Lay Personality Theories in Interactive Decisions: Strongly Held,Weakly Supported

In interactive decisions, cues to what others will do are important in forming a strategy. Information about others' personalities appears to be potentially valuable for this purpose. We report a series of four studies examining how information about another actor's personality influences people's own choices in interactive decisions. The studies found widespread beliefs that others' personality characteristics are strongly predictive both of broad classes of decision behavior (competition/cooperation, risk‐seeking/risk‐aversion) (Study 1) and of specific choices (Study 2) in single‐agent settings. These beliefs extended to predicting others' choices in interactive decisions (Study 3) and to shaping the predictor's own decisions in interactive play in Chicken and Assurance games (Study 4). Overall, we found extensive evidence that laypeople believe that the personality traits we selected (angry‐hostility, anxiety, assertiveness, excitement‐seeking, and warmth) have substantial effects on behavior in interactive decisions and they act on those beliefs when making their own decisions. The empirical evidence supporting the predictive validity of these traits was, however, quite weak. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Applying a logic of appropriateness to understand behavioral differences between common resource dilemmas and public good dilemmas

Common resource dilemmas (CRDs) and public good dilemmas (PGDs) are distinct types of social dilemmas, yet they model the same underlying conflict between the collective interest and one's self-interest. Here, we study and interpret behavioral differences between these two main types of social dilemmas by applying a logic of appropriateness. In two experiments, we argue and demonstrate that CRDs, relative to PGDs, evoke higher levels of cooperation, because taking from collective property (in CRDs) is generally considered less appropriate than not giving from personal property (in PGDs). Importantly, these differential considerations of appropriateness are reflected not only in the willingness to cooperate but also in the willingness to punish and reward others' (non)cooperative behavior. Taken together, the findings reveal that CRDs and PGDs elicit different norms of appropriateness.     

Dynamic probability of reinforcement for cooperation: Random game termination in the centipede game

Experimental games have previously been used to study principles of human interaction. Many such games are characterized by iterated or repeated designs that model dynamic relationships, including reciprocal cooperation. To enable the study of infinite game repetitions and to avoid endgame effects of lower cooperation toward the final game round, investigators have introduced random termination rules. This study extends previous research that has focused narrowly on repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games by conducting a controlled experiment of two‐player, random termination Centipede games involving probabilistic reinforcement and characterized by the longest decision sequences reported in the empirical literature to date (24 decision nodes). Specifically, we assessed mean exit points and cooperation rates, and compared the effects of four different termination rules: no random game termination, random game termination with constant termination probability, random game termination with increasing termination probability, and random game termination with decreasing termination probability. We found that although mean exit points were lower for games with shorter expected game lengths, the subjects' cooperativeness was significantly reduced only in the most extreme condition with decreasing computer termination probability and an expected game length of two decision nodes.     

Développer l’apprentissage,la coopération et l’identité organisationnelle en milieu hospitalier Evaluation de l’impact d’un Dispositif d’Immersion Structuré

In this article we analyse the effects of an innovative approach adopted in a hospital institution. Using a specific framework, this approach consists of placing staff into a department other than their own. The objectives of this approach relate to cognition, identity and organisational behaviour. Based on thematic and structural analysis of 25 interviews, this evaluation shows that the effects of the intervention are consistent with the anticipated objectives on several levels: (1) learning about ways of functioning and working in the host department, (2) growth of co-operation between departments, (3) the development of a feeling of organisational belonging.     

Who volunteers in psychology experiments? An empirical review of prosocial motivation in volunteering

The central purpose of the present research is to provide a review of social value orientation (i.e., prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientation), a construct measured with methods rooted in game theory (i.e., decomposed games). Also, we examine its ability to predict volunteering in psychology experiments. Consistent with hypotheses, Study 1 revealed that prosocials are more likely to volunteer in psychological experiments than do individualists and competitors. Study 2 replicated these findings, and revealed also that social value orientation was strongly linked to the academic study they chose. In particular, among psychology students, prosocials (57%) was the largest group, followed by individualists (37%), and only a few competitors (6%); in contrast, among economics students, individualists appeared largest (47%), followed by prosocials (36%), and still a fairly sizeable percentage of competitors (17%). It is concluded that psychologists and economists tend to rely on samples (from their participant pools) that may systematically differ in terms of motivation and beliefs that are associated with differences in prosociality, selfishness, and competition.     

