Law, Convention and Objectivity: Comments on Kramer

Since I do not disagree with the line of argument taken by Kramer and the distinctions he draws between the different ways rules can be ‘mind-independent’, my comments focus on some of the complexities involved in the application of his distinctions. I suggest that law, properly understood as a system of rules/conventions is both existentially and observationally weakly mind independent, but nonetheless objective.

From Normative Spheres to Normative Practices: New Prospects for Normative Theory after Habermas

Abstract

In this paper I argue against Jürgen Habermas’s theoretical dualism between ethics and morality. I do this by showing how his account of normativity is vitiated by an unnecessary superposition of a social-evolutionary and a theoretical-linguistic account of normativity, and that this brings about theoretical problems that in the end cannot be overcome. I also show that Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s distinction is equally doomed to failure, but that his attempt nevertheless invites new and more fruitful avenues for normative theory that are worth exploring. The conclusion of this paper is that traditional notions of ethics and morality can be preserved provided we heavily redefine their meanings and release them from some of the theoretical work they have been expected to accomplish, but that to complete this transition we also need to supersede Forst’s pluralization of normative contexts toward a theory of normative practices that in the end makes the distinction between ethics and morality workable but useless. I begin by first locating the debate about ethics and morality within the context of recent normative theory (§1), and proceed to examine the two main strategies through which Habermas has elaborated his idea of a sharp dualism between ethics and morality (§2). I then introduce a theoretical distinction between what I call a horizontal and a vertical integration of ethics and morality (§3) and contend that whilst only the horizontal is viable, Habermas decidedly prefers the idea of a vertical integration (§4). With this work done, I proceed to complete my critique of Habermas’s argument and show how, by recovering the pragmatist roots of his thought, an alternative solution based on a functionalist understanding of morality could be envisaged (§5). I then conclude by examining Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s account, and show that the failure of Forst’s attempts opens the way for new and more fruitful approaches to normative theory which are more likely to recover the pragmatist roots of Habermas’s thought (§6).     

The role of negative urgency impulsivity and financial management practices in compulsive buying

Previous research has shown that negative urgency impulsivity is associated with compulsive buying even after controlling for depression. The aim of the present study was to replicate this finding and to examine if financial management practices mediated this relationship. A community sample of 162 participants (34 male and 128 female), aged between 18 and 82 years, completed online self‐report questionnaire measures. As expected, results revealed (1) significant positive associations between compulsive buying and both negative urgency impulsivity (NUI) and psychological distress; and (2) a significant negative association between compulsive buying and financial management practices. We also found that after controlling for psychological distress (3) NUI was still significantly correlated with compulsive buying, and (4) financial management practices partially mediated the relationship between NUI and financial management practices. Our findings are consistent with an extension of the theory that compulsive buying is motivated by relieving negative mood states, positing both negative affect‐driven impulsivity and psychological distress as important factors in understanding compulsive buying. These findings also support current cognitive‐behavioural interventions for the treatment of compulsive buying that target psychological distress, NUI, and financial management practices.     

Understanding moral responsibility in the design of trailers

This paper starts from the presupposition that moral codes often do not suffice to make agents understand their moral responsibility. We will illustrate this statement with a concrete example of engineers who design a truck’s trailer and who do not think traffic safety is part of their responsibility. This opinion clashes with a common supposition that designers in fact should do all that is in their power to ensure safety in traffic. In our opinion this shows the need for a moral philosophy that helps engineers to interpret their responsibility and think more critically about it. For this purpose we will explore the moral philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre, which is particularly interesting because he locates the beginning of moral thinking in the daily practice of a profession. This is consistent with the history of moral codes, for codes are also the product of moral reflection by professionals. We will use MacIntyre’s philosophy to (1) explain what is wrong with the designers’ understanding of their responsibility and (2) show a possible way to bring their reflection to a more self-critical level. We will also inspect MacIntyre’s proposal critically.     

Maternal conceptions of the parenting role and mother–child collaborative behaviours in at-risk context

This study investigated to what extent mothers' conceptions of the parenting role drive mother–child collaborative behaviour as well as expert ratings on maternal practices. It also investigated whether there is any direct link between mother and child behaviours and expert ratings. Self-report measures for maternal conceptions and observed mother–child behaviours in the shopping task were obtained from a sample of 75 at-risk mothers with a child 8 to 12 years old. Social workers reported on mothers' negligent, coercive and resilient practices. Structural equation models showed that high power conception had a negative influence on mother and child's collaborative efforts, whereas reciprocity and parental support conceptions had a positive influence. Reciprocity, low power and parental support schemas consistently predicted experts' view on maternal practices. However, only mother's passivity predicted negatively expert ratings on resilient practice, indicating that expert views were mostly derived from mothers' reflections on their parenting role. Results suggested ways for improving experts' assessment of parental capacities and the use of intervention programmes to promote mothers' positive conceptions and actions.     

Tina Keller's analyses with C. G. Jung and Toni Wolff, 1915-1928

This historical essay documents the clinical practices of C. G. Jung and Toni Wolff with their analysand Tina Keller, a Swiss physician and psychotherapist, during the formative years of analytical psychology (1915-1928). The topic is investigated through an examination of primary documents, largely unpublished, in English and German, based on Keller's autobiographical writings. It presents biographical information on Keller's life and details of her analyses with Jung and Wolff, emphasizing the technique of active imagination and describing the clinical practices of Jung and Wolff in Keller's analyses.     

JEFFREY STOUT ON DEMOCRACY AND ITS CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN CRITICS

Jeffrey Stout addresses two of the main criticisms of liberal democracy by its contemporary neotraditionalist Christian critics: that liberal democracy is destructive of social tradition, and thereby of virtue in the citizenry, and that liberal democracy is inherently secular, committed to expunging religious voices from the public arena. I judge that Stout effectively answers these charges: liberal democracy has its own tradition, it cultivates the virtues relevant to that, and it is not inherently hostile to piety. What Stout does not do, I suggest, is take the next step of showing, positively, that Christianity can and should affirm the substance of liberal democratic society. This is due, in good measure, to the fact that Stout never tells us, except in off‐hand comments, what he takes the substance of liberal democracy to be. And this, in turn, is due to his way of employing pragmatism: he uses pragmatism to give an account of human society generally, not of liberal democratic society. I raise some questions about the general account that pragmatism gives of human society, and thus about the account that it would give of liberal democracy.