Can bottom-up processes of attention be a source of ‘interference’ in situations where top-down control of attention is crucial?

In this study, we investigate whether emotionally engaged bottom-up processes of attention can be a source of ‘interference’ in situations where top-down control of attention is necessary. Participants were asked to monitor and report on a video of a war scenario showing a developing battle in two conditions: emotionally positive and emotionally negative. Half of the participants (n = 15) were exposed to task-irrelevant pictures of positive emotional valence embedded within the scenario; the other half were exposed to task-irrelevant pictures of negative emotional valence. Sensitivity and Bias scores were calculated using signal detection theory. Overall, task accuracy scores were dependent upon the valence; negative pictures had an adverse effect on performance, whereas positive pictures improved performance. We concluded that negative emotional pictures interfered with top-down control of attention by attracting competing bottom-up processes of attention. We found the opposite effect for positive emotional stimuli.     

Mothers' Ideal Positive Affect Predicts their Socialization of Children's Positive Affect

Parents generally want their children to be happy, but little is known about particular types of positive affect (PA) that parents want their children to experience. Tsai's (2007) affect valuation theory offers a useful framework to understand how parents' emotional goals may shape the socialization of particular types of PA (e.g., excitement vs. relaxation). Participants were 96 mothers and their 7- to 12-year-old children. Results indicated that mothers endorsed similar levels of ideal PA (IPA) for low-, moderate-, and high-arousal PA for both themselves and for their child, suggesting that mothers desire the same type of PA for their children as they want for themselves. In support of the study's main hypothesis, mothers' IPA for their children predicted specific socialization responses that would encourage that type of PA (e.g., mothers' high-arousal IPA predicted greater encouragement of their child to celebrate, whereas mothers' low-arousal IPA predicted encouragement of affection). The findings extend affect valuation theory and emotion socialization research by indicating that parents' emotional goals (i.e., IPA) for their children may contribute to their socialization of children's PA.     

Exploring and integrating discrete and dimensional approaches while inducing negative emotional states

Selecting visual stimuli for inducing specific emotional states is very challenging, since the choice relies on specific conceptualization of emotions. In this work, we present a set of 55 stimuli, realized integrating discrete and dimensional theories of emotions, and specifically selected to investigate anger, fear, and disgust reactions in non-clinical and clinical contexts. Our set of stimuli presents several aspects of novelty since (1) a large and heterogeneous sample of subjects from the general population was involved in the labelling task, and (2) bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques were applied to integrate emotion models. The proposed set of stimuli could be useful for researchers and other professionals in the affective sciences to address negative emotion recognition issues within a broader perspective both in general population and in psychiatric samples. The obtained comprehensive characterization of the stimuli allowed us to confirm the sexual dimorphism in emotional processing.     

Explaining embodied emotions – with and without representations

Embodied accounts have offered a theoretical framework in which emotions are understood to be patterned embodied responses that are about core relational themes. Some authors argue that this intentionality should be understood in terms of some kind of non-conceptual representation format, while others suggest a radical enactivist framework that takes emotions to be intentional but not representational. In this paper I will argue that the abstract nature of the core relational themes emotions are about and the interrelatedness of emotions with each other and with other mental states speak in favor of emotions being representations.     

Not quite neo-sentimentalism

The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those concepts requires being rationally compelled to form evaluative beliefs in response to certain emotions.     

I feel you feel what I feel: Perceived perspective‐taking promotes victims' conciliatory attitudes because of inferred emotions in the offender

In the context of bullying in a nursing workplace, we test the argument that an offender's perspective‐taking promotes victim conciliation, mediated by perceived perspective‐taking, that is, the extent to which the victim perceives the offender as taking their perspective. Perceived perspective‐taking facilitates the attribution of moral emotions (remorse, etc.) to the offender, thereby promoting conciliatory victim responses. However, perceived perspective‐taking would be qualified by the extent to which the severity of consequences expressed in the offender's perspective‐taking matches or surpasses the severity for the victim. In Studies 1 and 2 (Ns = 141 and 122, respectively), victims indicated greater trust and/or forgiveness when the offender had taken the victim's perspective. This was sequentially mediated by perceived perspective‐taking and victim's inference that the offender had felt moral emotions. As predicted, in Study 2 (but not Study 1), severity of consequences qualified victims' perceived perspective‐taking. Study 3 (N = 138) examined three potential mechanisms for the moderation by severity. Victims attributed greater perspective‐taking to the offender when the consequences were less severe than voiced by the offender, suggesting victims' appreciation of the offender's generous appraisal. Attributions of perspective‐taking and of moral emotions to the offender may play an important role in reconciliation processes. Key outcome: To the extent that victims perceive the offender as taking their perspective (perceived perspective‐taking), they infer that the offender feels more moral emotions, prompting victims to be more conciliatory. Perceived perspective‐taking benefits from the offender over‐stating the consequences to the victim.     

