Elementary Polyhedral Mereotopology

A region-based model of physical space is one in which the primitive spatial entities are regions, rather than points, and in which the primitive spatial relations take regions, rather than points, as their relata. Historically, the most intensively investigated region-based models are those whose primitive relations are topological in character; and the study of the topology of physical space from a region-based perspective has come to be called mereotopology. This paper concentrates on a mereotopological formalism originally introduced by Whitehead, which employs a single primitive binary relation C(x,y) (read: x is in contact with y). Thus, in this formalism, all topological facts supervene on facts about contact. Because of its potential application to theories of qualitative spatial reasoning, Whitehead's primitive has recently been the subject of scrutiny from within the Artificial Intelligence community. Various results regarding the mereotopology of the Euclidean plane have been obtained, settling such issues as expressive power, axiomatization and the existence of alternative models. The contribution of the present paper is to extend some of these results to the mereotopology of three-dimensional Euclidean space. Specifically, we show that, in a first-order setting where variables range over tame subsets of R ³, Whitehead's primitive is maximally expressive for topological relations; and we deduce a corollary constraining the possible region-based models of the space we inhabit.     

Variables for designing cube folding tasks influencing sixth-graders' performance

This study investigated whether the three variables of task form, squares carried, and figural complexity, for designing cube folding tasks, affect sixth graders' cube folding performance. Two task forms were used to develop two versions of “cube folding test.” Each version was designed based on two levels of squares carried and three levels of figural complexity, and contained 18 multiple-choice items. The sample included 107 boys and 92 girls with an average age of 12.04 years who were randomly assigned to complete one of the two versions. A linear mixed model was carried out with three factors: task forms, squares carried, and figural complexity, in which squares carried and figural complexity were “within-subjects” factors, and task form was the “between-subjects” factor. The results showed the interaction effect of squares carried and task form, and the main effect of figural complexity, which differentiated the difficulty in cube folding tasks.     

Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck

Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.     

Effects of Causal Structure on Decisions About Where to Intervene on Causal Systems

We investigated how people design interventions to affect the outcomes of causal systems. We propose that the abstract structural properties of a causal system, in addition to people's content and mechanism knowledge, influence decisions about how to intervene. In Experiment 1, participants preferred to intervene at specific locations (immediate causes, root causes) in a causal chain regardless of which content variables occupied those positions. In Experiment 2, participants were more likely to intervene on root causes versus immediate causes when they were presented with a long‐term goal versus a short‐term goal. These results show that the structural properties of a causal system can guide the design of interventions.     

Major personality traits and regulations of social behavior: Cheaters are not the same as the reckless,and you need to know who you’re dealing with

This research explores the hypothesis that major personality traits are systematically associated with social regulation response tendencies. Specifically, the adaptive function of specific traits from ‘Big-Five’ and HEXACO models were evaluated in terms of how they are understood and utilized in predicting the behaviors of others. Big-Five factors of agreeableness and conscientiousness track tendencies to obey or break social contract and precautionary rules, but not discriminatively nor as predicted. HEXACO traits, however, provided discriminative patterns of associations between personality and response tendencies (within individuals and for third-person associations, cross-culturally) in greater accord with previous work. Honesty–humility is associated with social contract behaviors and conscientiousness is associated with precaution behaviors, consistent with conceptualizations as psychological adaptations for tracking fitness-relevant individual differences.     

Accuracy Motivations,Predispositions, and Social Information in Political Discussion Networks

This analysis studies how variation in individuals' motivation to form accurate judgments affects the process of political discussion. I use a small‐group experiment in which participants compete to elect the simulated candidate who best represents their true preferences. I manipulate economic incentives to control participants' accuracy motivations. The results show that accuracy‐motivated participants, compared to those with weaker accuracy goals, seek discussants with more expertise and a more diverse set of viewpoints, place greater emphasis on socially provided messages, and reduce emphasis on political predispositions. As a result of these differences, however, accuracy‐motivated participants rely more heavily on biased information. Hence, accuracy motivations do not produce more accurate judgments or better decisions. Although previous work on political discussion has largely ignored the role of motivations, these results suggest that accuracy motivations play an important but nuanced role in this process. Strengthened accuracy motivations increase individuals' exposure to political expertise and ideological diversity but also increase their potential to be misled.     

Negativity bias in defeasible reasoning

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning.     

Explaining Away and the Cognitive Science of Religion

In order to evaluate the claim that theistic belief can be explained away by science, four models of the relationship between science and theism are developed and their relevance to explaining away explored. These models are then used to evaluate an argument against theistic belief based on developments in the cognitive science of religion. It is argued that even if the processes that produce theistic belief are unreliable, this is insufficient to show that explaining away takes place. Indeed, given the difficulty of showing that the conditions for explaining away are met, it is very unlikely that such an argument can succeed.