Changes in functional response units with briefly delayed reinforcement

In two experiments, key-peck responding of pigeons was compared under variable-interval schedules that arranged immediate reinforcement and ones that arranged unsignaled delays of reinforcement. Responses during the nominal unsignaled delay periods had no effect on the reinforcer presentations. In Experiment 1, the unsignaled delays were studied using variable-interval schedules as baselines. Relative to the immediate reinforcement condition, 0.5-s unsignaled delays decreased the duration of the reinforced interresponse times and increased the overall frequency of short (<0.5-s) interresponse times. Longer, 5.0-s unsignaled delays increased the duration of the reinforced interresponse times and decreased the overall frequency of the short interresponse times. In Experiment 2, similar effects to those of Experiment 1 were obtained when the 0.5-s unsignaled delays were imposed upon a baseline schedule that explicitly arranged reinforcement of short interresponse times and therefore already generated a large number of short interresponse times. The results support earlier suggestions that the unsignaled 0.5-s delays change the functional response unit from a single key peck to a multiple key-peck unit. These findings are discussed in terms of the mechanisms by which contingencies control response structure in the absence of specific structural requirements.     

Concurrent-schedule performance: Effects of relative and overall reinforcer rate

Six pigeons were trained to respond on two keys, each of which provided reinforcers on an arithmetic variable-interval schedule. These concurrent schedules ran nonindependently with a 2-s changeover delay. Six sets of conditions were conducted. Within each set of conditions the ratio of reinforcers available on the two alternatives was varied, but the arranged overall reinforcer rate remained constant. Each set of conditions used a different overall reinforcer rate, ranging from 0.22 reinforcers per minute to 10 reinforcers per minute. The generalized matching law fit the data from each set of conditions, but sensitivity to reinforcer frequency (a) decreased as the overall reinforcer rate decreased for both time allocation and response allocation based analyses of the data. Overall response rates did not vary with changes in relative reinforcer rate, but decreased with decreases in overall reinforcer rate. Changeover rates varied as a function of both relative and overall reinforcer rates. However, as explanations based on changeover rate seem unable to deal with the changes in generalized matching sensitivity, discrimination accounts of choice may offer a more promising interpretation.     

Effects of alternative reinforcement sources: A reevaluation

The effects of two alternative sources of food delivery on the key-peck responding of pigeons were examined. Pecking was maintained by a variable-interval 3-min schedule. In the presence of this schedule in different conditions, either a variable-time 3-min schedule delivering food independently of responding or an equivalent schedule that required a minimum 2-s pause between a key peck and food delivery (a differential-reinforcement-of-other-behavior schedule) was added. The differential-reinforcement-of-other-behavior schedule reduced response rates more than did the variable-time schedule in most instances. The delay between a key peck and the next reinforcer consistently was longer under the differential-reinforcement-of-other-behavior schedule than under the variable-time schedule. Response rates and median delay between responses and reinforcers were negatively correlated. These results contradict earlier conclusions about the behavioral effects of alternative reinforcement. They suggest that an interpretation in terms of response–reinforcer contiguity is consistent with the data.     

Canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones and applications

Canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones consists in looking for two vectors (one in each cone) whose square cosine is a maximum. This paper presents new results about the properties of the optimal solution to this problem, and also discusses in detail the convergence of an alternating least squares algorithm. The set of scalings of an ordinal variable is a convex polyhedral cone, which thus plays an important role in optimal scaling methods for the analysis of ordinal data. Monotone analysis of variance, and correspondence analysis subject to an ordinal constraint on one of the factors are both canonical analyses of a convex polyhedral cone and a subspace. Optimal multiple regression of a dependent ordinal variable on a set of independent ordinal variables is a canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones as long as the signs of the regression coefficients are given. We discuss these three situations and illustrate them by examples.     

ON MARTIN EGER'S "A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES"

Abstract. Criticisms are presented against Eger's challenge to the demarcation between the natural sciences and ethics. Arguments are given both against his endorsement of the "new" philosophy of science and against his rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, his educational recommendations are reinforced rather than weakened by these criticisms     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.     

