Habermas in the Lab: A Study of Deliberation in an Experimental Setting

This study outlines a new paradigm for the investigation of the effects of deliberation on political decisions. Specifically, it uses the ultimatum game as a situation in which the opportunity to deliberate and the placement of this opportunity are experimentally manipulated. Structural factors, such as the players' roles and their ability to vote on the proposal being offered, are also manipulated as a basis for comparison. Two outcomes are examined: the games' allocations, and players' perceptions of fairness. After controlling for structural factors, deliberative opportunity creates a more equitable distribution of money and enhances fairness perceptions. However, these results hold only when such an opportunity occurs before the proposal stage. Deliberative opportunity after the proposal stage has no discernible impact. A survey of participants found that their personal characteristics and political predispositions influence perceptions of fairness for proposers, but not for acceptors. These findings demonstrate the potential benefits of deliberation while highlighting the importance of the nature of its implementation in determining its level of success.     

Tragic Dilemmas and the Priority of the Moral

My purpose in this paper is to argue that we are not vulnerableto inescapable wrongdoing occasioned by tragic dilemmas. I directmy argument to those who are most inclined to accept tragicdilemmas: those of broadly Nietzschean inclination who reject``modern moral philosophy' in favor of the ethical ideas of theclassical Greeks. Two important features of their project are todeny the usefulness of the ``moral/nonmoral distinction,' and todeny that what are usually classified as moral reasons always oreven characteristically ``trump' nonmoral reasons in anadmirable agent's deliberations.I show critics of modern moral philosophy such as BernardWilliams that their acceptance of tragic dilemmas underminestheir project of denying the moral/nonmoral distinction and thepriority of moral reasons. The possibility of tragic dilemmasrequires an account of practical deliberation in which moralreasons appear as already in-force obligations, with blame andguilt ready to be invoked, while nonmoral reasons appear as merereasons. This makes moral reasons importantly different fromnonmoral reasons in how they achieve their deliberative weight,and also makes them characteristically weightier. Thus,accommodating tragic dilemmas reinforces the moral/nonmoraldistinction and the priority of moral reasons, the very thingsthese critics want to deny. By accepting the possibility oftragic dilemmas, these critics are undermining their own project.The standard normative theories are dead set against tragicdilemmas, and the critics of modern moral philosophy shouldreject tragic dilemmas for the good of their project. Thus we allshould reject tragic dilemmas.     

The contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe

There is an interesting contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe. Plausibly, if it is permissible to believe something from a perspective with incomplete evidence, it cannot become impermissible to believe it from a second perspective with complete evidence. In contrast, it seems that something permissible to do for an agent in a perspective with limited evidence can become impermissible in a second perspective in which all the relevant evidence is available. What is more, an agent with incomplete evidence may be permitted to do something that she knows would be impermissible if she occupied a perspective of complete evidence. In this paper, I argue that this contrast is explained by a disanalogy between the role played by belief in epistemic deliberation and the role played by action in practical deliberation. Epistemic deliberation may be closed by adopting other attitudes than belief (e.g. accepting some hypothesis as the most likely one), whereas in general, practical deliberation can only be closed by endorsing some course of action. Thus, when there are pressures to close some practical deliberation, agents have to make a decision about what to do even if they lack relevant information. By contrast, lacking relevant evidence, agents may always refrain from forming a belief and close instead their epistemic deliberation by adopting some other attitude.     

Fit between decision mode and processing style predicts subjective value of chosen alternatives

Intuition is associated with a global processing style, whereas deliberation is associated with a local processing style. Drawing on previous research on the effects of decisional fit on the subjective value attached to chosen alternatives, we examined the possibility that a fit between processing style and decision mode results in greater subjective value than a lack of fit. In three experiments employing various combinations of naturally occurring and experimentally manipulated processing styles and decision modes, we found that when congruence was high (i.e., global processing style and intuitive judgment, or local processing style and deliberative judgment), participants judged their chosen item to be more expensive than when congruence was low. These findings indicate that increased fit resulted in higher estimated value. We discuss implications for judgment and decision‐making.     

