Resting EEG in alpha and beta bands predicts individual differences in attentional blink magnitude

Accuracy for a second target (T2) is reduced when it is presented within 500 ms of a first target (T1) in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) - an attentional blink (AB). There are reliable individual differences in the magnitude of the AB. Recent evidence has shown that the attentional approach that an individual typically adopts during a task or in anticipation of a task, as indicated by various measures, predicts individual differences in the AB deficit. It has yet to be observed whether indices of attentional approach when not engaged in a goal-directed task are also relevant to individual differences in the AB. The current studies investigated individual differences in the AB by examining their relationship with attention at rest using quantitative measures of EEG. Greater levels of alpha at rest were associated with larger AB magnitudes, where greater levels of beta at rest were associated with smaller AB magnitudes. Furthermore, individuals with more beta than alpha demonstrated a smaller AB effect than individuals with more alpha than beta. Our results suggest that greater attentional engagement at rest, when not engaged in a goal-directed task, is associated with smaller AB magnitudes.     

反刍思维的脑功能网络机制

反刍思维是指个体在经历了消极生活事件后不由自主地反复思考该事件的产生原因、经过和结果, 表现出负性自我参照加工、消极情绪性以及持续性的特点。采用脑功能网络分析方法, 研究者发现反刍思维的上述三个特点分别与默认网络内部的异常活动模式、突显网络功能连接的改变以及注意相关网络之间的异常耦合有关。未来研究应进一步明确反刍思维与相关脑网络活动之间的因果关系, 探究反刍思维脑功能网络的结构基础, 同时也应关注反刍思维及其脑网络的老龄化特征, 并致力于探索有效干预反刍思维的神经调控技术。     

On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness

According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does not yet mean that he confronts it with a sound objection.     

Justice and desert-based emotions

A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and offers a conceptual overview of some common emotions of this sort having to do with the fortunes of others and of oneself, respectively. The article does not give a definitive answer to the question of whether those emotions really are virtuous, but aims at enriching our understanding of what kind of virtue they might possibly represent.     

The duplication of love's reasons

If X loves Y does it follow that X has reasons to love a physiologically exact replacement for Y? Can love's reasons be duplicated? One response to the problem is to suggest that X lacks reasons for loving such a duplicate because the reason-conferring properties of Y cannot be fully duplicated. But a concern, played upon by Derek Parfit, is that this response may result from a failure to take account of the psychological pressures of an actual duplication scenario. In the face of the actual loss of a loved one and the subsequent appearance of a duplicate, how could we resist the inclination to love? Drawing upon duplication scenarios from Parfit and from Stanislaw Lem's Solaris, this paper will argue that there could be reasons for X to come to love a duplicate of Y but that these would not be identical with the reasons that X had (and may still have) to love Y. Nor (in the case of an agent with a normal causal history) could they be reasons for a love that violates the requirement that love is a response to a relationship and therefore takes time to emerge.     

Reasons,rational requirements,and the putative pseudo-question “Why be moral?”

In this paper, I challenge a well-known argument for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question.     

Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action

Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational permissibility that Smith wants to capture. Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf.     

Some Remarks on Ultrafilter and Normality Logics

The paper presents the main ideas of Ultrafilter Logic (UL), as introduced by Veloso and others. A new proposal, Normality Logic (NL), is outlined for expanding the expressive power of UL. The system NL appears to offer a simpler solution to the problem of expressive power than the sorting strategy of Carnielli and Veloso. Interpretations of NL are discussed and an important point of contact to Hansson's notion of non-prioritized belief revision is observed. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

IN DEFENCE OF THE AGENT-CENTRED PERSPECTIVE

Abstract: This article explores certain issues that arise at the borderline between conceptual analysis and metaphysics, where answers to questions of a conceptual nature compete with answers to questions of an ontological or metaphysical nature. I focus on the way in which three philosophers, Kant, Collingwood and Davidson, articulate the relationship between the conceptual question “What are actions?” and the metaphysical question “How is agency possible?” I argue that the way in which one handles the relationship between the conceptual and the ontological question has important implications for one's conception of the nature of philosophy, and that thinking hard about what it takes to defend the autonomy of the mental and of the agent‐centred perspective should force us to think about our underlying conception of philosophy and to choose between one that understands it as first science and one that understands it as the under‐labourer of science.