人与自然和谐的道德基础——古代"天人合一"思想的现代生态伦理启示

人与自然的和谐有着道德基础。古代的“天人合一”思想为我们从道德的视角研究人与自然的和谐,以及建构现代生态伦理观提供了一定的帮助。从道德的意义上,人与自然的和谐中人是道德主体,承担着全部道德责任,其行为是道德评价的对象。人对自然的适应与改造、尊重与利用是辩证的统一。     

Banking Seed: Use and Value in the Conservation of Agricultural Diversity

Since the 1930s it has been widely acknowledged that agricultural crop diversity is being lost at an alarming rate. The international response to this genetic erosion has principally taken the form of ex situ genebanks. In these facilities and in the international regulatory frameworks that now surround them, it is genetic diversity that is the focus of conservation efforts. This focus, however, passes over the many other important diversities—both biological and social (or ‘biosocial’)—that exist in, and depend on, agricultural environments. These diversities cannot be conserved in genebanks. In addition to failing to actually conserve agricultural diversity (in any full sense of the term), ex situ banking projects also produce important potential inequalities—in terms of which material is banked and who has access to it. If, however, we refuse to accept an exclusive focus on the genetic components of plants, and instead insist on a brand of conservation that includes whole biosocial, more-than-human communities, then the role of banked resources must be radically rethought. Genebanks might instead take the place of central nodes in networks of diversity sharing, helping to keep plant varieties growing and circulating. This focus, in turn, requires that we also pay more critical attention to the various economic, legal and other mechanisms that prevent or stifle the flow and development of plant genetic resources in/to agricultural communities—especially those of peasant and indigenous farmers that play such a crucial role in conserving the world's (agro)biodiversity.     

Kant's One World: Interpreting 'Transcendental Idealism'

The relationship between divine and created causality was widely discussed in medieval and early modern philosophy. Contemporary scholars of these discussions typically stake out three possible positions: occasionalism, concurrentism, and mere-conservationism. It is regularly claimed that virtually no medieval thinker adopted the final view which denies that God is an immediate active cause of creaturely actions. The main aim of this paper is to further understanding of the medieval causality debate, and particularly the mere-conservationist position, by analysing Peter John Olivi's neglected defence of it. The paper also includes discussion of Thomas Aquinas's arguments for concurrentism and an analysis of whether Olivi's objections refute his position.     

Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.     

孔子与泰德·本顿的生态观之比较

20世纪后半期,人类面临的最突出的问题就是全球性的生态危机和环境问题。摆脱人类生存的困境,走向具有生态持续性的文明社会是中国现代化实践面临的严峻挑战。本文试将孔子和泰德·本顿的生态观加以比较,求同存异,发掘其中蕴含的积极因素。两者在对自然的解读上,强调自然的客观实在性,重视自然的内在价值和对自然规律的遵循;在人与自然的关系上,阐发人与自然的息息相关性和密不可分性,强调二者相互作用。相互影响;在对自然资源的利用上,强调合理地支配和有限地利用自然,承认自然的极限。这些思想为我国生态文明建设提供了有益的借鉴。     

Attributing and denying humanness to others

We review a programme of research on the attribution of humanness to people, and the ways in which lesser humanness is attributed to some compared to others. We first present evidence that humanness has two distinct senses, one representing properties that are unique to our species, and the other—human nature—those properties that are essential or fundamental to the human category. An integrative model of dehumanisation is then laid out, in which distinct forms of dehumanisation correspond to the denial of the two senses of humanness, and the likening of people to particular kinds of nonhuman entities (animals and machines). Studies demonstrating that human nature attributes are ascribed more to the self than to others are reviewed, along with evidence of the phenomenon's cognitive and motivational basis. Research also indicates that both kinds of humanness are commonly denied to social groups, both explicitly and implicitly, and that they may cast a new light on the study of stereotype content. Our approach to the study of dehumanisation complements the tradition of research on infrahumanisation, and indicates new directions for exploring the importance of humanness as a dimension of social perception.     

Our Cosmos,from Substance to Process

Philosophies of nature over the past three centuries have gone through three distinct phases, beginning with classical views and now evolving into a process view at the dawn of the 21st century. These phases derive from a complex weaving of two frameworks of physics since Newton's time [classical, modern] with two principal metaphysical frameworks[substance, event]. Problematic fin de siècle claims at the end of both the 19th and 20th centuries appear to have a common root in substance metaphysics and part/whole reductionism. Going beyond such simplistic forms of modernism requires a more integrated, ecological worldview, or process view of nature.     

DIVINE PURPOSE AND EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES

When Darwin's theory of natural selection threatened to put Paley's Designer out of a job, one response was to reemploy God as the author of the evolutionary process itself. This idea requires an account of how God might be understood to act in biological history. I approach this question in two stages: first, by considering God's action as creator of the world as a whole, and second, by exploring the idea of particular divine action in the course of evolution. As creator ex nihilo God acts directly in every event as its sustaining ground. Because God structures the world as a lawful order of natural causes, God also acts indirectly by means of creatures. More controversially, God might act directly within the world to affect the course of events; this action need not take the form of a miraculous intervention, if the natural order includes the right sort of indeterministic chance. In each of these ways God's purposes can shape evolutionary processes.     

BIOLOGY AND THE THEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN

We will consider two Christian responses to the enormous advances in recent years in the connected sciences of genetics, evolutionary biology, and biochemistry, a dualist one by Pope John Paul II and an “emergentist” one by Arthur Peacocke. These two could hardly be more different. It would be impossible within the scope of a brief comment to do justice to these differences. What I hope to do instead is more modest: to draw attention to troublesome ambiguities in some of the key concepts on which discussions of human uniqueness depend, to recall very briefly some of the difficulties philosophers have encountered in their attempts to define the relation of the human powers of mind to the material capacities of body, and finally to ask what the theological significance of all this is.     

Valedictory

Contingentism, generally contrasted with law necessitarianism, is the view that the laws of nature are contingent. It is often coupled with the claim that their contingency is knowable a priori. This paper considers Bird's [2001 Bird, Alexander 2001. Necessarily, Salt Dissolves In Water, Analysis 61/4: 267–74.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2002 Bird, Alexander 2002. On Whether Some Laws Are Necessary, Analysis 62/3: 257–70.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2005 Bird, Alexander 2005. Unexpected A Posteriori Necessary Laws of Nature, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83/4: 533–48.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2007 Bird, Alexander 2007. Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties, Oxford: Clarendon Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] arguments for the thesis that, necessarily, salt dissolves in water; and it defends his view against Beebee's [2001] and Psillos's [2002 Psillos, Stathis 2002. Salt Does Dissolve In Water, But Not Necessarily, Analysis 62/3: 255–7.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] contingentist objections. A new contingentist objection is offered and several reasons for scepticism about its success are raised. It is concluded that certain higher-level laws describing the behaviours of molecular compounds may be necessary due to their dependence on underlying physical laws, and that the modal status of laws of nature cannot be determined a priori, as the structural features of the substances and properties they govern must first be investigated.