A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons

Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic (David Lewis's system VC), conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a conclusive reason for believing p in Dretske's sense, and if p logically implies q, and if p and q satisfy one additional condition, it follows that r is a conclusive reason for believing q. After introducing this additional condition, I explain its intuitive import and use the condition to shed new light on Dretske's response to scepticism, as well as on his distinction between the so-called ‘lightweight’ and ‘heavyweight’ implications of a piece of perceptual knowledge.     

Experience and Life as Ever‐Present Constraints on Knowledge

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind‐independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others.     

Why Bayesian Psychologists Should Change the Way They Use the Bayes Factor

The discussion following Bem’s (2011 Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 407–425. doi: 10.1037/a0021524[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) psi research highlights that applications of the Bayes factor in psychological research are not without problems. The first problem is the omission to translate subjective prior knowledge into subjective prior distributions. In the words of Savage (1961 Savage, L. J. (1961). The foundations of statistical inference reconsidered. In J. Neyman, (Ed.), Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Volume 1: Contributions to the Theory of Statistics, pp. 575–586. BerkeleyCA: University of California. [Google Scholar]): “they make the Bayesian omelet without breaking the Bayesian egg.” The second problem occurs if the Bayesian egg is not broken: the omission to choose default prior distributions such that the ensuing inferences are well calibrated. The third problem is the adherence to inadequate rules for the interpretation of the size of the Bayes factor. The current paper will elaborate these problems and show how to avoid them using the basic hypotheses and statistical model used in the first experiment described in Bem (2011 Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 407–425. doi: 10.1037/a0021524[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). It will be argued that a thorough investigation of these problems in the context of more encompassing hypotheses and statistical models is called for if Bayesian psychologists want to add a well-founded Bayes factor to the tool kit of psychological researchers.     

Coping,Reasons for Living,and Suicide in Black College Students

The authors examined the roles of reasons for living and coping in protecting against suicidal behaviors among 361 Black college students. Results of a path analysis revealed that reasons for living mediated against suicidal ideation through an inverse effect on depression. Results also indicated that greater use of emotion‐oriented coping may lead to suicidal ideation through increased depression and decreased reasons for living, whereas avoidance‐oriented coping protected against suicide. Implications for these results are further discussed.     

Authority in Relationships

Abstract

Authority consists in having standing to make a claim on another person’s actions. Authority comes in degrees: persons have the authority to make moral demands on each other, but if they participate in close relationships, such as friendships or love relationships, their authority over each other is greater, compared to the authority of strangers to make demands, as participants in personal relationships can demand more from each other than can strangers. This paper discusses the phenomenon of a relationship-dependent greater authority on a conceptual level. It thereby fills a gap in the literature on the proper theory of authority: while being a common part of our moral practice, relationship-dependent authority has mostly been neglected in this context. It is even doubtful whether the most influential contemporary accounts of authority can accommodate it. As will be argued, neither Joseph Raz’s service conception nor Stephen Darwall’s second-personal conception of authority are able to. The triggering-reasons account of authority, as recently developed by David Enoch, is better suited in this regard: according to this conception, relationship-dependent authority stems from special conditional reasons that are implied by relationships and that can be triggered by the authoritative demands of their participants.     

A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account

This paper presents a new objection to the buck-passing account of value. I distinguish the buck-passing account of predicative value from the buck-passing account of attributive value. According to the latter, facts about attributive value reduce to facts about reasons and their weights. But since facts about reasons’ weights are themselves facts about attributive value, this account presupposes what it is supposed to explain. As part of this argument, I also argue against Mark Schroeder's recent account of the weights of reasons, which purports to explain the weights of reasons in terms of further reasons without circularity. I then argue that if we abandon the buck-passing account of attributive value, it would be ad hoc and unjustifiable to continue to endorse the buck-passing account of predicative value. In short, there seems to be little hope for the buck-passing account in either form. The paper ends by sketching a novel alternative theory according to which reasons are analysed in terms of the attributive value of motives. I suggest that a normative reason to ? is something that would be a good motive for ?-ing. At least at first glance, this view has numerous merits and few problems.     

Charting the Attributes of God: The Common Ground of Three Religions according to Ramon Llull (1232–1316)

The Open Letter written by 138 major representatives of Islam to the leaders of the Christian churches, on 13 October 2007, came as something of a surprise. Perhaps more surprisingly, in 1283, the Catalan theologian, Ramon Llull, wrote imaginatively of exactly such a letter in one of his novels, thus demonstrating that the interfaith question is not just a problem of our modern times, which became acute only on September 11. On the contrary, the churches have always been conscious of this interfaith context. Yet methods of tackling the problem have differed widely down the centuries and among Christian traditions. The solution proposed by Ramon Llull and analysed in this article starts from the common acceptance of the attributes of God in all three monotheistic religions. It deserves our attention not only as an interesting historical example but also as a way of avoiding some of our current problems and impasses.     

默认网络的神经机制、功能假设及临床应用

认知神经科学的迅速发展使得研究者对大脑的功能有了深刻的认识。近些年来, 研究者对大脑在进行外在注意任务时产生的负激活有了更多的了解, 默认网络(Default Mode Network)的概念被提出, 并引起了很多神经科学家的关注, 关于默认网络的相关理论也已提出。当前综述对默认网络的研究历史, 概念理论, 个体和种系发展, 及其与疾病的关系以及临床应用等方面进行了概括总结。未来研究可从默认网络的个体发展, 种系差异, 与其他大脑网络(如注意网络, 视觉网络, 执行控制网络)的关系以及与具体疾病的关系等角度入手进行研究, 共同来探讨默认网络的神经机制。