The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?

According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities are justified if and only if they arise from choices for which it is reasonable to hold agents responsible. This position has been criticised for its purported harshness in responding to the plight of individuals who, through their own choices, end up destitute. This paper aims to assess the Harshness Objection. I put forward a version of the objection that has been qualified to take into account some of the more subtle elements of the luck egalitarian approach. Revising the objection in this way suggests that the Harshness Objection has been overstated by its proponents: because luck egalitarians are sensitive to the influence of unequal brute luck on individuals’ choices, it is unlikely that there will be any real world cases in which the luck egalitarian would not have to provide at least partial compensation. However, the Harshness Objection still poses problems for the luck egalitarian. First, it is not clear that partial compensation will be sufficient to avoid catastrophic outcomes. Second, the Harshness Objection raises a theoretical problem in that a consistent luck egalitarian will have to regard it as unjust if any assistance is provided to the victim of pure option luck, even if such assistance could be provided at no cost. I consider three strategies the luck egalitarian could pursue to accommodate these concerns and conclude that none of these strategies can be maintained without either violating basic luck egalitarian principles or infringing upon individual liberty.

Dissimilarity cumulation theory and subjective metrics

We present a new mathematical notion, dissimilarity function, and based on it, a radical extension of Fechnerian Scaling, a theory dealing with the computation of subjective distances from pairwise discrimination probabilities. The new theory is applicable to all possible stimulus spaces subject to the following two assumptions: (A) that discrimination probabilities satisfy the Regular Minimality law and (B) that the canonical psychometric increments of the first and second kind are dissimilarity functions. A dissimilarity function Dab for pairs of stimuli in a canonical representation is defined by the following properties: (1) a≠b?Dab>0; (2) Daa=0; (3) If and , then ; and (4) for any sequence {a_nX_nb_n}_n∈N, where X_n is a chain of stimuli, Da_nX_nb_n→0?Da_nb_n→0. The expression DaXb refers to the dissimilarity value cumulated along successive links of the chain aXb. The subjective (Fechnerian) distance between a and b is defined as the infimum of DaXb+DbYa across all possible chains X and Y inserted between a and b.     

Pakistan Federal Shariat Court's Collective Ijtihād on Gender Equality,Women's Rights and the Right to Family Life

This article argues on the basis of recent case law that the judges of the Pakistan Federal Shariat Court (FSC) have asserted their right to ijtihād and have indeed engaged in collective ijtihād. While in some areas, such as freedom of religion, Islamic law has been interpreted rigidly in a non-human-rights-friendly fashion in Pakistan, in some other areas, the flexibility and pluralism of Islamic law has been used to improve gender equality, women's rights and the right to family life. By using its constitutional powers, with its collective ijtihād, the FSC has been tackling the traditionally illiberal interpretation and application of Muslim laws in these areas. Regardless of the methodology and process of this ijtihādic endeavor, the output shows that the FSC has been either modifying the traditional ijtihāds or coming up with totally new ijtihāds to answer contemporary questions faced by Islamic law. The findings of the article once again challenge the views of scholars such as Schacht, Coulson and Chehata, who have argued that, by the fourth/tenth century, the essentials of Islamic legal doctrine were already fully formulated and that the doctrine remained fixed.     

Sorting Out Support for Democracy: A Q‐Method Study

Support for democracy is crucial to democratic stability. Yet the nature and range of democratic belief systems, and whether these belief systems are idiosyncratic to specific individuals and polities or are more general, remain largely unknown. Such unknowns complicate an already daunting measurement task. Extant survey‐based measures are fraught with validity problems and say little about the democratic beliefs individuals most strongly hold or reject. To address these problems, this study blends focus groups, interviews, and Q‐sort methodology to examine patterns of subjective, behavioral renderings of democratic support profiles. It finds seven shared profiles of beliefs concerning democracy, alternative regimes, and political and civil freedoms across Chile and Argentina. Their resemblance to democratic belief systems found with other methods bolsters their validity and generalizability. The analyses reveal the relative weight of each orientation within each belief profile and their intensity across profiles. In so doing, they identify which items are crucial for within‐ and across‐case comparisons. Altogether, these insights should inform survey‐based approaches to detecting and describing the democratic support profiles latent in the polity.     

