Three Questions about Minding God

Abstract. Gregory Peterson's Minding God does an excellent job of introducing the cognitive sciences to the general reader and drawing preliminary connections between these disciplines and some of the loci of theology. The book less successfully articulates how the cognitive sciences should impact the future of theology. In this article I pose three questions: (1) What semantics is presupposed in relating the languages of theology and the cognitive sciences? How do the truth conditions of these disparate disciplines relate? (2) What precisely does theology gain from what is central to cognitive science: the emphasis on information processing, inner representation, and the computer model of the mind? What exactly does cognitive science offer to theology beyond the now‐standard rejection of Cartesian dualism, the affirmation of an embodied mind, and the repudiation of reduction? (3) What can the cognitive sciences offer in tackling crucial questions in the theology‐science discussion such as divine agency and divine causation? Finally, I point to a possible begging of the question in the claim that cognitive science relates to theology because theology deals with meaning and purpose, and a particular interpretation of cognitive science grants more meaning and purpose to human beings than antecedent post‐Cartesian positions in the philosophy of mind.     

Dissonance émotionnelle et bien-être dans la profession infirmière : le rôle médiateur des stratégies de régulation émotionnelle

The purpose of this study is to contribute to understanding the role of emotional regulation strategies in the relationship between emotional dissonance and well-being at work. The study was conducted on a sample of 559 nurses from two Algerian hospitals. The results indicate that emotional dissonance has a negative relationship with work engagement and job satisfaction. Attentional deployment and expressive suppression play a mediating role in this relationship. Emotional work can be understood as an important mechanism in the relationship between dissonance/well-being at work.     

The influence of partial‐match cues on event‐based prospective memory

In event‐based prospective memory tasks people form an intention to respond when an environmental cue signals that conditions are appropriate to fulfil an intended activity. In the ongoing activity the authors embedded partial‐match cues that only partially, but not completely, satisfied the conditions required to make a prospective response. The consequence of encountering these partial‐match cues was to increase responses to appropriate prospective memory cues encountered later. This outcome occurred both with semantic and orthographic cues, but only the former led to longer processing latencies of the partial‐match cues. This asymmetry suggests that partial‐match cues may not need to be processed consciously in order to benefit event‐based prospective memory. A parametric manipulation of the number of partial‐match cues resulted in numerically but not statistically better prospective memory. Consequently, partial‐match cues may function as overt reminders of the intention to respond or they may serve to engage participants in self‐initiated remindings of the intention.     

Uncertainty about the rest of the sentence

A word-by-word human sentence processing complexity metric is presented. This metric formalizes the intuition that comprehenders have more trouble on words contributing larger amounts of information about the syntactic structure of the sentence as a whole. The formalization is in terms of the conditional entropy of grammatical continuations, given the words that have been heard so far. To calculate the predictions of this metric, Wilson and Carroll's (1954) original entropy reduction idea is extended to infinite languages. This is demonstrated with a mildly context-sensitive language that includes relative clauses formed on a variety of grammatical relations across the Accessibility Hierarchy of Keenan and Comrie (1977). Predictions are derived that correlate significantly with repetition accuracy results obtained in a sentence-memory experiment (Keenan & Hawkins, 1987).     

Does threatening imagery sensitize distress during contaminant exposure?

Prominent models of fear focus on the role of cognition in the development and maintenance of maladaptive responses. Little research, however, has evaluated the impact of cognition on distress reduction. The current study uses an experimental design to examine the effect of different types of imagery (moving harm, static harm, and safety) on reduction of distress associated with a contaminating stimulus in a normal university sample. Results indicate that use of moving harm imagery sensitizes distress during a 30-min exposure, whereas static harm and safety imagery reduce distress. These findings demonstrate that cognitive factors can moderate affective response during exposure. Clinical implications for the treatment of anxiety disorders are discussed.     