The Importance of Assessing Impairment Associated With Limited Prosocial Emotions

Limited prosocial emotions (LPE) are characterized by a lack of remorse or guilt, callousness/lack of empathy, being unconcerned about performance, and shallow/deficient affect. While previous research has largely focused on the presence or absence of LPE in youth, there is considerable evidence that symptom presence/absence and symptom impairment are separable dimensions, where impairment often is found to play a significant, unique role in assessing child psychopathology. The current study utilized a newly developed questionnaire with the purpose of exploring its psychometric properties and better understand the dual and potentially differential role LPE symptom presence and LPE-related impairment have in youth. Mothers (n = 265) of children (M_age = 8.04, SD = 2.07) completed questionnaires assessing LPE impairment, LPE symptoms, externalizing disorder symptoms, and functional impairment. Results demonstrated strong support for the psychometric properties of the newly developed measure of LPE impairment. Importantly, LPE-related impairment uniquely predicted all impairment domains above-and-beyond the effects of LPE symptoms, oppositional defiant disorder, and CD symptoms (as well as child age and sex covariates). Moreover, youth in the top 25th percentile on both LPE symptoms and LPE-related impairment (compared to youth only in the top 25th percentile in LPE symptoms) had greater mean externalizing symptoms and functional impairment. The preliminary evidence provided suggests researchers and clinicians may benefit from assessing both LPE symptoms and LPE-related impairment when attempting to identify youth with high levels of conduct problem symptoms and/or psychosocial impairment. Future research should aim to replicate and expand our findings to other clinical populations.     

A bright side of sadness: The depolarizing role of sadness in intergroup conflicts

Intractable conflicts constitute violent and threatening environments that lead to intense emotions and polarized attitudes. Sadness is one emotion frequently elicited by the price of such conflicts. This investigation characterized the effects of sadness on conflict‐related information processing and attitudes in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Findings from four experimental studies suggest that both incidental and integral sadness can induce a depolarization of political attitudes. In Study 1 (N = 163), sadness reduced the effect of political ideology on conflict‐related decisions. Sadness reduced the effect of political ideology on in‐group bias in resource allocation in Studies 2 (N = 213) and 4 (N = 274), willingness to negotiate in Studies 1 and 3 (N = 174), and openness to information supporting the out‐group's perspective (Study 4). Overall, in addition to its more negative implications, these results suggest that sadness (compared to both the non‐emotional and anger conditions) may have a bright side, since it may induce depolarization of political attitudes in intractable conflicts.     

On modeling the creativity and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre

The problem of modeling the creativity is shown to be entirely connected with another mysterious challenge — the “Explanatory Gap” between the concepts of “Brain” and “Mind”. We use the Natural Constructive Cognitive Architecture, with its important feature being the combination of two subsystems, for generation of new information and for its conservation. “Brain” is considered as records of the raw images of real objects (individual objective information), while “Mind” refers to individual subjective information created inside the cognitive system (symbols). We argued that creativity can be treated as “an effort to bring a piece of personal “Brain” into the “Mind” and World”. Specific thinking mode (intellectual panic or throes of creativity) is shown to enhance the creative work resulting in over-mobilization and even enriching personal deep inside (“Brain”) experience. It is simulated by chaotic jumps of the noise amplitude around abnormally high value. The nature of Aesthetic Emotions and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre are analyzed. It is shown that they are caused by the “recognition paradox”: an object seems both, familiar but unusual. This occurs if the “Brain” does see its subtle features, while the “Mind” does not realize. Bright aesthetic emotions (goosebumps) are caused by irregular excitation of implicit associations provided by weak (“gray”) connections of the halo neurons (simulating the subconsciousness). General formula for Chef-D’oeuvre in science and art could be expressed as “condensed capacity to see the invisible, to combine the incompatible”.     

Affect,Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation

Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect (3d3; 3 General Definition of the Affects), desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns the priority of desires and evaluative judgements. While 3p9s and 3p39s suggest that evaluative judgements are (necessarily) posterior to desires, Andrew Youpa has recently argued that passages in Ethics 4 indicate that rational evaluative judgements can give rise to, rather than arise out of, desires. I aim to offer solutions to these problems that reveal the elegance and coherence of Spinoza's account of motivation. Ultimately, I argue that whereas emotions and desires stand in a non-reductive, symmetrical relationship to one another, evaluative judgements must be understood as asymmetrically dependent on, and reducible to, emotions or desires. This interpretation sheds light on our understanding of Spinoza's cognitivist account of emotion. For Spinoza, while emotions are representational, they are not underpinned by evaluative judgements. Rather than inflating emotions to include evaluative judgements, he deflates evaluative judgements, treating them as emotions, or valenced representations, and nothing more.