter defence behavior shows that, under conditions of communal nesting, kinship does not seem to affect parental investment in the young significantly. Rather, the cumulative litter size could be used by paired females as a major indicator for parental investment allocation.     

Teaching self-control to small groups of dually diagnosed adults

The present study examined the use of a progressive delay procedure to teach self-control to two groups of dually diagnosed adults. When given a choice between an immediate smaller reinforcer and a larger delayed reinforcer, both groups chose the smaller reinforcer during baseline. During treatment, progressive increases in work requirements for gaining access to a larger reinforcer resulted in both groups selecting larger delayed reinforcers. The results are discussed with respect to increasing cooperative work behavior and self-control.     

Cost containment forces physicians into ethical and quality of care compromises

Contemporary cost containment measures ignore patients' need for privacy, destroy long-term doctor-patient relationships, and demand ethical and standard of care compromises.Economic considerations have distracted the physician and he/she no longer focuses primarily on the patient's welfare. The superficiality of the doctor-patient relationship and the cost-cutting efforts have jointly contributed to the deterioration of the quality of medical care.