ANIMAL PASSIONS AND BEASTLY VIRTUES: COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY AS THE UNIFYING SCIENCE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SUBJECTIVE,EMOTIONAL, EMPATHIC,AND MORAL LIVES OF ANIMALS

Abstract. In this essay, my response to four papers that were presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion in a session devoted to my research on animal behavior and cognitive ethology, I stress the importance of interdisciplinary research and collaboration for coming to terms with various aspects of animal behavior and animal cognition. I argue that we have much to learn from other animals concerning a set of “big” questions including who we are in the grand scheme of things, the role science (“science sense”) plays in our understanding of the world in which we live, what it means to “know” something, what some other ways of knowing are and how they compare to what we call “science,” and the use of anecdotes and anthropomorphism to inform studies of animal behavior. I ask, Are other minds really all that private and inaccessible? Can a nonhuman animal be called a person? What does the future hold if we continue to dismantle the only planet we live on and persecute the other animal beings with whom we are supposed to coexist? I argue that cognitive ethology is the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals, because it is essential to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines in the company of their friends and when they are alone. It is also important to learn why both the similarities and differences between humans and other animals have evolved. The more we come to understand other animals, the more we will appreciate them as the amazing beings they are, and the more we will come to understand ourselves.     

从麻木到复苏——对医学人文关怀的关注与期待

中国医学的人文关怀有着深厚的传统根基,只是到了市场经济发展的新阶段,随着经济发展的不平衡、人口的增长,客观上造就了医疗功能的利益驱动,使得医学的人文关怀退居麻木境地,因此必须扬人性化、温情化之长,避技术化、商业化之短,以多样化的人文关怀改善医患关系,为和谐社会营造健康氛围。     

IMAGINATIVE CONTAGION

Abstract: The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional emotions, and social priming. It is suggested that imaginative contagion is a more prevalent phenomenon than has typically been recognized.     

情绪生理机制研究的外周与中枢神经系统整合模型

阐明人类情绪的生理机制是心理学家和神经科学家所面临的巨大挑战。以往研究倾向于分别考察情绪的外周反应模式和脑机制。近年来,随着情绪电生理学和认知神经科学的发展,许多研究者从外周与中枢神经系统相互作用的角度,提出了一些解释情绪生理机制的整合模型。其中,以情绪环路模型和神经内脏整合模型为典型代表。前者强调由外周到中枢的自下而上的加工方式,试图说明情绪经验形成的机制;后者则采取由中枢到外周的自上而下的加工方式,试图阐明情绪调控的机制。今后的研究有必要借鉴这两个模型,并结合近期有关情绪信息加工神经机制的新成果,以便构建能够更为全面解释人类情绪的生理模型。     

Work-family balance and energy: A day-level study on recovery conditions

The present study examines whether daily recovery inhibiting and enhancing conditions predict day-levels of work-family conflict (WFC), work-family facilitation (WFF), exhaustion and vigor. Forty-nine individuals from various professional backgrounds in Spain provided questionnaire and daily survey measures over a period of five working days. Multilevel analyses showed that day-levels of work pressure and recovery after breaks at work significantly predicted WFC and exhaustion, and WFF and vigor, respectively. Moreover, daily fluctuations in expression of emotions had different effects depending on the expressed content (negative or positive) and the setting where it took place (work or home). Furthermore, additional analyses provided some evidence for a moderating role of expression of emotions at work on the relationship between recovery inhibiting and enhancing conditions and exhaustion. These findings reveal practical implications for individuals and organizations and suggest possible avenues for future research.     

Horribly Wrong

Moral horror is an extreme emotional response to that which violates things we regard as sacred. In Robert Merrihew Adams's view, horror is a response to badness and not to wrongness, and so one could properly regard some actions as horrible but not wrong. In contrast, I argue that horror, when directed toward actions, is only appropriate for wrong actions. The reason is that horror involves moral disgust, and agents who committed a horrible action would have self‐disgust, that is, they would be repulsive to themselves. I argue, with reference to killing in combat and in self‐defense, that those who have done no wrong should not be in such a state.     

Can bottom-up processes of attention be a source of ‘interference’ in situations where top-down control of attention is crucial?

In this study, we investigate whether emotionally engaged bottom-up processes of attention can be a source of ‘interference’ in situations where top-down control of attention is necessary. Participants were asked to monitor and report on a video of a war scenario showing a developing battle in two conditions: emotionally positive and emotionally negative. Half of the participants (n = 15) were exposed to task-irrelevant pictures of positive emotional valence embedded within the scenario; the other half were exposed to task-irrelevant pictures of negative emotional valence. Sensitivity and Bias scores were calculated using signal detection theory. Overall, task accuracy scores were dependent upon the valence; negative pictures had an adverse effect on performance, whereas positive pictures improved performance. We concluded that negative emotional pictures interfered with top-down control of attention by attracting competing bottom-up processes of attention. We found the opposite effect for positive emotional stimuli.     

Mothers' Ideal Positive Affect Predicts their Socialization of Children's Positive Affect

Parents generally want their children to be happy, but little is known about particular types of positive affect (PA) that parents want their children to experience. Tsai's (2007) affect valuation theory offers a useful framework to understand how parents' emotional goals may shape the socialization of particular types of PA (e.g., excitement vs. relaxation). Participants were 96 mothers and their 7- to 12-year-old children. Results indicated that mothers endorsed similar levels of ideal PA (IPA) for low-, moderate-, and high-arousal PA for both themselves and for their child, suggesting that mothers desire the same type of PA for their children as they want for themselves. In support of the study's main hypothesis, mothers' IPA for their children predicted specific socialization responses that would encourage that type of PA (e.g., mothers' high-arousal IPA predicted greater encouragement of their child to celebrate, whereas mothers' low-arousal IPA predicted encouragement of affection). The findings extend affect valuation theory and emotion socialization research by indicating that parents' emotional goals (i.e., IPA) for their children may contribute to their socialization of children's PA.