Discrete emotions linking abusive supervision to employee intention and behavior

Drawing on appraisal theories of discrete emotions, we propose and test a model in which abusive supervision directed toward oneself and toward work unit peers (coworker abusive supervision) are interactively related to generalized feelings of shame, anger, and fear. These discrete emotions, in turn, tend to precipitate distinct responses that do not directly target the supervisor. We tested our hypotheses with a three-wave, time-lagged survey of 285 full-time workers from 55 work units. Consistent with our theorizing, supervisory abuse was associated with stronger feelings of shame while at work when the abusive supervision reported by one's coworkers was lower (vs. higher), whereas abuse had a stronger association with anger when coworkers also perceived relatively high levels of abuse. The distinct action tendencies associated with shame and anger are related to employees engaging in less voice behavior and more interpersonal deviance, respectively, and fear is related to higher turnover intentions. We discuss the study's implications for theory development concerning abusive supervision.     

When your heart is in your mouth: the effect of second language use on negative emotions

Research on bilingualism and emotions has shown stronger emotional responses in the native language (L1) compared to a foreign language. We investigated the potential of purposeful second language (L2) use as a means of decreasing the experience of psychological distress. Native Swedish speakers read and answered questions about negative and neutral texts in their L1 (Swedish) and their L2 (English) and were asked to rate their level of distress before or after the questions. The texts and associated questions were either written in the same (within-language), or different languages (cross-language). We found that within-language trials when the text was written in participants’ native language (Swedish–Swedish) resulted in an increase of distress, whilst cross-language trials (Swedish–English) resulted in a decrease of distress. This implies that purposeful second language use can diminish levels of distress experienced following a negative event encoded in one's first language.     

Fear,Anger, and Voting for the Far Right: Evidence From the November 13, 2015 Paris Terror Attacks

The conjecture that negative emotions underpin support for far‐right politics is common among pundits and scholars. The conventional account holds that authoritarian populists catalyze public anxiety about the changing social order and/or deteriorating national economic conditions, and this anxiety subsequently drives up support for the far right. We propose that while emotions do indeed play an independent causal role in support for far‐right parties and policies, that support is more likely built upon the public’s anger rather than fear. This article explores the relative impact of fear and anger in reaction to the 2015 Paris terror attacks on the propensity to vote for the French far‐right party, the Front National, in the 2015 regional elections. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that anger is associated with voting for the Front National, while fear is associated with voting against the Front National. Moreover, anger boosts the Front National vote most powerfully among far‐right and authoritarian voters. On the other hand, fear reduces support for the far right among those same groups.     

Studying Emotions in Security and Diplomacy: Where We Are Now and Challenges Ahead

The core objective of this special issue has been to shed light on emotions as (1) frames that shape interpersonal diplomatic relations, (2) as key tools that are used as part of the statecraft's toolbox, and (3) as formative/productive dynamics with real effects on human beings—that, in turn, often construct and maintain conflicts. It is therefore pertinent that we interrogate the political psychology of individual, collective, mass, and communal emotions and how these are often (mis)used in diplomacy and security narratives to legitimize politicians' decisions and practices. This concluding article provides a state of the art account of the study of emotions in International Relations (IR), sums up the main findings from all special issue contributions and constructively explores potential challenges ahead for the study of emotions in IR, especially in security and diplomacy studies. It concludes with an appeal for the development of a multiperspective approach—that is, one that combines social sciences, natural sciences, and humanities—for a nuanced study of the role of emotional work in state, diplomatic as well as security narratives and practices. This approach will in turn require methodological pluralism in how we go about, as reflexive researchers, our emotional research.     

Methodological Challenges in the Study of Emotions in Politics and How to Deal With Them

This introductory article to the special issue zooms in on the literature on political emotions with a specific focus on methodological questions of “how to study” political emotions. To the extent that methodological matters are addressed in the extant literature, the associated challenges are often portrayed as a clash between social science and natural science disciplines, a clash frequently illustrated by the meeting between political science and neuroscience. Rather than being a clash between academic disciplines, this article argues that many of the methodological challenges facing emotional research have their origin in scholars' diverse views on the relationship between themselves as researchers and political emotions as a research object. In the light of this acknowledgment, the article encircles and discusses the methodological challenges associated with three key conceptual distinctions between: (1) individual and collective emotions, (2) emotions and reason, and between (3) involuntary political emotions and the strategic usage of political emotions. Using the contributions to this special issue as illustrations, the article argues in favor of moving beyond mutually exclusive dichotomies regarding these conceptual distinctions and offers pathways for dealing with current methodological challenges to emotional research. It points to methodological pluralism, transparency, and context‐sensitive research strategies.     

How Emotional Frames Moralize and Polarize Political Attitudes

Moralized issues, such as abortion and same‐sex marriage, are some of the most polarizing and divisive issues in politics. These topics motivate political engagement but present a barrier to democratic resolution. Yet we know little about how some issues become “moral issues” and others do not. In this article, I argue that exposure to persuasive frames, particularly those eliciting anger and disgust, serves to moralize and polarize public opinion. I test these hypotheses across three experiments on emerging debates over food politics. The results consistently show that persuasive frames increase issue moralization and, in turn, facilitate polarization. A panel analysis demonstrates that the effect of a single exposure lasts at least two weeks. Mediation analyses suggest that feelings of disgust and anger help explain how persuasive frames moralize political attitudes, while anger alone seems to explain the polarizing effects of framing. Overall, the findings provide new insight into framing, emotion, and the development of moral issues.     

Rousing the Partisan Combatant: Elite Incivility,Anger, and Antideliberative Attitudes

The claim that elite political incivility can rouse partisan, antideliberative attitudes has many adherents, but the empirical record demonstrating a relationship is surprisingly limited. Yet the extant research suggests that incivility can stimulate aversive feelings, of the sort that discrete and dimensional theories of emotion predict should induce a partisan, antideliberative mode of citizenship among those exposed. Leveraging two online experiments, I address the questions of whether elite incivility provokes anger, rather than enthusiasm and anxiety, and whether the affective reactions induced by incivility yield the changes in deliberative attitudes that theories of emotion predict. I find that elite incivility, when counterattitudinal, rouses anger, which in turn can provoke an active and combative form of partisan citizenship. Despite claims to the contrary, the link between proattitudinal incivility, anger, and antideliberative attitudes is less clear. The results provide insight into the dynamics of discourse in the digital age, when affective polarization is the norm and elites commonly employ uncivil rhetoric.     

On the difficulty interpreting He Yan’s ‘emotionless sage’

This paper examines the debate surrounding He Shao’s account that ‘He Yan thinks the sage is without pleasure, anger, sorrow and grief.’ The point of controversy surrounds squaring a perspective on the sage as emotionless with a thinker who otherwise largely expounds values and political views found in the Lunyu and the Laozi. Since proper management of emotions is important in both texts, it is difficult to imagine how He Yan could hold such a radical view. Dealing with this difficulty scholars have either simply found He Yan ‘unreasonable’ and ‘contradictory’ or otherwise sought to explain away his emotionless sage through complex ontological or political arguments. When He Yan’s work is contextualized in terms of philosophical religious views at the time, we find additional problems with how He Yan’s work has been interpreted. This paper considers a new way to view He Yan, one that respects his multifarious views.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.