Moral Deliberation in a Public Lutheran Church

Abstract : Variety and complementarity characterize the views of six Lutheran theologians regarding the place of the church in the public square: Martin Marty, Ronald Thiemann, Robert Benne, Gary Simpson, Cynthia Moe‐Lobeda, and Patrick Kiefert. This article explicates their thought in with respect to the internal and external life of the church. To think of the church as a “community of moral deliberation” in the public square becomes the preferred model for Lutherans in North America.     

Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's Ethics

This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle.     

Public involvement: How to encourage citizen participation

The study was aimed at identifying the impact of a pool of variables on the willingness of the participants in five consultative arenas (Open Space Technology) to become involved in future experiences of civic engagement. The study also intended to verify whether such willingness varied among subgroups of participants. In total, 194 participants (49.5% men, 50.5% women; mean age = 37.04) were recruited during five OSTs held in Italy between May and November 2008 and asked to fill in a questionnaire composed of the following measures: perceived costs and benefits, emotions, sense of community, trust in institutions and need for cognitive closure. Findings suggested that the setting‐related variables—namely the perception of costs and benefits and the arousal of positive feelings—were more influential than the community‐related variables, such as sense of community and trust in institutions. Indications and suggestions for the design, implementation and evaluation of participatory settings were discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dissecting the expanded cognitive reflection test: an item response theory analysis

This study presents a psychometric evaluation of the Expanded Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT7) based on item response theory. The participants (N?=?1204) completed the CRT7 and provided self-reported information about their cognitive styles through the Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale (PID). A two-parameter logistic model was fitted to the data to obtain the item difficulty and discrimination parameters of the CRT7. The results showed that the items had good discriminatory power (αs?=?.80 ? 2.92), but the range of difficulty was restricted (βs ranged from ?.60 to .32). Moreover, the CRT7 showed a pattern of correlations with the PID which was similar to that of the original CRT. When taken together, these results are evidence of the adequacy of the CRT7 as an expanded tool for measuring cognitive reflection; however, one of the newer items (the pig item) was consistently problematic across analyses, and so it is recommended that in future studies it should be removed from the CRT7.     

Constructions of Participatory Democracy Institutions and Same-Sex Union Rights in Online Public Deliberation in Greece

This article aims to explore the argumentative lines employed in an online public deliberation concerned with legislation on same-sex civil union in Greece. Drawing on rhetorical and discursive developments in political social psychology and sexual citizenship debates, the article focuses on arguments regarding the relevance and the implications of public deliberation on the construction of LGBTQI+ claims and rights. The analytic corpus consisted of 1,000 comments, analyzed with the concepts and tools of Rhetorical and Critical Discursive Social Psychology. A recurring line of arguing against the legislation questioned the democratic quality of public deliberation, representing it as a means used to legitimize predetermined decisions. Moreover, overtly discriminatory arguments were predicated on the values of participatory democracy. Accounts in favor of the legislation, though, challenged public deliberation on the grounds that it allows room for the dispute of universal human rights. The potential contribution of these findings to the understanding of the dilemmas of participatory democracy, the reproduction of heteronormativity, and the assimilation of LGBTQI+ claims is discussed.     

Tracing the Boundaries of Motivated Reasoning: How Deliberative Minipublics Can Improve Voter Knowledge

A large body of work shows that reasoning motivated by partisan cues and prior attitudes leads to unreflective decisions and disparities in empirical beliefs across groups. Surprisingly little research, however, has tested the limits of motivated reasoning. We argue that the publicly circulated findings of deliberative minipublics can spark a more reflective motivation in voters when these bodies provide policy-relevant factual information. To test that proposition, we conducted a survey experiment using information generated by one such minipublic during an election. Results showed that exposure to the minipublic's findings improved the accuracy of voters' empirical beliefs regarding a ballot proposition on the regulation of genetically modified seeds. This treatment effect transcended voters' partisan identities and prior environmental attitudes. In some instances, the respondents showing the greatest knowledge gains were those who a directional motivated-reasoning account would have expected to resist the treatment most effectively, owing to party identity or prior attitudes.