Infants perceive human point-light displays as solid forms

While five-month-old infants show orientation-specific sensitivity to changes in the motion and occlusion patterns of human point-light displays, it is not known whether infants are capable of binding a human representation to these displays. Furthermore, it has been suggested that infants do not encode the same physical properties for humans and material objects. To explore these issues we tested whether infants would selectively apply the principle of solidity to upright human displays. In the first experiment infants aged six and nine months were repeatedly shown a human point-light display walking across a computer screen up to 10 times or until habituated. Next, they were repeatedly shown the walking display passing behind an in-depth representation of a table, and finally they were shown the human display appearing to pass through the table top in violation of the solidity of the hidden human form. Both six- and nine-month-old infants showed significantly greater recovery of attention to this final phase. This suggests that infants are able to bind a solid vertical form to human motion. In two further control experiments we presented displays that contained similar patterns of motion but were not perceived by adults as human. Six- and nine-month-old infants did not show recovery of attention when a scrambled display or an inverted human display passed through the table. Thus, the binding of a solid human form to a display in only seems to occur for upright human motion. The paper considers the implications of these findings in relation to theories of infants' developing conceptions of objects, humans and animals.     

Successful Use of Peer Educators for Sharing Genetic Information

This study examined the impact of a genetics education module provided by Reach to Recovery peer volunteers. Participants included 113 women with confirmed breast cancer diagnoses. Eighty-eight of these women (78%) completed a baseline survey, participated in a peer-led intervention, and completed a follow-up survey. Approximately half of the women received an education module that included a genetic component, while the other half did not. Results indicated that women who received the genetics module had greater increases in genetics knowledge than the group that did not receive the module. However, follow-up interest in genetic testing was not significantly different between the two groups. Results indicate that a peer-led genetics module can increase knowledge about genetics. However, it does not appear to have a differential effect on genetic testing interest.     

Not Everything is Possible

This paper makes a point about the interpretation of the simplestquantified modal logic, that is, quantified modal logic witha single domain. It is commonly assumed that the domain in questionis to be understood as the set of all possibile objects. Thepoint of the paper is that this assumption is misguided.     

No more than Conjectures: Popper and the Ethics of Scientific Enterprise

Karl Popper dealt with both problems Yurevich (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 43(2), 2009, doi: 10.1007/s12124-008-9082-7) deals: the crisis in Psychology and in the discourse about the nature of science. Although he failed to provide a complete response for both problems, his proposals can yet be fruitful to the reflection on these matters in the context of the present discussion. He offers some tentative answers to what could be considered a healthy epistemic activity, something Yurevich does not provide. More interestingly, some of the Popper proposals seem to fit, and in some extent correct, the quest for “collaborative work” proposed by Zittoun et al. (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 43(2), 2009, doi: 10.1007/s12124-008-9082-7) as a way of transforming crisis in development.     

不同主题和风险下的人际信任:“信任圈”的中、加比较

在人际关系网络中,那些被信任者构成了个体的"信任圈",信任圈的规模可以代表个体表现出的信任水平。本研究考察了在不同交流主题(借钱、正面和负面信息交流)和风险等级下,中国人和加拿大人信任圈规模的差异。对202名中国和加拿大成年被试的调查表明,交流主题对信任水平有影响,在借钱和交流正面信息时信任圈明显大于交流负面信息时;风险等级越高,信任圈越小,在借钱时人们对风险等级尤其敏感;无论分享正面还是负面信息时,中国人的信任圈都比加拿大人更小,而在借钱方面中国人比加拿大人的信任圈更大。可见,人际信任与主题、风险和文化因素及其交互作用有关,这些结果对于理解信任的文化差异和跨文化交往实践非常有意义。     

医师知识结构和思维方式与肺血栓栓塞症诊断

肺血栓栓塞症是常见的临床病症,因其临床表现多样,易发生误诊漏诊而导致较高的病死率。但“凡事预则立,不预则废”,充分掌握肺血栓栓塞症的知识、以正确的思维方式引导临床诊疗可以有效减少和避免误诊漏诊。     

Inexact Knowledge with Introspection

Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common knowledge in situations of bounded rationality.     

RESPONSES TO NUCCETELLI, LEMOS, AND BUENO

Abstract: Susana Nuccetelli discusses critically my account of Moore's Proof of the External World. Noah Lemos takes up my views on skepticism and my distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Otávio Bueno focuses on my treatment of dream skepticism. In this article I offer replies to my three critics.     

Précis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium.     

Replies to commentators on <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.