Commitment and self-control in a prisoner's dilemma game

Humans often make seemingly irrational choices in situations of conflict between a particular smaller-sooner reinforcer and a more abstract, temporally extended, but larger reinforcer. In two experiments, the extent to which the availability of commitment responses-self-imposed restrictions on future choices-might improve self-control in such situations was investigated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy-cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. Defecting produced a small-immediate reinforcer (consisting of points convertible to gift cards) whereas cooperating increased the amount of subsequent reinforcers, yielding a greater overall reinforcer rate. Participants were normally free to cooperate or defect on each trial. Additionally, they could choose to make a commitment response that forced their choice for the ensuing five trials. For some participants, the commitment response forced cooperation; for others, it forced defection. Most participants, with either commitment response available, chose to commit repeatedly despite a minor point loss for doing so. After extended exposure to these contingencies, the commit-to-cooperate group cooperated significantly more than a control group (with no commitment available). The commit-to-defect group cooperated significantly less than the control group. When both commitment alternatives were simultaneously available-one for cooperation and one for defection-cooperation commitment was strongly preferred. In Experiment 2, the commitment alternative was removed at the end of the session; gains in cooperation, relative to the control group, were not sustained in the absence of the self-imposed behavioral scaffold.     

Making IBM's Computer, Watson, Human

This essay uses the recent victory of an IBM computer (Watson) in the TV game, Jeopardy, to speculate on the abilities Watson would need, in addition to those it has, to be human. The essay's basic premise is that to be human is to behave as humans behave and to function in society as humans function. Alternatives to this premise are considered and rejected. The viewpoint of the essay is that of teleological behaviorism. Mental states are defined as temporally extended patterns of overt behavior. From this viewpoint (although Watson does not currently have them), essential human attributes such as consciousness, the ability to love, to feel pain, to sense, to perceive, and to imagine may all be possessed by a computer. Most crucially, a computer may possess self-control and may act altruistically. However, the computer's appearance, its ability to make specific movements, its possession of particular internal structures (e.g., whether those structures are organic or inorganic), and the presence of any nonmaterial "self," are all incidental to its humanity.     

社会决策：自我利益与他人利益的权衡

自我利益与他人利益之间的冲突是社会决策中最重要的心理冲突之一。在自我利益与他人利益中寻求平衡是社会决策的关键。西方经济学理论在很长一段时间里认为,追求自我利益是人类行为的唯一动机。近年来越来越多的理论和实证研究表明在社会互动中,人类同时也会关心他人的利益。本文试图将自我利益和他人利益作为社会决策中利益权衡的两端,综合起来阐释诸如合作、利他、公平、利己等人类社会决策行为的重要概念,力图将纷繁的概念整合到统一、清晰的框架中。     

Cooperation in Ethnically Diverse Neighborhoods: A Lost‐Letter Experiment

Several studies suggest a negative impact of ethnic diversity on cooperation, but most of them rely on attitudinal and other indirect measurements of cooperation or are derived from the artificial laboratory setting. We conducted a field experiment based on the lost‐letter technique across 52 neighborhoods in Berlin, Germany. The study has two aims. First, we investigate whether the negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on cooperation holds for concrete cooperative behavior in a real‐world setting. Second, we test the most prominent psychological mechanism that has been proposed to explain the negative effects of heterogeneity on cooperation, namely in‐group favoritism. We do so by experimentally varying the ethnicity and religion of the senders of letters. We find strong support for the negative effect of ethnic diversity on cooperation. We find no evidence, however, of in‐group favoritism. Letters from Turkish or Muslim organizations were as often returned as those from German and Christian organizations, and the ethnic diversity effect was the same for all types of letters.     

A Description–Experience Gap in Social Interactions: Information about Interdependence and Its Effects on Cooperation

In social interactions, decision makers are often unaware of their interdependence with others, precluding the realization of shared long‐term benefits. In an experiment, pairs of participants played an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under various conditions involving differing levels of interdependence information. Each pair was assigned to one of four conditions: “No‐Info” players saw their own actions and outcomes, but were not told that they interacted with another person; “Min‐Info” players knew they interacted with another person but still without seeing the other's actions or outcomes; “Mid‐Info” players discovered the other's actions and outcomes as they were revealed over time; and “Max‐Info” players were also shown a complete payoff matrix mapping actions to outcomes from the outset and throughout the game. With higher levels of interdependence information, we found increased individual cooperation and mutual cooperation, driven by increased reciprocating cooperation (in response to a counterpart's cooperation). Furthermore, joint performance and satisfaction were higher for pairs with more information. We discuss how awareness of interdependence may encourage cooperative behavior in real‐world interactions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.