汉语第三人称单数代词对人物性别判定的影响

采用启动范式考察汉语第三人称单数代词对人物性别判定的影响.实验l发现,“他”导致被试更多地将人物判定为男性,“她”使被试产生更多的女性意象,中性句引起的偏差较小.PMB程度无性别差异.实验2表明,“他”导致被试更多地将中性人物判定为男性,将部分女性误判为男性.     

Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions. The main focus of theorizing has been why 3-year-olds fail, and only recently have there been any models of how success is achieved in false-belief tasks. Leslie and Polizzi (Inhibitory processing in the false-belief task: Two conjectures. Developmental Science, 1, 247-254, 1998) proposed two competing models of success, which are the focus of the current paper. The models assume that belief-desire reasoning is a process which selects a content for an agent's belief and an action for the agent's desire. In false belief tasks, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) provides plausible candidate belief contents, among which will be a 'true-belief.' A second process reviews these candidates and by default will select the true-belief content for attribution. To succeed in a false-belief task, the default content must be inhibited so that attention shifts to another candidate belief. In traditional false-belief tasks, the protagonist's desire is to approach an object. Here we make use of tasks in which the protagonist has a desire to avoid an object, about which she has a false-belief. Children find such tasks much more difficult than traditional tasks. Our models explain the additional difficulty by assuming that predicting action from an avoidance desire also requires an inhibition. The two processing models differ in the way that belief and desire inhibitory processes combine to achieve successful action prediction. In six experiments we obtain evidence favoring one model, in which parallel inhibitory processes cancel out, over the other model, in which serial inhibitions force attention to a previously inhibited location. These results are discussed in terms of a set of simple proposals for the modus operandi of a domain specific learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is in part modular--the ToMM--and in part penetrable--the Selection Processor (SP). We show how ToMM-SP can account both for competence and for successful and unsuccessful performance on a wide range of belief-desire tasks across the preschool period. Together, ToMM and SP attend to and learn about mental states.     

Salient Color Terms in Four Languages

Elicited lists of color terms were used to investigate the relative salience of basic and nonbasic color terms in four languages. Salience was operationalized in terms of frequency of mention and mean rank sequence of appearance on the lists. Primary basic terms were generally found to be the most salient, followed by derived basic and nonbasic terms, in that order. However, in some of the group lists the nonbasic terms beige, turquoise, navy blue and sky blue were found to have higher frequencies of mention and/or higher mean sequence ranks than some derived basic terms. The possible basicness of these terms is discussed.     

论老子首倡人性善

老子是第一个提出人性善的哲学家。从他的宇宙生成论、人性修养论可以看出老子是主张人性善的。老子认为人性变坏的原因主要是客观事物的影响和世俗教育,复归于婴儿是老子人性修养论的总纲,其复归美好天性的主要措施是:反对享乐品的出现,反对世俗的教育。     

大学生颜色词分类的研究

运用自然分类和多维标度法．对279名大学生进行了11种基本颜色词的分类研究、结果表明,大学生将11种基本颜色词分成三类：(1)非彩色,包括黑、白、灰,也包括色彩暗淡的棕色;(2)暖色,包括红、橙、黄和粉红色;(3)冷色．包括绿、蓝和紫。基本颜色词的语义空间有两个纬度：(1)彩色／非彩色;(2)冷色／暖色。不同专业大学生对颜色词分类基本一致,但也具有专业特点。     

Nature versus nurture: The simple contrast

We respond to the commentary of Franklin, Wright, and Davies (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology,102, 239-245 [2009]) by returning to the simple contrast between nature and nurture. We find no evidence from the toddler data that makes us revise our ideas that color categories are learned and never innate.     

Desire, Judgment, and Reason: Exploring the Path not Taken

At the outset of The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel charts two paths out of the fundamental dilemma confronting metaethics. The first path rejects the claim that a persuasive account of the motivational backing of ethical judgments must involve an agent’s desires. But it is the second path, a path that Nagel charts but does not himself take, that is the focus of this essay. This path retains the standard account, upon which all motivation involves desire, but denies that desires are given prior to reason. Instead, these attitudes that motivate are themselves open to rational assessment. One reason for this focus is that many philosophers, including Quinn, Raz, and Scanlon, have come to reject the claim Nagel takes to block this path – that desires are somehow given prior to reason, hence are not in the relevant way proper objects of rational assessment. A second reason is that unlike the first path, this second does not require the rejection of the belief-desire theory, only the rejection of one assumption about the nature of conative attitudes. Unlike Nagel’s chosen path, then, the second holds out the prospect of reconciling ethical objectivity, internalism, and the belief-desire theory within a unified account. I argue that the account of desire found in Quinn, Raz, and Scanlon, augmented by aspects of Davidson’s account of propositional attitudes, yields a coherent account of the involvement of reason even in basic desires, an account that is well suited to Nagel’s intriguing path not taken. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at UC Santa Barbara and the University of Michigan. I am grateful to members of those audiences for helpful comments, in particular to Stephen Darwall, David Velleman, Kevin Toh, Voula Tsouna, and Tony Anderson. I have also benefited from helpful discussions of these arguments with Peter Thielke, Ted Hinchman, Dion Scott-Kakures, and Charles Young.     

奖惩中枢与学习

奖惩现象及实验揭示了:兴奋了奖赏中枢的思想、行为(神经通路)能被奖赏中枢强烈易化,而兴奋了惩罚中枢的思想、行为能被惩罚中枢强烈抑制。在此基础上,通过讨论奖惩中枢在学习中的作用得出:思想、行为的动力由奖惩中枢影响产生;奖惩中枢在思想、行为(神经兴奋)习惯的选择、形成过程中起着主要作用。     

Can desires determine ends?

According to a common view of human agency, desires determine at least some of the ends that agents set for themselves. In this paper, I argue that this view is false. I show that without reason’s ability to determine the means to an end it is impossible to determine ends. Furthermore, even when an end is determined in light of a desire, only reason can make sense of the distinction between an end and merely a means to that end. In fact, in many cases the end which is determined in light of desires is to remove these desires, rather than to “serve and obey” them. Hence, reason is necessary for determining our ends, and thus explaining the teleological aspect of agency.