苏俄心理学对中国心理学的影响与启示

苏俄心理学是现代心理科学的一个重要的组成部分。近一个世纪来,苏俄心理学不仅对我国心理学的发展产生了重要影响,而且也从理论与实践双重层面给我们以有益的启示。     

Psychoanalysis and empirical research

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the idea of reason began to lose its universal and absolute value, undermining the view of science as a form of objective knowledge that reveals a fundamental reality. These changes have also had an impact on psychoanalysis, leading to a proliferation of theories and the end of a positivistic approach, epitomized by a 'neutral' analyst who knows the contents of the patient's mind. Hermeneutic philosophy provides a tool with which to explore both theoretical multiplicity and the contribution of the analyst's subjectivity to the analytic process. Furthermore, a hermeneutic approach does not have to be hostile to empirical science, but can be integrated with it in a 'scientific-hermeneutic model' in which historical and biological principles are given equal value.     

Jung's view on myth and post-modern psychology

Post-modern psychology embodies two core themes, the social mind and the narrative self. Whereas the social-mind thesis seems diametrically opposed to Jung's position regarding human nature, the narrative-self thesis is associated with research and theorizing about personal myth and mythmaking in ways that could make contact with Jung's concerns. Jung's view is examined here with particular attention to McAdams' theory of narrative identity. It is suggested that the ostensible differences between Jung and post-modern psychology might reflect divergent interests, rather than necessarily irreconcilable worldviews.     

Indigenization and the history of psychology

This article argues for the development of a historical perspective to help understand the process of indigenization in psychology. The indigenization of psychology in both the United States and India is shown to be part of larger social, economic, and political processes. A center and periphery model of knowledge production and praxes is deployed to show how practices of scientific imperialism are used to maintain the hegemony of the center. It is argued that historical approaches may be useful to challenge and counter such practices. Finally, the authors call for a polycentric history of psychology that will correspond to the emerging polycentrism exemplified in indigenous psychologies.     

Cognitive epidemiology: With emphasis on untangling cognitive ability and socioeconomic status

This commentary touches on practical, public policy, and social science domains informed by cognitive epidemiology while pulling together common themes running through this important special issue. As is made clear in the contributions assembled here, and others (Deary, Whalley, & Starr, 2009; Gottfredson, 2004; Lubinski & Humphreys, 1992, 1997), social scientists and practitioners cannot afford to neglect cognitive ability when modeling epidemiological and health care phenomena. However, given the dominant concern about the confounding of general cognitive ability (GCA) and socioeconomic status (SES), and the extent to which SES is frequently seen as the primary cause of health disparities (while GCA is neglected as a possible influence in epidemiology and health psychology), some methodological applications for untangling the relative influences of GCA and SES are reviewed. In addition, cognitive epidemiology is placed in a broader context: Just as cognitive epidemiology facilitates an understanding of pathology (“at risk” populations, and ways to attenuate undesirable personal and social conditions), it may also enrich our understanding of optimal functioning (“at promise” populations, and ways to identify and nurture the human and social capital needed to develop innovations for saving lives, economies, and perhaps even our planet). Finally, while GCA is likely the most important dimension in the study of individual differences for modeling healthy behaviors and outcomes, other relatively independent dimensions of psychological diversity do add value (Krueger, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000). For example, compliance has at least two psychological components: a “can do” competency component (ability) and a “will do” motivational component (conscientiousness). Ultimately, developing and modeling healthy behaviors, interpersonal environments, and medical maladies are best accomplished by teaming multiple dimensions of human individuality.     

Sunk-cost effects on purely behavioral investments

Although the sunk-cost effect is a well-documented psychological phenomenon in monetary investments, existing literature investigating behavioral investments (e.g., time, effort) has not replicated this effect except when such investments relate to monetary values. The current explanation for this discrepancy proposes that purely behavioral sunk-cost effects are unlikely to be observed because they are difficult to book, track, and balance in a mental account. Conversely, we argue that, through an effort-justification mechanism, people account for the amount of behavioral resources invested when selecting an alternative, in which case they may fall prey to purely behavioral sunk-cost effects. The results of two experiments support this prediction. Because many decisions involve behavioral investments, behavioral sunk-cost effects should be pervasive psychological phenomena.     

The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.     

Simulation à la Goldman: pretend and collapse

Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006). We argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument. Fig. 1 Structure of argument

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“Der Weisheits letzter Schluss”? Wisdom’s Last Conclusion?

Unexpected empirical findings lead Schwarz (2009) to question current methodological approaches within psychology. He claims that distribution anomalies, which cannot be explained by independent variables, actually prove an error in classical test theory, which then leads him to criticize current scientific conventionalism. In this commentary, it is shown that the current university system not only uses, but often reproduces conventionalism. It is, of course, necessary to teach certain techniques and tools to future psychologists, but using these critically seem to be essential in preventing scientific approaches turn into ideologies that are or must not be questioned—even if this is sometimes less threatening to one’s identity as a scientist/psychologist. This is true for all sciences, but understanding the bio-psycho-social interdependencies of human nature (ambiguities), as Schwarz describes it, seems to be a particular challenge that is in many ways different from other disciplines. Instead of striving to be like them, it is suggested we establish an ambiguity-accepting and critical environment in psychology in which theories and approaches are not considered final but temporary to foster change and progress.

Two Books for Teachers

Murphy, Nancey and Ellis, George F. R. On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics
Haught, John F. Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation