Value Words and Lizard Brains: Do Citizens Deliberate About Appeals to Their Core Values?

Political elites often present citizens with frames that define issues in terms of core values. This study tests two competing accounts of how citizens might process such frames. According to the "passive receiver" thesis, citizens process elite frames automatically, without engaging in critical thought. In contrast, the "thoughtful receiver" thesis holds that the impact of frames may depend on how favorably or unfavorably citizens respond to them. An experiment in value framing produced evidence more consistent with the thoughtful receiver thesis: The message that welfare reform is "tough love" influenced opinion only among those it did not anger, whereas the message that welfare reform is "cruel and inhumane" produced an effect only among those who judged it to be strong. More generally, these findings suggest that active processing of frames may limit the power of elite framing.     

Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's Ethics

This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle.     

Can Voters Predict Changes in Theor Own Attitudes?

Although scholars have established that voters have unstable preferences (e.g., Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992) and that they are not accurate when recalling past preferences (e.g., Markus, 1986; Niemi, Katz, & Newman, 1980; Smith, 1984), existing research has not systematically explored whether voters can accurately predict the changing nature of their own opinions. The question of whether whether people recognize the instability of their political preferences was explored in a random sample of Pennsylvania registered voters who were surveyed in August and October 1996, during the presidential election campaign. The first survey elicited respondents' positions on two political issues (welfare reform and the environment) and on the two major candidates, and also asked them to estimate the likelihood that each of these positions would change during the next 2 months. The second survey elicited positions at that time and also asked voters to recall their prior positions. Measured both by expectations and recall, respondents tended to underestimate the degree to which their own positions would change or had changed over time. This research has implications for the use of public opinion polling and more broadly for the practice of democratic politics.     

Public involvement: How to encourage citizen participation

The study was aimed at identifying the impact of a pool of variables on the willingness of the participants in five consultative arenas (Open Space Technology) to become involved in future experiences of civic engagement. The study also intended to verify whether such willingness varied among subgroups of participants. In total, 194 participants (49.5% men, 50.5% women; mean age = 37.04) were recruited during five OSTs held in Italy between May and November 2008 and asked to fill in a questionnaire composed of the following measures: perceived costs and benefits, emotions, sense of community, trust in institutions and need for cognitive closure. Findings suggested that the setting‐related variables—namely the perception of costs and benefits and the arousal of positive feelings—were more influential than the community‐related variables, such as sense of community and trust in institutions. Indications and suggestions for the design, implementation and evaluation of participatory settings were discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Problems and solutions for a hybrid approach to grounding practical normativity

Source Hybridism about practical reasons is the position that facts that constitute reasons sometimes derive their normative force from external metaphysical grounds, and sometimes from internal. Although historically less popular than either Source Internalism or Source Externalism, hybridism has lately begun to garner more attention. Here, I further the hybridist's cause by defending Source Hybridism from three objections. I argue that we are not warranted in rejecting hybridism for any of the following reasons: that hybridists cannot provide an account of normative weight, that hybridists are committed to implausible results concerning practical deliberation, or that Source Hybridism is objectionably unparsimonious.     

Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?

A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider, and reply to, seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way of softening the blow, I show how the counterexample itself suggests a plausible diagnosis of why this claim has seemed so plausible to so many.     

Dissecting the expanded cognitive reflection test: an item response theory analysis

This study presents a psychometric evaluation of the Expanded Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT7) based on item response theory. The participants (N?=?1204) completed the CRT7 and provided self-reported information about their cognitive styles through the Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale (PID). A two-parameter logistic model was fitted to the data to obtain the item difficulty and discrimination parameters of the CRT7. The results showed that the items had good discriminatory power (αs?=?.80 ? 2.92), but the range of difficulty was restricted (βs ranged from ?.60 to .32). Moreover, the CRT7 showed a pattern of correlations with the PID which was similar to that of the original CRT. When taken together, these results are evidence of the adequacy of the CRT7 as an expanded tool for measuring cognitive reflection; however, one of the newer items (the pig item) was consistently problematic across analyses, and so it is recommended that in future studies it should be removed from the CRT7.