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31.
以中国古代外伤止血技术为例,从医学发展进程的角度,比较东、西方止血技术发展的差异,分析外伤止血方法发展缓慢的原因,据此提出加快发展中医药现代化进程的若干建议. 相似文献
32.
Pekka Väyrynen 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2004,7(1):53-79
This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at
a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I
first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims
won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent
distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot
therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons
by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not
a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify
the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion,
and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’. 相似文献
33.
In this essay we advance the view that analytical epistemology and artificial intelligence are complementary disciplines. Both fields study epistemic relations, but whereas artificial intelligence approaches this subject from the perspective of understanding formal and computational properties of frameworks purporting to model some epistemic relation or other, traditional epistemology approaches the subject from the perspective of understanding the properties of epistemic relations in terms of their conceptual properties. We argue that these two practices should not be conducted in isolation. We illustrate this point by discussing how to represent a class of inference forms found in standard inferential statistics. This class of inference forms is interesting because its members share two properties that are common to epistemic relations, namely defeasibility and paraconsistency. Our modeling of standard inferential statistical arguments exploits results from both logical artificial intelligence and analytical epistemology. We remark how our approach to this modeling problem may be generalized to an interdisciplinary approach to the study of epistemic relations. 相似文献
34.
合理预期和想象未来事件或场景, 有利于个体做出适应性反应, 促进生存与发展。近年来, 研究者对想象未来的认知加工成分和神经机制进行了深入探讨, 提出了想象未来的相关概念和理论。我们首先概述了想象未来实验常用的思维采样范式和词语-线索范式, 接着介绍了想象未来的自我参照加工、心理场景构建等认知加工成分。此外, 特别介绍了想象未来的默认网络模型以及与之相关的其他大尺度脑网络, 并进一步提出了想象未来的脑网络研究框架。未来的研究可从想象未来的动态脑网络、复杂脑网络以及与疾病的关系等角度入手, 深入探究想象未来的神经机制。 相似文献
35.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
相似文献
Christian MillerEmail: |
36.
Simon Robertson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):263-277
A common view of the relation between oughts and reasons is that you ought to do something if and only if that is what you
have most reason to do. One challenge to this comes from what Jonathan Dancy calls ‘enticing reasons.’ Dancy argues that enticing
reasons never contribute to oughts and that it is false that if the only reasons in play are enticing reasons then you ought
to do what you have most reason to do. After explaining how enticing reasons supposedly work and why accepting them may appear
attractive, I firstly show why we are not committed to accepting them into our conceptual framework and then argue that no
reasons work in the way enticing reasons are claimed to. Thus we should reject the category of enticing reasons entirely.
相似文献
Simon RobertsonEmail: |
37.
Frank Zenker 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):227-236
A proposal by Ferguson [2003, Argumentation
17, 335–346] for a fully monotonic argument form allowing for the expression of defeasible generalizations is critically examined and rejected as a general solution. It is argued that (i) his proposal reaches less than the default-logician’s solution allows, e.g., the monotonously derived conclusion is one-sided and itself not defeasible. (ii) when applied to a suitable example, his proposal derives the wrong conclusion. Unsuccessful remedies are discussed. 相似文献
38.
Alfred R. Mele 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(3):283-294
The author argued elsewhere that a necessary condition that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer for moral responsibility is
too strong and that the sufficient conditions they offer are too weak. This article is a critical examination of their reply.
Topics discussed include blameworthiness, irresistible desires, moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and reasons responsiveness. 相似文献
39.
Kalle Grill 《Res Publica》2007,13(4):441-458
The philosophical debate on paternalism is conducted as if the property of being paternalistic should be attributed to actions.
Actions are typically deemed to be paternalistic if they amount to some kind of interference with a person and if the rationale
for the action is the good of the person interfered with. This focus on actions obscures the normative issues involved. In
particular, it makes it hard to provide an analysis of the traditional liberal resistance to paternalism. Given the fact that
actions most often have mixed rationales, it is not clear how we should categorize and evaluate interfering actions for which
only part of the rationale is the good of the person. The preferable solution is to attribute the property of being paternalistic
not to actions, but to compounds of reasons and actions. The framework of action–reasons provides the tools for distinguishing where exactly paternalism lies in the complex web of reasons and actions. 相似文献
40.
To test the hypothesis that pigeons will only code the more salient sample when samples differ markedly in salience, pigeons were trained with samples consisting of a 2-s presentation of food (highly salient sample) and an 8-s presentation of keylight (less salient sample). During retention testing, pigeons tended to respond at longer delays as if an 8-s keylight sample had been presented. This finding is consistent with use of a single-code/default strategy in which only the 2-s food sample was coded and the comparison associated with an 8-s keylight sample was selected by default in the absence of memory for the salient 2-s food sample. Hence, a marked difference in sample salience appears to encourage use of a single-code/default strategy. 相似文献