Pragmatism Regained

This article views the confrontation between pragmatism and Kant’s Critical undertaking as very possibly the single most consequential agon of contemporary philosophy, given the utter irreconcilability of their respective ways of addressing the concerns of First Philosophy, with regard to the enabling conditions of cognitive realism. Pragmatism favors an informal, fluxive, “instrumentalist” form of empiricism, impossible to complete, opposed to any and all the ontic and epistemic fixities of Kant’s Rationalism. Reason (Vernunft) cannot be more than a fiction. Kant has no supporting criterion of realism. The article proposes an empirical criterion of the distinctive (given) “duality” of sensory “appearings” and “appeareds” (that is, objects) as yielding a plausible “cognitive faculty” (involving “reasoning”—inference, for instance—but not Vernunft) that, in accord with the drift of evolutionism and Aristotle, readily extends to languageless animals as well as humans. It serves as the linchpin of the paper.     

Something more than the 'Something more than interpretation' is needed: A comment on the paper by the Process of Change Study Group

A critique is offered of the paper on non-interpretive mechanisms in psychoanalytic therapy by the Process of Change Study Group (Stern et al., 1998a). The attention paid to procedural learning and to the need to attend to implicit relational knowledge is welcomed but a number of the group's assumptions are questioned. In particular, it is argued that the differences between mother-infant and therapist-patient relationships are inadequately considered, that the polarisation of non-symbolic and verbal memory is unhelpful and that the separation of the therapy relationship into three strands is problematic. The assumption that pursuing the goal of intersubjective understanding is in itself therapeutic is questioned. It is suggested that the recognition of the importance of implicit relational knowledge calls for a wider reappraisal of important aspects of theory and practice and that direct means of making such knowledge explicit should be considered.     

心理学经验主义、理性主义与解释学认识论比较研究

虽然现代心理学一直想摆脱哲学的束缚与羁绊,但心理学的发展中总是自觉不自觉地表露出不同的认识论取向。经验主义、理性主义和解释学哲学对现代心理学的发展产生了重要影响。三种取向的心理学在心理学研究对象本质的理解、知识形成的途径、研究结果的表现形式以及研究方法的选择上各执己见,由此展现出三种不同的心理学风景。经验主义认识论注重事物各种特征的描述,经验材料的收集,主张采用自然科学研究方法以揭示现象的规律与法则。理性主义认识论关注现象背后的深层次结构,主张用信息加工、记忆检索、图式与结构、感觉输入等方式获得对现象本质的认识,并以形式结构的方式呈现研究结果。解释学认识论则注重对人类实践活动的理解,重视人与环境的相互作用,主张以语义的言说阐明研究结果。在未来,心理学仍需寻求完善的认识论基础,真正确立适于人性的心理学研究方式,以期展示人的完整本质。     

Should We Be Talking About Ethics or About Morals?

This article seeks to revisit the distinction between the words ethics and morals. First, we understand the word ethics to be focused on the way we seek to live our own life, and hence to connote a relativistic and essentially subjective perspective, whereas we understand the word morals to be focused on the way we should live our lives together, especially through sensitivity to viewpoints other than our own. Second, we perceive a usefulness in such a differentiation when the ethical values of those in a dilemmatic situation are conflicted in order to prioritize moral decision making in contemporary society. We argue that in our current era, characterized by a multiplicity of faiths and by pronounced value pluralism, a philosophical basis for moral decision making needs to be clearly attuned with intersubjectivity and interconnectivity among people. It should be able to determine principles of conduct toward others, no matter how one’s own ethical values, conceptions of the good, or life choices might differ from those of others. To do this, we relocate ethical decision making away from an essentially monological reflection on our own values and purposes into a social space wherein we have an inclusive, noncoercive, and reflective dialogue.     

Agendas,Relevance and Dialogic Ascent

E. C. W. Krabbe characterizes a metadialogue as a dialogue about a dialogue, which in turn, is characterized as a ground level dialogue. Krabbe raises a number of interesting questions about this distinction, of which the most pressing is whether the difference between ground level and metadialogues can be drawn in a principled and suitably general way. In this note, I develop the idea that something counts as a metadialogue to the extent that it stands to its ground level counterpart in a relation of irrelevance. The irrelevance in question subsumes a triple of subconcepts: strategic relevance, agenda-relevance and irredundancy-relevance.     

Looking Back,Looking Forward: ISPP at 40 and Future Directions for Political Psychology

The ISPP Presidential Address typically is an opportunity for the President to outline his or her research contribution and trajectory, and the publication of the Address takes the form of a research article. Given that in 2017, ISPP celebrated its 40th conference and 2018 is its 40th anniversary as an academic society, the 2017 Presidential Address and this article are focused on the state of the Society; What have we achieved? How have we changed? Where are we heading? Looking back, ISPP is a more diverse and international society than in 1978, and it is confidently fulfilling its mission. Looking forward, three areas that warrant further attention are outlined: (1) The issue of a possible decline in scientific rationalism and threat of anti‐liberalism (2) challenges with measurement and prediction of political opinion, political attitudes, and voting behavior, and (3) as a maturing field, the need to establish common theoretical frameworks that integrate current knowledge such as building a case that humans are political animals. Each direction is briefly outlined with the aim of provoking thought and stimulating discussion and debate about the future of political psychology.     

The World as Representation: Schopenhauer's Arguments for Transcendental Idealism

In this paper, I discuss Spinoza's conception of the cosmological argument for the existence of God (hereafter CA), as it can be reconstructed taking departure from Letter 12. By a CA, I understand, quite broadly, an argument which infers a posteriori the existence of a necessary being, usually identified as God, from the experience that there exists some other being, often oneself, the existence of which is contingent upon the existence of this necessary being. The difference between various versions of the CA stems from differences in the way in which the relation of existential dependence is understood. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a version of the CA which would be valid on Spinoza's principles. I argue that such a version must be understood in the context of Spinoza's causal rationalism. By such causal rationalism, I mean a doctrine committed to the idea that everything is rational and thus explicable and that causal explanations are somehow fundamental. Moreover, I hold that, in Spinoza's causal rationalism, there is one form of causation through which all other types of causation are ultimately understood. This ‘archetype’ of causation is self-causation.     

Educated intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance – in short: education – of our moral intuitions.     

More than a feeling

According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing on underappreciated elements of Kant's moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational.     

Thought experiments and conceptual revision

The idea that claims about the physical world might be arrived through a priori reasoning has a long history in physics. But it is clear that empiricist notions of the nature of science, and in particular the empirical nature of physics, have held sway in this century. Yet, in the idea of thought experiments in science, we might find the survival of earlier a priori reasoning to the truth of claims about the physical world. This paper challenges the notion that science can be understood as a purely empirical endeavor and points out what reforms would be necessary for teaching the image of science to our young.