Ginsborg on a Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts

ABSTRACT

According to a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the use of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the relevant conceptual norms. Recently, Ginsborg raises two important objections against this view. According to her, the normativity Brandom ascribes to concepts lacks the internalist or first-person character of normativity that Kant’s view demands, and the relevant normativity belongs properly not to concepts as such, but rather to belief or assertion. The purpose of this paper is to defend a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against these objections.     

Mental health – a normal state?

ABSTRACT

How can we conceptualize mental health; what is the relation between mental health and normality; and what has psychoanalysis to say about these questions? After a short resume of the views concerning normality and melancholia in the last centuries, the author turns to Freud and Bion. For Freud, mental health at best seems to be a relatively mild neurotic state, and perfect mental health is an unattainable ideal. Bion underlines the dynamic nature of the concept; mental health comprehended as a process. Problems connected to the individual’s subjective view of his or her mental health are considered, and some consequences that the questions under discussion have for psychoanalytic treatment are discussed. The author concludes with a reflection on the complex relation between mental health and normality.