‘My Husband is My Key to Paradise.’ Attitudes of Muslims in Indonesia and Norway to Spousal Roles and Wife-Beating

This article explores the influence of religious factors and values held by local societies, when Muslims develop their personal attitudes and perceived religious norms regarding spousal roles and wife-beating. It is based on qualitative interviews with 59 Muslims in Indonesia (N?=?35) and Norway (N?=?24). In addition, relevant Indonesian and Norwegian Muslim literature and web pages are examined. According to most Indonesian respondents, Islamic norms prescribe male leadership and allow the husband to beat a disobedient wife. This was regarded as crucial for the wife’s destiny after death. According to most Norwegian respondents, Islamic norms promote gender equality and oppose wife-beating. The sharp contrast between the perceived religious norms of Indonesian and Norwegian respondents may be caused by dissimilar cultural values in the two countries – values that influenced personal attitudes and thus the horizon of understanding where religion and authoritative text were interpreted. The reasoning of the respondents also sheds light on the importance of specific sacred texts when religious norms were developed individually. From a psychological point of view, the implementation of the egalitarian attitudes represented by numerous respondents may have positive effects for Muslim women living in patriarchal societies.     

The Deliberative Pulpit? The Democratic Norms and Practices of the PCUSA

In contrast to typical approaches that view religion as problematic or benign, thicker conceptions of religion's place in promoting and sustaining democratic politics are possible. This includes religious organizations modeling democratic practices and engaging in debate on common terms. We initiate this program of inquiry with data from a survey of Presbyterian Church, USA clergy gathered during the late summer and fall of 2009. We asked explicitly about clergy commitment to democratic norms and practices as reflected in their public speech and small group activities in their congregations. We use this article to explain variance in the results, looking especially to see if democratic commitments fall at the expense of religious competition, organizational maintenance, and personal preference and increased conservatism.     

Hobbes's Account of Distributive Justice as Equity

This paper examines the rationale for and grounds and implications of Hobbes's redefinition of distributive justice as equity. I argue that this unprecedented reformulation served to ensure the justness of distributive laws. Hobbes acknowledges that the sovereign can distribute rights and goods iniquitously by failing to treat citizens as equals. However, he insists that improper allocations are not unjust, properly speaking – they do not `wrong' citizens. To support this claim, Hobbes puts forth the un-Aristotelian maxim that merit in distributive justice is due by grace alone. You deserve what the sovereign gives you: there is no desert prior to and independent of his allocation of rights. For Hobbes, distributive justice does not track but create merit. It follows that distributive laws cannot fail to give what is due (which would be unjust). This paper proceeds to analyze the nature of the limits equity sets to the apportionment of goods. I argue that these limits are moral and purely procedural: citizens cannot invoke equity to claim a fair share of the goods distributed. Thanks to Hobbes's redefinition of distributive justice, the justness of the sovereign's conduct, and hence his legal immunity, remains intact.     

Incommensurability in Aristotle's Theory of Reciprocal Justice

In just proportional exchange, under Aristotle's theory of reciprocal justice, superior sharers in a community materially assist the weaker, and receive honour as a reward. Aristotle's economic thought is represented with a system of 18 formulae. Explained are: (1) What Aristotle means when he says that it is impossible for two sharers or their erga to be commensurable; (2) The extent to which the variables in Aristotle's proportions can be quantified. (3) What diagonal pairing ( κατ διμ?τρoν σζ?υξι?) is; (4) How need makes sharers and their erga ‘sufficiently' commensurable; and (5) Aristotle's theory of what is just in exchange.     

BUILDING CAPACITY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CRITICAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENRY THROUGH THE REDEFINITION OF EDUCATION

This article answers the question, How can we build capacity for the development of a critical democratic citizenry? This is achieved by generally describing postmodern society, and by introducing the idea of evolutionary consciousness as the next step in meeting the needs of a postmodern society. Secondly, the current nature of education is described, which is followed by a redefinition of education within the context of a critical ideal. The discussion concludes with a presentation of the pragmatics of building capacity for the development of a critical democratic citizenry through a redefinition of education.