PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

医科生医德认知度影响因素分析

通过对医务人员和在校医科生的广泛问卷调研,我们发现,医科生还普遍存在着医学伦理学基础知识不牢、过于重视医学专业知识的学习而轻视人文哲学社会科学知识的学习,以及轻视高尚人生观的追求等诸多问题。为此,我们可以采取多种综合性的措施来强化医德教育的有效性,全面提升医学生的医德认知度水平。关键词:医德认知度;医德修养;创新;     

儒家伦理的基德和荣格的道德观

作为中国传统文化之主体的儒家伦理,已经确立了中国传统文化的"基德"或"母德",这是在长达2000多年历史发展中形成的,经过先秦时期的百家争鸣,形成了独树一帜的儒家思想,董仲舒提出"抑黜百家、独尊儒术"的建议,确立了儒家在中国社会的统治地位。经过以后历代的兼收并蓄和对立融合,发展成为儒、道、佛融合一体的宋明理学,近代中国社会对儒家思想的批判性发展,促使人们对儒家伦理思想进行时代的反思。荣格的分析心理学思想为东西方道德观的比较提供了一种独特的研究视角。     

论红色政权区域的道德变化

在红色政权区域,中国共产党开展了以土地革命为基础的经济改革和民主政治建设,通过教育等途径培育了人们新的世界观、人生观,对传统习俗和道德进行了更为深入的荡涤,推进了区域内以全心全意为人民服务为宗旨,以集体主义为核心的新道德的建立,两性伦理方面的自由在理论和操作层面更为广泛。     

Empathy, values, morality and Asperger's syndrome

The aims of this study were, first, to re-address the issue of empathy among people with autism conditions; second, to explore the relationships between empathy and values among autistic populations and controls; and third, to explore the capacity for moral agency among those affected by autism. We compared responses of an Asperger group (N = 41) and a control group (N = 139) to measures of self-reported empathy (Davis's IRI) and value priorities (Schwartz's PVQ). Control group results were largely in line with previous studies, such that empathy subscales of perspective taking and empathic concern showed their strongest positive and negative relations to the Schwartz self-transcendence/self-enhancement dimensions. Results for the Asperger group showed that although on the one hand there were self-reported difficulties in perspective taking and the cognitive recognition of affect, and that on the other hand there were less connections between the empathy and value measures, there was nevertheless a comparable prioritization of moral values. Conclusions suggest that different people may acquire moral values through different mechanisms.     

池田大作的生命论伦理观——以《生命的尊严》为中心

伦理本源于社会生活,伦理的基础应当是人的生命和生活。池田大作立足于人的生命尊严来阐发幸福,倡导共生的道德风气,对生命的意义给予了新的诠释。     

William King’s Influence on Locke’s Second Edition Change of Mind about Human Action and Freedom

ABSTRACT

Locke’s influential discussion of agency in the chapter ‘Of Power’ in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding underwent important changes between the first and second edition. He reconsidered many of his central claims about the mind’s deliberation about actions. Locke’s position in the two editions is not only different but, as he himself points out, sometimes incompatible. This has suggested to some commentators that his change of mind was at least partly due to an external influence. Locke himself gestures towards this conclusion in the new ‘Epistle’ in the second edition Essay. One view is that William Molyneux was a notable influence, while another position is that Ralph Cudworth’s work on free will, either directly or indirectly through the influence of his daughter Damaris Masham, was an important influence. The position I develop in this paper is that the strongest candidate for an important external influence on Locke’s second edition revision is Molyneux’s close associate and friend, Irish philosopher and Archbishop of Dublin, William King. I argue that King’s criticism is a plausible influence on Locke’s reconceptualization of will and desire. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, King’s criticism appears to have been instrumental in Locke’s new emphasis on the agent’s capacity to determine what to value.     

Social norms are enforced by friends: The effect of relationship closeness on bystanders’ tendency to confront perpetrators of uncivil,immoral, and discriminatory behaviors

When witnessing an uncivil, immoral, or discriminatory behavior, bystanders have the opportunity to “speak up” and confront the perpetrator about his/her act. We examined whether the closeness of the relationship between the bystander and the perpetrator affects the bystander's reaction. We asked middle schoolers, high schoolers, and university students (N = 1,386) to indicate how they would react if they were to witness each of 26 uncivil, immoral, or discriminatory behaviors. We experimentally manipulated the relationship to the perpetrator, who was described as a friend, an acquaintance, or a stranger. Results showed that the closer the relationship to the perpetrator the greater the bystander's self-reported likelihood of “speaking up.” The findings speak to the role of close relationships in the perpetuation of social norms. They also suggest ways to curb anti-social behaviors in a variety of school and organizational settings.     

Kant’s deductions of morality and freedom

It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works.