Unvaxxed and unafraid: Unvaccinated Americans perceive less disease risk than do vaccinated Americans

Is disease risk perception accurately calibrated among the unvaccinated? People shift their attitudes to rationalize their choices, so those who choose to be unvaccinated may be motivated to feel less at risk. In three studies (total N = 1446), we asked Americans how worried they were about catching/spreading influenza and COVID-19 and whether they were vaccinated against those diseases. Unvaccinated participants felt less at risk of catching/spreading the diseases they were unvaccinated against than vaccinated participants. For instance, unvaccinated participants felt ∼24% less at risk of catching/spreading COVID-19 and had ∼28% stronger intention to engage in activities that carried a high risk of COVID-19 transmission (Study 3). Overall, those who choose to be the most vulnerable to disease feel and act the least vulnerable.     

Separating The Effects Of Trial-specific And Average Sample-stimulus Duration In Delayed Matching To Sample In Pigeons

Pigeons were studied in two experiments employing delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) tasks in which the reduction in delay to reinforcement signaled by the onset of the sample stimulus was manipulated by varying sample-stimulus duration. In Experiment 1, the duration of the sample stimulus was either 5 s or 10 s for one sample stimulus and 10 s or 20 s for the other. Subjects matched more frequently when the sample duration was 10 s following the sample associated with the shorter average duration. This finding is analogous to the memory distribution effect found by Honig (1987) in a successive DMTS task that varied retention interval. In Experiment 2, sample duration was either 5 s or 15 s. In Phases 1 and 3 each sample duration was correlated with a particular sample color, and in Phase 2 sample duration and color were uncorrelated. When sample duration was 5 s, subjects matched more frequently when sample duration and color were correlated than when they were uncorrelated. Overall, subjects matched more frequently when sample duration and color were correlated. The data from both experiments support Wixted's (1989) model, which states that one determinant of choice in a DMTS task is the delay-reduction value of the sample stimulus.     

General estimators for the reliability of qualitative data

We study a proportional reduction in loss (PRL) measure for the reliability of categorical data and consider the general case in which each ofN judges assigns a subject to one ofK categories. This measure has been shown to be equivalent to a measure proposed by Perreault and Leigh for a special case when there are two equally competent judges, and the correct category has a uniform prior distribution. We consider a general framework where the correct category is assumed to have an arbitrary prior distribution, and where classification probabilities vary by correct category, judge, and category of classification. In this setting, we consider PRL reliability measures based on two estimators of the correct category—the empirical Bayes estimator and an estimator based on the judges' consensus choice. We also discuss four important special cases of the general model and study several types of lower bounds for PRL reliability.Bruce Cooil is Associate Professor of Statistics, and Roland T. Rust is Professor and area head for Marketing, Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University. The authors thank three anonymous reviewers and an Associate Editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. This work was supported in part by the Dean's Fund for Faculty Research of the Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University.     

Concerning the integration of sciences: Kinds and stages

The detailed analysis allows to discern seven kinds of integration, namely: I₁ consisting in the synthesis of scientific disciplines from their elements, including disciplinary unification I₁; I₂ inclusion of a science in (reduction to) another, more general; I₃ — links between different sciences, especially establishing of common elements; I₄ — interdisciplines bridging various sciences; I₅ — combination of two (or more) disciplines into a new (complex) science; I₆ — a general approach to several domains or multidisciplinary unification; I₇ — transdisciplinary sciences about relations of the same type in various traditional domains. These kinds of integration are interwoven with processes of differentiation, viz. D₁ — internal differentiation of the sciences resulting of I₁; D₂ — interdisciplinary differentiation concomitant I₄, and D₃ — specialization of I₇ sciences in several sections. As a result integration and differentiation are combined in the pairs I₁ — D₁, I₇ — D₃, and D₂ — I₄. The processes of integration (and differentiation) may be presented schematically in the following (not strictly isolated one of another) sequence: in the 17th century started I₁ followed by D₁, and in the last decades by I₁ during the 18th and the 19th c. cases of I₂ and I₃ appear; I₄ (together with D₂) is unfolding since the late 19th century. Finally, I₇ (and D₃), as well as I₅ and I₆ pertain to the latter half of our century. Representative are for one thing I₁, I₄, and I₇ outlining the main stages of integration and at the same time connected with respective kinds of differentiation.