Gender differs: Modelling knowledge sharing from a perspective of social network ties

The present paper proposes a model of knowledge sharing, in which coworker congruence, outcome interdependence, perceived organizational support, and procedural justice influence knowledge sharing indirectly through the mediation of instrumental ties and expressive ties, and examined gender differences in causal connections within the model. In a sample of employees in Taiwan, it was shown that the influence of instrumental ties on knowledge sharing is stronger for females than for males; the influence of expressive ties on knowledge sharing is stronger for males than for females; the influence of coworker congruence on expressive ties is stronger for females than for males; the influence of outcome interdependence on instrumental ties is stronger for females than for males; and the influence of perceived organizational support on instrumental ties is stronger for males than for females.     

儿童情绪理解发展的研究述评

近20年来,情绪理解越来越成为大家关注一个的研究领域。作者认为情绪理解可以分为对情绪状态的理解和对情绪过程的理解两部分。情绪状态的理解包括表情识别、情绪情景识别和混合情绪理解等,情绪过程的理解涉及情绪原因的理解、愿望与信念对情绪作用的理解、情绪表现规则知识和情绪调节的理解等。作者系统介绍了情绪理解的研究方法及相关研究成果,同时从研究方法和研究内容上提出目前研究的局限性,在方法上有必要对研究材料的文化适用性进行标准化,对问题和情景进行严格设计,降低对儿童语言能力的要求,还可以补充自然语言分析等方法;在内容上有必要深入探讨情绪理解过程及其作用的内部机制,开展情绪理解作用的实验研究,加强对情绪理解的个体内部影响因素的考察     

中小学生数学知识观的调查研究

本研究采用12道假设性情境题目和包含数学涉及运算、思考、实用性三个维度的数学认识问卷,选取90名六年级小学生和106名初二学生作为被试,探讨中小学生的数学知识观。结果表明:1)中小学生数学知识观形成及发展与学校数学课程内容紧密相关。2)中小学生数学知识观存在差异,主要表现在初二学生对假设性情境的认同程度显著地高于六年级学生;在数学认识问卷的数学实用性维度上,六年级学生的肯定程度显著地高于初二学生。3)从总体上看,学生的学业水平与数学知识观的关系不大。     

内隐序列学习的表征机制及年龄效应研究

该研究从年龄效应这一独特视角探讨了内隐序列学习的表征机制。结果表明:(1)内隐序列学习存在具体联结和抽象层级编码双重表征机制,且在该研究中以抽象编码为主;(2)老、青、幼三组被试的内隐序列学习无显著差异,间接支持了具体联结机制不起主要作用的结论。该研究的推论是:(1)内隐序列学习的表征是一个遵循“最优级编码”的动态过程;(2)该过程不涉及注意机制和短时记忆。     

Revival and significance of political philosophy at present time

Taking a panoramic view on the history of modern philosophy, we can learn that political philosophy, a new arena for modern philosophy, has become an important field in philosophical studies since the later half of the 20th century. As far as the problem domain of political philosophy is concerned, political philosophy is only a special form of philosophy. The revival of political philosophy, however, indicates that philosophical inspection of political matters has regained legitimacy, and also means the restaging of philosophy as a knowledge type at modern times. In one sense, we can view the newly-revived political philosophy as typical modern philosophy, because its problem domain, its unique angle of looking into the life world and its ideal concern about the actual world make it one of the best ways in which we can reflect the existence of mankind in modern times. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (6) by Teng Jianhui     

Philosophy and reflection: A critique of Frank Welz’s sociological and “processual” criticism of Husserl and Schutz

Frank Welz’s Kritik der Lebenswelt undertakes a sociology of knowledge criticism of the work of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz that construes them as developing absolutist, egological systems opposed to the “processual” worldview prominent since the modern rise of natural science. Welz, though, misunderstands the work of Schutz and Husserl and neglects how their focus on consciousness and eidetic features pertains to the kind of reflection that one must undertake if one would avoid succumbing to absolutism, that uncovers the presuppositions of the processual worldview itself, and that secures a domain distinctive of philosophy over against sociology. Finally, Welz’s charge that Schutz favors a Neo-Kantian social scientific methodology contradictory to his phenomenology neglects the levels of Schutz’s discourse and ignores how the Weberian ideal-typical approach can be subsumed within phenomenology.     

What is Science? Methodological Pitfalls Underlying the Empirical Exploration of Scientific Knowledge

Summary  The validity of three premises, set as foundational pillars of modern sociological approach to science, is contested, namely: (i) the postulate, stating that science is devoid of whatever generis specifical; (ii) it is liable to the usual empirical study; (iii) the practicing scientist’s self-reflexive judgements must be disbelieved and rejected. Contrariwise, the ignored so far quaint nature of knowledge, escaping even from the elementary empirical treating - discernment and observation – is revealed and demonstrated. This peculiar nature requires, accordingly, a specific meta-cognitive dealing for positing it as ‘empirical object’, unfortunately missed still by the Strong Programme. The inadequate approach adopted led to a substitution of ‘scientific’ for common knowledge. The tacit thus far alternative, setting the foundations of meta-science, is suggested.     

国外心理咨询师职业耗竭研究现状

职业耗竭是学术界关注的一个新热点,国外心理咨询师的职业耗竭问题也得到了比较系统的研究.通过回顾国外相关研究,从心理咨询师职业耗竭的发生率、影响因素、症状特点、职业易感性等几个方面进行总结,尝试提出干预意见,并对未来研究趋势进行展望.     

BELIEF AND PRETENSE: A REPLY TO GENDLER

Abstract: In cases of imaginative contagion, imagining something has doxastic or doxastic‐like consequences. In this reply to Tamar Szabó Gendler's article in this collection, I investigate what the philosophical consequences of these cases could be. I argue (i) that imaginative contagion has consequences for how we should understand the nature of imagination and (ii) that imaginative contagion has consequences for our understanding of what belief‐forming mechanisms there are. Along the way, I make some remarks about what the consequences of the contagion cases are for the relation between knowledge and imagination.     

WHY I BELIEVE IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD

Abstract: I claim in this article that if my experience is such that it seems to me that there is an external object before me, then I have reason to believe that there is an external object before me. The sceptic argues that since my having the experience is compatible both with there being and with there not being an external object before me, I have no reason to believe that the former possibility obtains and not the latter. I respond that the sceptic has ignored a relevant difference between the two possibilities: I can make sense of the former possibility but not of the latter. I examine two broad categories of sceptical possibilities (dreams and hallucinations), explain why I cannot make sense of them, and explain why my inability to make sense of them gives me reason to believe they do not obtain.