Rhetoric and “doing philosophy”

By drawing new distinctions labelled appeal and response to replace traditional rhetorical modes of written discourse, the essay sketches a new perspective about what philosophers are doing rhetorically in doing philosophy. To think of philosophers as simply engaged in argument is an oversimplification and a distortion of what philosophers do. Crucial to doing philosophy are four activities: (1) definition and redefinition of problems and issues that form both the focus of the canonical historical literature of philosophy and what goes on in contemporary philosophy as a discipline, (2) the development and use of formal languages and technical vocabularies to abbreviate and label complexity and to disambiguate and precise distinctions necessary to deal with problems and issues, (3) the development and exploration of argumentative appeals for acceptance or refutation of answers to questions raised by the philosophical problematic, and (4) the development and exploration of explanatory responses to questions raised by the problematic. In so far as these four activities are driven and sanctioned by the current, self-defining philosophical problematic, contemporary philosophy as a body of knowledge is historical, cumulative, and marked by progress, and the doing of philosophy is fundamentally the making of written appeals and responses about its problematic.     

Effects of response requirement and alcohol on human aggressive responding.

Nine men participated in two experiments to determine the effects of increased response requirement and alcohol administration on free-operant aggressive responding. Two response buttons (A and B) were available. Pressing Button A was maintained by a fixed-ratio 100 schedule of point presentation. Subjects were instructed that completion of each fixed-ratio 10 on Button B resulted in the subtraction of a point from a fictitious second subject. Button B presses were defined as aggressive because they ostensibly resulted in the presentation of an aversive stimulus to another person. Aggressive responses were engendered by a random-time schedule of point loss and were maintained by initiation of intervals free of point loss. Instructions attributed these point losses to Button B presses of the fictitious other subject. In Experiment 1, increasing the ratio requirement on Button B decreased the number of ratios completed in 4 of 5 subjects. In Experiment 2, the effects of placebo and three alcohol doses (0.125, 0.25, and 0.375 g/kg) were determined when Button B presses were maintained at ratio values of 20, 40 and 80. Three subjects who reduced aggressive responding with increasing fixed-ratio values reduced aggressive responding further at higher alcohol doses. One subject who did not reduce aggressive responding with increasing fixed-ratio values increased aggressive responding at the highest alcohol dose. The results of this study support suggestions that alcohol alters aggressive behavior by reducing the control of competing contingencies.     

Choice with delayed and probabilistic reinforcers: effects of variability, time between trials, and conditioned reinforcers.

In a discrete-trials procedure with pigeons, a response on a green key led to a 4-s delay (during which green houselights were lit) and then a reinforcer might or might not be delivered. A response on a red key led to a delay of adjustable duration (during which red houselights were lit) and then a certain reinforcer. The delay was adjusted so as to estimate an indifference point--a duration for which the two alternatives were equally preferred. Once the green key was chosen, a subject had to continue to respond on the green key until a reinforcer was delivered. Each response on the green key, plus the 4-s delay that followed every response, was called one "link" of the green-key schedule. Subjects showed much greater preference for the green key when the number of links before reinforcement was variable (averaging four) than when it was fixed (always exactly four). These findings are consistent with the view that probabilistic reinforcers are analogous to reinforcers delivered after variable delays. When successive links were separated by 4-s or 8-s "interlink intervals" with white houselights, preference for the probabilistic alternative decreased somewhat for 2 subjects but was unaffected for the other 2 subjects. When the interlink intervals had the same green houselights that were present during the 4-s delays, preference for the green key decreased substantially for all subjects. These results provided mixed support for the view that preference for a probabilistic reinforcer is inversely related to the duration of conditioned reinforcers that precede the delivery of food.     

Maximizing versus matching on concurrent variable-interval schedules

Maximization and matching predictions were examined for a time-based analogue of the concurrent variable-interval variable-ratio schedule. One alternative was a variable interval whose time base operated relatively independent of the schedule chosen, and the other was a discontinuous variable interval for which timing progressed only when selected. Pigeons switched between schedules by pecking a changeover key. The maximization hypothesis predicts that subjects will show a bias toward the discontinuous variable interval and undermatching; however the obtained results conformed closely to the predictions of the matching law. Finally, a quantitative comparison was made of the bias and sensitivity estimates obtained in published concurrent variable-interval variable-ratio analogue studies. Results indicated that only the ratio-based analogue of the concurrent variable interval variable ratio studied by Green, Rachlin, and Hanson (1983) produced significant bias toward the variable-ratio alternative and undermatching, as predicted by reinforcement maximization.