Is this a dax which I see before me? Use of the logical argument disjunctive syllogism supports word-learning in children and adults

Many authors have argued that word-learning constraints help guide a word-learner's hypotheses as to the meaning of a newly heard word. One such class of constraints derives from the observation that word-learners of all ages prefer to map novel labels to novel objects in situations of referential ambiguity. In this paper I use eye-tracking to document the mental computations that support this word-learning strategy. Adults and preschoolers saw images of known and novel objects, and were asked to find the referent of known and novel labels. Experiment 1 shows that adults systematically reject a known distractor (e.g. brush) before mapping a novel label (e.g. "dax") to a novel object. This is consistent with the proposal that participants worked through a Disjunctive Syllogism (i.e. Process-of-Elimination) to motivate the mapping of the novel label to the novel object. Experiment 2 shows that processing is similar for adults performing an implicit Disjunctive Syllogism (e.g. "the winner is the dax") and an explicit Disjunctive Syllogism (e.g. "the winner is not the iron"). Experiment 3 reveals that similar processes govern preschoolers' mapping of novel labels. Taken together, these results suggest that word-learners use Disjunctive Syllogism to motivate the mapping of novel labels to novel objects.     

Reasoning about complex probabilistic concepts in childhood

The competencies of children, particularly their understanding of the more complex probabilistic concepts, have not been thoroughly investigated. In the present study participants were required to choose the more likely of two events, a single event, and a joint event (conjunctive or disjunctive). It was predicted that the operation of the representativeness heuristic would result in erroneous judgements when children compared an unlikely component event with a likely-unlikely conjunction (the conjunction fallacy) and when a likely component event was compared to a likely-unlikely disjunction. The results supported the first prediction with both older children aged between 9 and 10 years and younger children aged between 4 and 5 committing the conjunction fallacy. However, the second prediction was not confirmed. It is proposed that the basis of representativeness judgements may differ between the conjunctive and disjunctive cases with absolute frequency information possibly playing a differential role.     

Rules for Reasoning from Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge

In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.

Changing perspective within and across environments

Perspective change within a single environment is a slow and effortful process. However, little research has addressed perspective change across multiple environments. Using a task-set switching paradigm, subjects judged spatial relationships between target locations from differing perspectives. Response times were longer when successive trials probed different perspectives. However, this cost was greater when perspective was changed within a single environment compared to when it was changed across two environments. This result indicates that the processing of perspective change, and perhaps general spatial reasoning, differs in these two cases. Implications for theories of perspective change and environmental knowledge are discussed.     

On the consistency problem for the calculus

In this paper, we further investigate the consistency problem for the qualitative temporal calculus introduced by Pujari et al. [A.K. Pujari, G.V. Kumari, A. Sattar, INDU: An interval and duration network, in: Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1999, pp. 291–303]. We prove the intractability of the consistency problem for the subset of pre-convex relations, and the tractability of strongly pre-convex relations. Furthermore, we also define another interesting set of relations for which the consistency problem can be decided by the -closure method, a method similar to the usual path-consistency method. Finally, we prove that the -closure method is also complete for the set of atomic relations of implying that the intervals have the same duration.     

E Contrario Reasoning: The Dilemma of the Silent Legislator

Summary This contribution offers an evaluation of e contrario reasoning in which the interpretation of a legal rule is based on the context of the law system (contextual e contrario reasoning). A model is presented which will show all the explicit and implicit elements of the argument at work and will also point out how these distinct parts are interrelated. By questioning the content and justificatory power of these elements, the weak spots in the argument can be laid bare. It will be argued that e contrario reasoning inevitably requires a dubious argumentative step, which renders the argument intrinsically weak. The model is applied to a European lawsuit on French cheese.     

Does Arguing from Coherence Make Sense?

In this paper the argument from coherence is submitted to a critical analysis. First, it is argued to be a complex form of coordinative argumentation, structured on various argumentative levels. Then, using the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation a distinction is brought out between two basic forms of the argument from coherence: in one use this argument occurs as a sequence of two symptomatic arguments; in the other use we have a main symptomatic argument supported by a subordinate pragmatic argument. Finally, from an evaluative point of view it is assessed whether the argument from coherence can be found acceptable as a tool for settling disputes. It is claimed that in general, we can welcome this argumentative structure as sound and fully acceptable provided that we are aware of the interpretative discretion its use implies. A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the symposium organised by the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdamon the 27/02/04. I wish to express my indebtedness to Dora Achourioti, Francesco Belvisi, Frans van Eemeren, Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen, Jean Wagemans, Peter Houtlosser, and Henrike Jansen for their helpful remarks. Needless to say, the responsibility for the views expressed herein as well as for any errors of form or content rests solely with me.     

因果信息和提示指导语对大学生贝叶斯推理的影响

基于三重加工心智模型,以大学生为被试,采用经典贝叶斯推理的文本范式,通过操纵自变量：因果信息（有或无）与提示指导语（提供或不提供）,试图探讨激发反省心智,消解理性障碍的情况下,因果贝叶斯框架的作用机制。估计正确率和准确性的结果都表明因果信息显著提高了贝叶斯推理成绩,准确性的结果也说明指导语可以提示被试放下既有观念,以无偏见的方式进行推理,从而有效促进了贝叶斯推理表现。而在提示条件下增加因果信息并没有促进作用,表明对于较高元认知的被试因果信息作用是有限的。     

Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions. The main focus of theorizing has been why 3-year-olds fail, and only recently have there been any models of how success is achieved in false-belief tasks. Leslie and Polizzi (Inhibitory processing in the false-belief task: Two conjectures. Developmental Science, 1, 247-254, 1998) proposed two competing models of success, which are the focus of the current paper. The models assume that belief-desire reasoning is a process which selects a content for an agent's belief and an action for the agent's desire. In false belief tasks, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) provides plausible candidate belief contents, among which will be a 'true-belief.' A second process reviews these candidates and by default will select the true-belief content for attribution. To succeed in a false-belief task, the default content must be inhibited so that attention shifts to another candidate belief. In traditional false-belief tasks, the protagonist's desire is to approach an object. Here we make use of tasks in which the protagonist has a desire to avoid an object, about which she has a false-belief. Children find such tasks much more difficult than traditional tasks. Our models explain the additional difficulty by assuming that predicting action from an avoidance desire also requires an inhibition. The two processing models differ in the way that belief and desire inhibitory processes combine to achieve successful action prediction. In six experiments we obtain evidence favoring one model, in which parallel inhibitory processes cancel out, over the other model, in which serial inhibitions force attention to a previously inhibited location. These results are discussed in terms of a set of simple proposals for the modus operandi of a domain specific learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is in part modular--the ToMM--and in part penetrable--the Selection Processor (SP). We show how ToMM-SP can account both for competence and for successful and unsuccessful performance on a wide range of belief-desire tasks across the preschool period. Together, ToMM and SP attend to and learn about mental states.