Nietzsche on morality as a “sign language of the affects”

Abstract

This article argues that Nietzsche’s meta-ethics is basically a form of sentimentalism (as opposed to cognitivism), but a form of sentimentalism that includes cognitive components in the sentiments that are involved. The article also ascribes to Nietzsche the more original position that the moral sentiments in question vary dramatically between historical periods, cultures, and even individuals, sometimes indeed to the point of becoming inverted between one case and another. Finally, the article also attributes to Nietzsche a hermeneutic insight into certain problems that this situation causes for the accurate interpretation of other people’s (moral) viewpoints. Along the way, the article in addition argues that Nietzsche’s positions on all these issues were molded not only by such well-known influences as Paul Rée and Hume, but also, and indeed more strongly, by Herder (and Hegel), and it develops some grounds for thinking that the positions in question are highly plausible ones.     

The moral contents of anti‐atheist prejudice (and why atheists should care about it)

Anti‐atheist prejudice is pervasive worldwide. Past research indicates that this is driven by perceptions of atheist immorality, yet such perceptions have not been explored in detail. Using Moral Foundations Theory and samples of U.S. Christians, we investigated whether anti‐atheist prejudice is explained by atheists' perceived adherence to certain foundational moral values more than others. Study 1 participants completed measures of moral value endorsements from the perspective of a typical atheist. Study 2 participants read that either atheists or people in general strongly endorse one of five moral foundations. Anti‐atheist prejudice was consistently explained best by perceived atheist concern for values of caring/compassion rather than fairness/justice, loyalty, deferential respect, or purity/decency. Findings suggest that efforts to reduce anti‐atheist prejudice should emphasize atheists' capacity for kindness and caring.     

Toward a psychoanalytic theory of violence,fundamentalism and terrorism

Abstract

Why would a group of people behave in ways that appear to us as moral nihilism, such as the events of 9/11? One cause is an affective one that underlies all violent behavior, namely, narcissistic injuries severe enough to threaten the survival of the self or of the group with which the self identifies, in the absence of non-violent means of maintaining or restoring individual or collective self-esteem. But there is also a uniquely modern cognitive reason for this uniquely modern form of violence, and of the apocalyptic fundamentalism that legitimizes it: namely, that terrorists see themselves as destroying the nihilism that they perceive as coming from us, that is, from the modern Western scientific mentality that destroys the credibility of the traditional sources of moral, legal and political authority and legitimacy, God and religion. Fundamentalism originated in the United States and has spread throughout the world as a rebellion against modernity. This suggests means of curing it: by facilitating access to modern education, psychological awareness, socio-economic equality and political democracy, to help protect all societies from the affective threats of shame and humiliation, and the cognitive threats of nihilism, anomie and anarchy (and their alternatives, nationalism, dogmatism and theocracy).     

开放监控冥想的特定影响效果

近几年来,开放监控冥想(Open Monitoring Meditation,OM)受到越来越多的关注,许多研究者对它进行了系统研究。与其它冥想,特别是与聚焦注意冥想(Focus Attention Meditation,FA)相比较,OM具有明显的差异。OM似乎对某些认知过程(创造性思维)的影响以及疼痛和焦虑的缓解具有优势,而对注意力的影响结果并不一致。脑电波、功能定位以及脑功能关联性方面的研究结果初步揭示了开放监控冥想过程中的脑神经机制,但是这种冥想对于默认网络的影响效果表现出不一致性。另外,研究中使用的OM训练方法也存在明显的差异性,尤其是注意的起点是否从呼吸开始,以及是否需要保持注意两个方面。这些结果需要今后的研究使用更加标准化的方法进一步明确。     

行为决策中的默认效应

默认效应指的是当存在默认选项时, 人们决策时倾向于保留默认选项而不做出改变的一种现象。这种现象广泛存在于器官捐献政策、退休金储蓄计划和消费决策等领域并在这些领域中有巨大的应用价值。目前, 研究者主要从损失规避、质询理论、暗含的推荐和神经心理机制四个方面解释默认效应的形成机制。默认效应还受到努力成本、默认选项的框架和个人经验等因素影响。未来的研究可以从深入探讨默认效应的产生根源、加强其跨文化研究以及拓展其应用领域这三个方面来展开。     

A Neo-Kantian foundation of Corporate Social Responsibility

‘Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is conceptualized in many ways. We argue that one cannot be indifferent about the issue of its conceptualization. In terms of methodology, our position is that any conceptual discussion must embed CSR in political theory. With regard to substance, we link up with the discussion on whether CSR must be defined on the basis of a tripartite or a quadripartite division of business responsibilities. We share A.B. Carroll’s intuition that a quadripartite division is called for as a basis to define CSR. However, defending the quadripartite division of business responsibilities requires that the distinctions between economic, legal, ethical and discretionary business responsibilities be made intelligible. Carroll’s account is defective in this respect. We argue that contemporary Neo-Kantian political ethics is able to make sense of these distinctions, because of its specific interpretation of liberalism. Interestingly, from a conventional liberal perspective this interpretation of liberalism is atypical, as it extends public morality beyond the domain of the law.

道德与自然:"形上之道"与"形而上学"的本质区别

Both thinkings on Dao in Chinese philosophy and metaphysics in Western philosophy investigate things on a spiritual level that transcends experience, but there are incommensurable differences between them. The objective of “metaphysics” is ontological knowledge about nature from the perspective of epistemological “truth-pursuing”. Western metaphysics is thus a “metaphysics of nature”. Dao in Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, more often manifests itself in “good-pursuing” by means of the internal, experiential pursuit of moral stature and spiritual security. Philosophy of Dao is thus a “metaphysics of ethics”. The cause of this difference can be traced back to the differences between the rational tradition of the West, characterized by the dualism of the subject and the object, and the moral tradition of China, characterized by the integration of man and nature. __________ Translated by Zhang Lin from Lunlixue yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Studies in Ethics), 2007, (4): 62–65     

张君劢“德法合一”论述评

张君劢的“德法合一”是儒家之德与西方之法的合一,在德与法的关系上,二者并不是地位相同的,德法合一是在德的基础上德与法的合一,德比法更根本,“德法相辅而行”更深层的意义是“德主法辅而行”。张君劢“德法合一”论始终未离儒家道德本位,决定了这种结合仍是停留在道德文化层面,而没有落实为政治法律事实,若将“德法合一”论还原为“内圣外王”之道,我们仍可看到传统儒学在当代社会面临的困境。     

THE BROTHERS BONHOEFFER ON SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND THEOLOGY

On one level this is a case study in science, religion, and morality, with special attention to the consequences for morality of science's embeddedness in society. On another level this is the science-and-theology dialogue between the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his brother Karl-Friedrich, a physicist. The influence of Karl-Friedrich and the brothers' exchanges on Dietrich's prison theology receives special attention. Because this study is set in Germany in the 1930s and 40s, and Karl-Friedrich's work intersected Germany's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, the discussion leads to Los Alamos and the Manhattan Project. The attention there is to the interplay of science, religion, and morality at the time the bomb was detonated at the Trinity site.