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Bradley Armour‐Garb 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):53-57
This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation for opting for such a position. In addition, it provides some reasons for thinking that such a theory of truth is “minimal” or “deflationary” in the way that contemporary truth theorists have claimed it to be. 相似文献
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Jeremy Wyatt 《Ratio》2023,36(3):235-240
Jamin Asay has recently argued that deflationists about the concept of truth cannot satisfactorily account for our alethic desires, i.e., those of our desires that pertain to the truth of our beliefs. In this brief reply, I show how deflationists can draw on well-established psychological findings on framing effects to explain how the concept of truth behaves within the scope of our alethic desires. 相似文献
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Bo Mou 《Metaphilosophy》2000,31(3):262-286
In this paper, I give a metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of deflationism by discussing some basic conceptual and methodological issues involved in the debate between deflationism and substantivism. In so doing, I argue for three positive points. First, the crux of the dispute between deflationism and substantivism is whether or not truth is substantive in its metaphysical nature and in its explanatory role in philosophical enterprises, rather than whether or not a minimal approach regarding conceptual resources is taken to explain truth; a minimal approach itself is philosophically innocent. Second, there is no intrinsic connection between the core idea of deflationism and the Tarski-style equivalence thesis, which is often identified as implying or supporting the former. Third, there are some unbridged fundamental gaps between the core idea of deflationism and various redundancy theses; these redundancy theses cannot be identified as the former, nor can they be used to justify the former on their own. 相似文献
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Dirk Greimann 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2000,31(1):133-155
This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that Horwich's anti-primitivist version of minimalism must be rejected
because, already for formal reasons, the truth-schema does not achieve a positive explication of any property of propositions.
The second goal is to develop a more moderate primitivist version of minimalism according to which the truth-schema is admittedly
powerless to underpin truth with something more basic but it still succeeds in giving a complete account of the necessary
and sufficient conditions for a proposition to be true.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Journal of Philosophical Logic - 相似文献