Timing inter-reward intervals

Rats judged inter-reward intervals (IRIs) in a two-alternative, forced-choice task. The IRI was either short (S) or long (L). At the end of each IRI, two response levers were inserted into the box. A press to the lever designated as correct or incorrect produced a large (3-5 food pellets) or small (1 pellet) reward, respectively. Psychophysical functions were obtained by testing intermediate IRIs, which were followed by the small reward, independent of the response location. S and L intervals were manipulated across groups, as specified (in seconds) by the group name, S-L: 3-12 (n=12), 25-100 (n=12), and 50-200 (n=7). The psychophysical functions (p[L] vs. IRI) were ogival in shape and had bisection points (p[S]=p[L]=0.5) near the geometric mean of S and L intervals. The psychophysical functions did not superimpose in relative time (IRI/L). Instead, 3-12 was timed with greater relative sensitivity than were 25-100 and 50-200.     

Gender,the Perception of Aggression,and the Overestimation of Gender Bias

The purpose of this study was to investigate how the gender of aggressor, target, and observer influences the perception and evaluation of aggression. One hundred seventy-one university students (predominantly White) read 1 of 8 vignettes that described an aggressive act. The aggressor–target gender combinations and the aggressive act were varied. Data did not support the hypothesis that, because of the impact of gender stereotypes, participants would perceive more aggressiveness in men's aggression than in women's aggression. Participants rated women's aggression as more acceptable than men's aggression, and male participants considered the aggression more acceptable, apparently because they saw the act as less aggressive. In addition, participants estimated how most men/women would perceive and evaluate the aggression. Results suggest that people overestimate how biased others are toward members of their own gender.     

Increasing Behavioral Skills and Level of Understanding in Adults: A Brief Method Integrating Dennison's Brain Gym & #x00AE; Balance with Piaget's Reflective Processes

A single session intervention was given individually to 4 adults in order to assist them in achieving their personal goals by improving their behavioral skills for achieving the goals and their conceptual understanding of & #x201C;how to & #x201D; attain these goals. The method was based on a brain-ability analysis of understanding & #x201C;conservation & #x201D; on Jean Piaget's conservation tasks combined with Paul and Gail Dennison's Brain Gym & #x201C;balance & #x201D; procedure. My & #x201C;whole brain understanding & #x201D; model (C. A. Wolfsont, 1999, 2000) and M. L. Commons et al.'s Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System manual were used to analyze the verbal protocols (M. L. Commons et al., 1992; Commons, Danaher, & Meaney, 2000). Increases were found in the participants' conceptual understanding and in the complexity of their performance.     

Risk perception and risky choice: Situational, informational and dispositional effects

We investigated how situational (gain–loss), informational (opportunity–threat framing) and dispositional (achievement motive and avoidance motive) variables affected opportunity–threat perception and risky choice in managerial decision-making contexts. In Study 1, the risk preference of the participants showed a reflection effect due to situational differences (gain or loss) and a partial framing effect caused by presenting the same choice information in terms of either opportunities or threats. However, both effects were in the opposite direction of predictions from prospect theory. Gains and positive framing enhanced risk-seeking preference whereas losses and negative framing augmented risk-averse preference. Risk-seeking choices were mediated by opportunity perception whereas risk-averse choices were mediated by threat perception. In Study 2, the participants high in achievement motive perceived greater opportunities in a negative situation, and the participants high in avoidance motive perceived greater threats in a positive situation, suggesting that ambition (achievement motive) operates more significantly in the face of adversities whereas cautiousness (avoidance motive) functions more significantly in prosperity.     

