完善单身女性“冻卵”规范浅析——基于传统伦理与生育自主决定权博弈的视角

“冻卵”作为人类辅助生殖技术的重要组成部分已经愈发成熟和规范,但目前我国的人类辅助生殖技术规范却并不允许为单身女性实施冻卵技术。冻卵是女性行使生育决定权以实现生育权的方式,而生育权作为一项基本权利,具有明显的人格属性,它与女性对身体的自由决定和人格的自由发展紧密相关,不应以特定的婚姻身份为前提。允许在一定条件下适当放开单身女性利用此项技术具有重要的意义。相应的法律规范也需要作出调整,以避免生育市场化风险和高近亲结婚率。     

NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF'S JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS: AN INTRODUCTION

This introduction sets the stage for four papers on Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs , written by Harold Attridge, Oliver O'Donovan, Richard Bernstein, and myself. In his book, Wolterstorff defends an account of human rights. The first section of this introduction distinguishes Wolterstorff's account of rights from the alternative account of rights against which he contends. The alternative account draws much of its power from a historical narrative according to which theory and politics supplanted earlier ways of thinking about justice. The second section sketches that narrative and Wolterstorff's counter-narrative. The third section draws together the main points of Wolterstorff's own account.     

Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) and Neurological Outcomes: A Review for Practitioners

ABSTRACT

Thirty-eight million women will experience intimate partner violence (IPV) during the course of their lifetime. Many of these women will experience brain injuries as a result of IPV and may not seek medical attention. Several types of practitioners who work with IPV survivors consistently, e.g., first responders, advocates, and clinicians, may be unfamiliar with brain functioning, screening, assessment, and treatment. This article reviews the dual traumas of IPV and TBI, the impact on neurological processes and symptomatology, and short and long-term outcomes. Recommendations for screening, intervention, interprofessional collaboration, and research are outlined.     

Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically Heuristic?

What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect.     

Letters, Notes, and Comments

Letter: Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World's Religions
Commenting on "Leaping into the Boundless: A Daoist Reading of Comparative Religious Ethics" by Francisca Cho, "Moral Reason, Risk, and Comparative Inquiry" by Robin W. Lovin, "Heuristic Power as the Test of Theory" by Ronald M. Green, and "The Author Replies" by Francisca Cho     

THE LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS AND CONCEPTUAL HISTORY

The historical problem about the origins of the language of rights derives its importance from the conceptual problem: of “two fundamentally different ways of thinking about justice,” which is basic? Is justice unitary or plural? This in turn opens up a problem about the moral status of human nature. A narrative of the origins of “rights” is an account of how and when a plural concept of justice comes to the fore, and will be based on the occurrence of definite speech‐forms—the occurrence of the plural noun in the sense of “legal properties.” The history of this development is currently held to begin with the twelfth‐century canonists. Later significant thresholds may be found in the fourteenth, sixteenth, and eighteenth centuries. Wolterstorff's attempt to find the implicit recognition of rights in the Scriptures depends very heavily on what he takes to be implied rather than on what is stated, and at best can establish a pre‐history of rights‐language.     

Response to Ranganathan

This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor the Universal Declaration's implication—through its use of terms such as “inherent” and “inalienable”—that humans participate in transcendent reality, necessarily presuppose a Christian metaphysics. Second, a concept such as “inherent dignity” must be affirmed to be intrinsically heuristic unless we are to assume that its meaning can be completely known within the conditions of existence; but this affirmation does not render such concepts “indeterminate of sense.” Finally, Ranganathan's distinction between“weak” and “strong” senses of transcendence is untenable. If human truths beyond all contingencies are knowable (“weak” transcendence), then there must be a real dimension of meaning that transcends all contingencies (“strong” transcendence).     

JUSTICE AS INHERENT RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS

The critical comments by my fellow symposiasts on my book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs , have provided me with the opportunity to clarify parts of my argument and to correct some misunderstandings; they have also helped me see more clearly than I did before the import of some parts of my argument. In his comments, Paul Weithman points out features of the right order conception of justice that I had not noticed. They have also prodded me to clarify in what way rights are trumps; and both his comments and Bernstein's have prodded me to clarify certain aspects of the theistic account of human rights that I offered. Attridge's comments lead me to see that I was perhaps over-zealous in emphasizing the objective aspects of the semantic range of dikaiosunê as used in the New Testament and downplaying the subjective aspects. And O'Donovan's comments have provided me with the opportunity to make clear that my account of rights is not an immunities account that presupposes nominalism, and to emphasize the ways in which it is not an asocial individualistic account.     

Action Research on Meaning-Making at Residents' Meetings for Local Disability Policy1

This is the third in a series on residents' meetings (RMs) for municipal disability policymaking in Japan; members included people with disabilities (PWDs). I focused on members' meaning-making process for three community organizational goals: task, process, and relationship. Action research was employed in all three studies during my participation in RMs, which began in 2002. The present study is a follow-up on the meetings' development and covers 2013 to 2019. Meetings were divided into three phases: (a) use of the annual symposium to inform a broader audience about disability policies; (b) appreciation that PWDs can play active roles as supporters of others, especially other PWDs; and (c) recognition that contradiction and dilemma are present in attempts to provide “universal” social equipment for social minorities. The three goals were interrelated through uncertainty and vagueness of RMs; however, it enabled the members to interpret their multifaceted disability-related experiences. PWDs realized their power to help others and developed disability identities through intensive discussions, while they realized the difficulty of social acceptance of their power and the limited solidarity among PWDs.