Freedom,determinism and circular reasoning

This paper uses a short dialogue between a determinist and a free-will advocate as a basis for exploring some of the elements of circular reasoning which have for centuries kept alive one of the classical debates of philosophy, the freedom-versus-determinism debate. The chronic circularity which infests both sides of the debate arises from a procedural asymmetry in the argument, which in turn is produced by the different metaphysical commitments of the debaters.     

The computational value of debate in defeasible reasoning

Defeasible reasoning is concerned with the logics of non-deductive argument. As is described in the literature, the study of this type of reasoning is considerably more involved than the study of deductive argument, even so that, in realistic applications, there is often a lack of resources to perform an exhaustive analysis. It follows that, in a theory of defeasible reasoning, the order and direction in which arguments are developed, i.e. theprocedure, is important. The aim of this article is to show that debate is the most efficient procedure to argue in the presence of limited resources. To do so, there is first some general theory on defeasible argumentation, which is followed by an introduction to the problem of dialectical search. The problem of dialectical search is (or at least, should be) the essential issue in every theory on argumentation, and emerges at every occasion that involves adjudication on competing arguments. Starting with an example, it is explained that dialectical search can be best scheduled according to classical debating techniques, that work along well-tried methods. These methods (which include various forms of curtailment, interruption, and interpretation) have proven their value in keeping debating efforts within reasonable bounds. How they apply in a theory of formal argument, will be shown in this article.This research was made possible by SION, and is financed by NWO under contract number 612-316-019. Part of this research has been conducted at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. This article contains fragments of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the author's dissertation. Studies in Defeasible Argumentation (1993).     

Casuistry as methodology in clinical ethics

This essay focuses on how casuistry can become a useful technique of practical reasoning for the clinical ethicist or ethics consultant. Casuistry is defined, its relationship to rhetorical reasoning and its interpretation of cases, by employing three terms that, while they are not employed by the classical rhetoricians and casuists, conform, in a general way, to the features of their work. Those terms are (1) morphology, (2) taxonomy, (3) kinetics. The morphology of a case reveals the invariant structure of the particular case whatever its contingent features, and also the invariant forms of argument relevant to any case of the same sort: these invariant features can be called topics. Taxonomy situates the instant case in a series of similar cases, allowing the similarities and differences between an instant case and a paradigm case to dictate the moral judgment about the instant case. This judgment is based, not merely on application of an ethical theory or principle, but upon the way in which circumstances and maxims appear in the morphology of the case itself and in comparison with other cases. Kinetics is an understanding of the way in which one case imparts a kind of moral movement to other cases, that is, different and sometimes unprecedented circumstances may move certain marginal or exceptional cases to the level of paradigm cases. In conclusion, casuistry is the exercise of prudential or practical reasoning in recognition of the relationship between maxims, circumstances and topics, as well as the relationship of paradigms to analogous cases.     

Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist extraction,truncation, and conversion

In the first section of this paper, we analyze classic framing effects according to principles of fuzzy-trace theory. The key principle of the theory is that reasoning prefers to operate on simple gist, as opposed to exact details. Then, we introduce new data in three experiments designed to test this fuzzy-processing assumption. In the first experiment, framing effects were conserved when numerical information was omitted from standard problems, arguing against a critical role for numerical processing. In the second experiment, evidence is presented that some subjects simplified framing problems by mentally truncating linguistically redundant complements in gambles. Experimentally deleting parts of gambles mimiced such effects, and choices varied depending on the information that remained explicit. In the third experiment, truncation effects were also demonstrated for mixed-frame problems, in which one option is positive and the other is negative. The data disconfirmed a ‘halo’ hypothesis that subjects merely selected the positive option over the negative one. Instead, choices were accounted for by conversion, that is, transforming problems into uniformly positive representations to avoid the complexity of negation. In all three experiments, choices could be explained as a consequence of radically simplifying decision information.     

Rethinking the Fallacy of Hasty Generalization

This paper makes a case for a refined look at the so- called fallacy of hasty generalization by arguing that this expression is an umbrella term for two fallacies already distinguished by Aristotle. One is the fallacy of generalizing in an inappropriate way from a particular instance to a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification. The other is the secundum quid (in a certain respect) fallacy of moving to a conclusion that is supposed to be a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification while overlooking qualifications that have to be added to the more limited kind of generalization expressed in the premise. It is shown that these two fallacies relate to two different kinds of generalization.The classification of fallacious generalizations is based on a new theory of generalization that distinguishes three kinds of generalizations – the universal generalization of the for all x type, used in classical deductive logic, the inductive generalization, based on probability, and the presumptive generalization, which is defeasible, and allows for exceptions to a general rule. The resulting classification goes beyond a logic-oriented analysis by taking into account how a respondent may oppose a potentially fallacious generalizing move by falsifying it. Using a dialectical interpretation of premise-conclusion complexes, the paper outline a richer concept of generalizing argument moves embedded in a communicational reconstruction of the strategic uses of such moves in which two parties take part in an orderly dialectical exchange of viewpoints.     

Social cognition and the human brain

Humans are exceedingly social animals, but the neural underpinnings of social cognition and behavior are not well understood. Studies in humans and other primates have pointed to several structures that play a key role in guiding social behaviors: the amygdala, ventromedial frontal cortices, and right somatosensory-related cortex, among others. These structures appear to mediate between perceptual representations of socially relevant stimuli, such as the sight of conspecifics, and retrieval of knowledge (or elicitation of behaviors) that such stimuli can trigger. Current debates concern the extent to which social cognition draws upon processing specialized for social information, and the relative contributions made to social cognition by innate and acquired knowledge.     

对以类别为基础的归纳推理的几种理论模型的评价

当前关于以类别为基础的归纳推理理论模型大致可以分为两种：强调相似性作用的归纳推理的理论模型和强调知识作用的归纳推理的理论模型。前者能较好的解释人们在知识贫乏领域的归纳推理现象,而后者则能够较好的解释人们在知识丰富领域的归纳推理现象。     

人格特质与认知操作关系的初步研究

本研究采用NEO PI R测试 ,以逻辑推理为认知操作指标 ,初步考察了人格特质与大学生认知操作的关系。结果表明 :①神经质、外倾性与逻辑推理有显著负相关 ,开放性则与之呈正相关 ;②人格特质和认知操作关系的偏相关分析与相关分析的结果基本一致 ;③多元逐步回归分析显示 ,外倾性与逻辑推理有负性预测关系 ,开放性及严谨性则与逻辑推理有正性预测关系 ;④人格特质与认知操作的关系受操作难度、认知任务和兴趣类型等因素制约。