Infants' perception of directional alignment of texture elements on a spherical surface

By appropriately compressing texture elements on a circular surface, one can evoke the impression of being confronted with the depiction of a spherical object in the picture plane. According to Todd and Akerstrom (1987), the 3D perception of such an object can be eliminated if the optical elements are not sufficiently elongated or if they are not aligned with one another. In the current investigation, 4‐month‐old infants were tested for their ability to react to a disruption of the directional alignment variable. They were habituated to either a spherical surface or a surface the spatial layout of which was destroyed by reorienting the texture elements, and were afterwards tested with a further ellipsoid object and with a further flat surface. Data analysis revealed that the female infants, but not the male participants, preferred the novel posthabituation display, that is, the test stimulus which included a change in the orientational alignment of texture elements. These findings are discussed within the context of development of sensitivity to pictorial depth cues. It is possible that infants as young as 4 months of age respond to manipulations of the directional alignment factor per se, while older infants are capable of using this factor as a cue for 3D object shape. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness

When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for example in cases of absent-minded perception. If unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, then sensory quality is an insufficient condition for consciousness. The second part of the paper argues that there are even better reasons to think that sensory quality is an unnecessary condition for consciousness. The idea is that mental states can be conscious even when they lack sensory quality, for example, in the case of certain conscious propositional attitudes. In the third part of the paper, an alternative to the rejected supposition, drawn from the phenomenological tradition, is offered: that consciousness is a matter of implicit self-awareness, rather than of sensory quality. According to this alternative, a mental state is conscious when, and only when, it involves implicit self-awareness.     

Religion, Science, and Evolution: Paul Tillich's Fourth Way

Abstract. In his book God After Darwin John Haught provides a useful categorization of theological approaches to evolution: some theologians actively oppose Darwinian evolution, another group maintains that science and religion have nothing to say to one another, and a third seeks to engage evolution. Haught wishes to pursue the third way. But many theological attempts to talk about divine action in the world, including divine involvement in the process of evolution, run afoul of the scientific principle of the conservation of matter‐energy. Haught's reliance on the now‐familiar notion that information can have causal efficacy does not in fact escape this difficulty. I suggest a fourth approach, represented by a constructive reading of Paul Tillich's theology. The central argument is that Tillich offers a way of taking Darwinian evolution up into one's ultimate concern without claiming that God has any causal relation to evolution. God provides no historical telos for evolution, but rather a “depth teleology” that springs from the manner in which God, as the depth of the structure of finite being, is the object of Christian faith.     

Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences

Social perceivers have been shown to draw spontaneous trait inferences (STI’s) about the behavior of an actor as well as spontaneous situational inferences (SSI’s) about the situation the actor is in. In two studies, we examined inferences about behaviors that allow for both an STI and an SSI. In Experiment 1, using a probe recognition paradigm, we found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s. In Experiment 2, using a relearning paradigm, we again found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s, regardless of temporarily activated processing goals. Results are discussed in light of three-stage models of the process of social inference.     

Racial Differences in Perceptions of Starting Salaries: How Failing to Discriminate Can Perpetuate Discrimination

Despite recent findings suggesting the presence of racial differences in the perception of starting salaries, researchers have yet to empirically investigate this possibility. Consequently, this study examined the interactive effects of race, ethnic identity, and starting salaries on the salary perceptions of 342 undergraduates. Hispanic, Asian American, and White participants exhibited positive effects of salary whereas Black respondents failed to discriminate between the different salaries. However, a three-way interaction involving ethnic identity, race, and salary revealed a more complex pattern of responses for Black participants: Higher ethnic identifiers responded similarly to Hispanic, White, and Asian Americans. The implications of these results regarding the perpetuation of racial wage inequity are discussed.     

Languages for Gestalts of line patterns

Any formal model of visual Gestalt perception requires a language for representing possible perceptual structures of visual stimuli, as well as a decision criterion that selects the actually perceived structure of a stimulus among its possible alternatives. This paper discusses an existing model of visual Gestalt perception that is based on Structural Information Theory. We investigate two factors that determine the representational power of this model: the domain of visual stimuli that can be analyzed, and the class of perceptual structures that can be generated for these stimuli. We show that the representational power of the existing model of Structural Information Theory is limited, and that some of the generated structures are perceptually inadequate. We argue that these limitations do not imply the implausibility of the underlying ideas of Structural Information Theory and introduce alternative models based on the same ideas. For each of these models, the domain of visual stimuli that can be analyzed properly is formally defined. We show that the models are conservative modifications of the original model of Structural Information Theory: for cases that are adequately analyzed in the original model of Structural Information Theory, they yield the same results.