HOW DID MORALITY EVOLVE?

Abstract. This paper presents and criticizes. Alexander's evolutionary theory of morality (1987). Earlier research, on which Alexander's theory is based, is also reviewed. The propensity to create moral systems evolved because it allowed ancestral humans to limit conflict within cooperating groups and thus form larger groups, which were advantageous because of intense between-group competition. Alexander sees moral codes as contractual, and the primary criticism of his theory is that moral codes are not completely contractual but also coercive. Ways of evaluating Alexander's theory as well as modified versions of it are discussed.     

Consequences of agreement versus disagreement on physical disgust: How do people perceive the cleanliness and morality of someone who expresses inappropriate disgust

We examined how people perceived a person who expressed inappropriate physical disgust—a person who was either under-disgusted by physically disgusting stimuli or over-disgusted by neutral stimuli. Participants formed an impression of a target after receiving information on how s/he rated disgusting (Studies 1, 2) or neutral (Studies 2, 3) pictures, and disgusting or angering scenarios (Study 4). Studies 1, 2 and 4 found that a target person who failed to experience disgust was seen as disgusting, immoral (but only to the extent that s/he was also seen unclean), and not socially desirable. A target who rated neutral stimuli as disgusting was not judged as disgusting but was nevertheless judged as immoral and not socially desirable (Studies 2, 3). Our results show that a target whose judgments of physical disgust deviate from one's own by showing either too much or too little disgust is perceived to be immoral.     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

Neural correlates of a default response in a delayed go/no-go task

Working memory, the ability to temporarily retain task-relevant information across a delay, is frequently investigated using delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) or delayed Go/No-Go tasks (DGNG). In DMTS tasks, sample cues instruct the animal which type of response has to be executed at the end of a delay. Typically, performance decreases with increasing delay duration, indicating that working memory fades across a delay. However, no such performance decrease has been found when the sample cues exist of present vs. absent stimuli, suggesting that pigeons do not rely on working memory, but seem to respond by default in those trials. We trained 3 pigeons in a DGNG task and found a similar default response pattern: The diverging slopes of the retention functions on correct Go and No-Go trials suggested that pigeons by default omitted their response following No-Go stimuli, but actively retained task-relevant information across the delay for successful responses on Go trials. We conducted single-cell recordings in the avian nidopallium caudolaterale, a structure comparable to the mammalian prefrontal cortex. On Go trials, many neurons displayed sustained elevated activity during the delay preceding the response, replicating previous findings and suggesting that task-relevant information was neurally represented and maintained across the delay. However, the same units did not show enhanced delay activity preceding correct response suppressions in No-Go trials. This activation-inactivation pattern presumably constitutes a neural correlate of the default response strategy observed in the DGNG task.     

The immoral gene: Does it really exist?

Over the last years several European patents were opposed for protecting technology violating the morality requirement under Article 53(a) EPC. Attempts have been made by the Appeal Boards of the European Patent Office (EPO), as well as by amendments introduced into the Implementing Regulations of the European Patent Convention (EPC), to address this sensitive patentability requirement more precisely. The most recent hot topic coming up in this context is the patentability of stem cells. It is to be expected that this discussion will still go on in the field of biotechnological inventions for the next several years. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Ethics and patentability in biotechnology

The systems of patent rights in force in Europe today, both at the level of national law and on the regional level, contain general clauses prohibiting the patenting of inventions whose publication and exploitation would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality. Recent years have brought frequent discussion about limiting the possibility of patent protection for biotechnological inventions for ethical reasons. This is undoubtedly a result of the dynamic development in this field in the last several years. Human genome sequencing, the first successful cloning of mammals, and the progress in human stem cell research present humanity with many new questions of an ethical nature. Directive 98/44 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 6, 1998, on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions created a new basis for patent protection in this field of technology. Based on the European experience to now, however, it must be said that patent law is not the right place to legislate the consequences of the morality of an invention. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today’s World

This article argues that there is no sound basis for thinking that we have a general and strong duty to rectify disparities of wealth around the world, apart from the special case where some become wealthy by theft or fraud. The nearest thing we have to a rational morality for all has to be built on the interests of all, and they include substantial freedoms, but not substantial entitlements to others assistance. It is also pointed out that the situation of the worlds poor is not that of victims of disasters, but simply of less-developed technology, which can be repaired by full and free trade relations with others. The true savior of the worlds poor is the businessman, not the missionary. What we do need to do is strike down barriers to commerce, rather than requisition aid.     

我国小学生品德发展关键期研究的述评与展望

关于小学生品德发展关键期的研究是德育心理学研究领域的重要的组成部分之一。本文综述了国内20多年的研究资料,探讨了我国小学生品德发展的关键期、测查工具,阐述了研究中存在的不足,并提出了研究的思路和方向。     

评中国思想家对道德与法律之关系的探索

儒家礼法合一论的真义是对“善法”的追求 ,对“恶法”的否定。因为善法体现了儒家的道德精神 ,反映了一种人道主义的价值取向 ,而恶法则是反人道的。墨家强调“法不仁不可以为法” ,其真实的意思是不道德的法律不是真正的法律 ,与儒家的礼法合一论有相似之处。法家主张“法虽不善犹善于无法” ,从而否定了法律的道德基础和价值根据。今天 ,我们在立法中贯彻道德的法律化取向需要谨慎从事 :一是注意把那些体现时代精神、合乎社会潮流的道德予以法律化 ,不能把落伍于时代的道德法律化 ;二是切忌把过高的道德义务转化为法律义务。必须认识到 ,应该法律化的道德只是“底线道德” ,而高层次的道德是不宜法律化的 ,否则就是强人所难。     

European values in bioethics: why,what, and how to be used?

Are there distinctly European values in bioethics, and if there are, what are they? Some Continental philosophers have argued that the principles of dignity, precaution, and solidarity reflect the European ethos better than the liberal concepts of autonomy, harm, and justice. These principles, so the argument goes, elevate prudence over hedonism, communality over individualism, and moral sense over pragmatism. Contrary to what their proponents often believe, however, dignity, precaution, and solidarity can be interpreted in many ways, and it is not clear which reading would, or should, be favored by popular opinion. It is therefore dangerous to think that any one understanding of "European", or any other, values could be legitimately imposed on those who have different ideas about morality in health care and related fields. Bioethical principles should be employed to promote discussion, not to suppress it.